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ABSTRACT
This thesis consists of three essays that examine empirical questions in corporate
finance and labor markets.
Chapter 1:
In the first essay, I use a matched employer-employee dataset linked with hand-
collected data on M&A activity in Brazil to examine how firms reorganize their labor force
after takeovers. I show that M&As are associated with a significant decline in employment
and total wages of target firms through increased layoffs, limited hiring and occupational
consolidation. Low-skilled labor is particularly affected, while firms experience voluntary
exit of high-skilled labor. Post-takeover average wages decline only for low-skilled workers.
Employees that perform routine occupational tasks experience a higher likelihood of invol-
untary separation in transactions where the acquirer is a foreign firm. Finally, I provide
evidence that occupational overlap is a key channel of increased layoffs: workers in occupa-
tions that overlap with occupations in the acquiring firm exhibit a higher likelihood of being
fired. The relative increase in the demand for high-skilled and non-routine labor and the
heterogeneous impact of M&As on wages leads to an increase in within-firm wage inequality.
Overall, my results are consistent with a neoclassical efficiency-seeking view of M&As.
Chapter 2:
The second essay examines the link among corruption, firm growth and labor reallo-
cation. Corrupt practices in the assignment of government contracts are largely diffused and
can generate misallocation of resources across firms. I study how disclosure of such practices
affects firm growth and labor reallocation. I exploit exogenous variation in the exposure of
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illegally favored firms using random municipality audits by a large anti-corruption govern-
ment program in Brazil. Firms exposed by the auditing program experience a decline in
employment growth relative to their peers. I document that young, less-educated workers
that do not occupy a managerial position have higher probability to leave the exposed firms.
Released workers tend to reallocate to firms not found to be illegally favored. Within-sector
firm size dispersion decreases in audited municipalities with respect to non-audited ones.
My evidence suggests that random auditing programs can reduce labor misallocation across
firms.
Chapter 3:
The third essay investigates the effect of founding-family control on the cost of bank
debt. Specifically, I examine the cost of accessing the syndicated market by using the financial
crisis and the unexpected nature of Lehman Brother’s collapse as a laboratory in order
to tease out the effect of family control. I find the increase in loan spreads around the
Lehman crisis was at least 24 basis points lower for family firms. Furthermore, the gap in
spreads among family and non-family firms becomes wider among firms that had pre-crisis
relationships with lenders with higher exposure to the shock. The evidence is consistent
with family control lowering the cost of accessing debt financing, especially when lenders are
constrained. I further investigate potential channels that drive the effect of family control. I
provide novel evidence that for 17% of the family firms creditors impose explicit restrictions in
private credit agreements that require the founding family to maintain a minimum percentage
of ownership or voting power. Thus, creditors value the presence of the family. Furthermore,
the impact of family control on lowering the cost of bank debt is higher when family CEOs
iii
run the firms and among firms with higher ex-ante agency conflicts.
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Chapter 1
Corporate Takeovers and Labor
Restructuring
1.1 Introduction
Corporate takeovers represent one of the most significant financial transactions among firms.
In 2015 the total value of global M&A transactions amounted to $4.73T. In general, the
rationale of corporate takeovers is to create value either by taking advantage of synergies or
by generating efficiency gains through cost-reduction, consolidation and disinvestment. As
a result, M&As affect the scope of the firms involved in the transaction and are followed
by an extensive restructuring process (Maksimovic, Phillips, and Prabhala (2011)). The
readjustment of firm boundaries in the post-takeover period is a subject that economists
have long been interested in. Indeed, examining the reorganization process of the acquired
assets in the post-takeover period contributes to our understanding of value creation sources
in takeovers and has broader product market implications. Human capital is an important
production factor, a scarce resource and a source of competitive advantage for firms and
thus, the restructuring process is bound to entail decisions related to the labor force of
1
the target firm, or even motivate the takeover (e.g. Dessaint, Golubov, and Volpin (2017);
Ouimet and Zarutskie (2016); Tate and Yang (2016)). In addition, the labor integration and
reorganization process in corporate takeovers is anecdotally a complicated and controversial
issue due to the perceived adverse effects on employment. Yet, the empirical literature has
largely focused on the restructuring process of physical assets of target firms, while human
capital and labor-related considerations that potentially affect the reorganization outcomes
have been relatively unexplored.
In this essay I empirically explore the post-takeover restructuring process of the labor
force in target firms by constructing and analyzing a longitudinal micro-level dataset that
combines manually-collected information on the identify of firms involved in M&A activ-
ity in Brazil and a comprehensive administrative employer-employee linked dataset. The
employer-employee linked dataset consists of the universe of formal employment in Brazil
and provides detailed information on individual employee characteristics and terminations of
labor contracts, that allows me to capture a thorough depiction of the evolution of the labor
force of target firms and characterize the extent and direction of post-takeover outcomes
related to the level and composition of the labor force. Therefore, I am able to mitigate
limitations in previous studies by disentangling the sources of net employment flows and
exploring employee-level heterogeneous effects to document change in the composition of la-
bor. The primary challenge in identifying the impact of M&As is selection bias reflecting the
non-random nature of the distribution of M&A activity across industries and firm character-
istics. However, the comprehensive nature of my dataset allows me to rely on nonlinear and
nonparametric methods with the use of matching estimators and a difference-in-differences
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specification to address the potential selection concern, closely following the methodological
approach of Davis, Haltiwanger, Handley, Jarmin, Lerner, and Miranda (2014). To empir-
ically categorize firms into productivity types for the purposes of the matching estimator,
I follow the methodology of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) (henceforth AKM) and
instrument for productivity by using the distribution of the firm-specific wage premium.
The definition of potential high-productivity firms as high-wage firms is consistent with
numerous recent models of frictional labor markets (e.g., Christensen, Lentz, Mortensen,
Neumann, and Werwatz (2005)), in which higher-productivity firms pay higher wages for
equivalent workers. In addition, to reinforce the M&A-related interpretation of the results,
I augment the empirical analysis by documenting that there are no employment effects on
withdrawn M&As for reasons unrelated to labor considerations.
I begin my firm-level analysis by examining the impact of takeovers on total employment
and total wages in target firms using a two-year window around the timing of the M&A
transaction. Previous literature has struggled to provide convincing evidence on the impact
of M&As on employment for reasons ranging from the use of only sparse employment data
to non-representative samples of corporate control changes and firms (e.g. McGuckin and
Nguyen (2001); Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wright (2002); Li (2013)). My dataset
allows me to overcome this problem. I demonstrate that corporate takeovers in Brazil are
associated with extensive labor restructuring at the target firm. Specifically, I find that
target firms experience a large decline in employment and total wages relative to control
firms in the two-year post-takeover period. The magnitude of my estimates indicate that
target firms experienced on average a decline of 29% in terms of employment and 17% in
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terms of total wages with respect to comparable firms.
In a second step of the analysis, I transition my focus on employment flows to shed
light into the sources of this adjustment. Previous literature has predominantly focused
on changes in total employment. Although net employment results are informative of the
direction of the post-takeover restructuring, a decline in net employment relative to the set
of control firms is likely to reflect an increase in separations and/or a decline in hirings.
Most importantly, an increase in separations is likely to reflect both voluntary and invol-
untary departures, leading to a different interpretation of the post-takeover labor-related
outcomes depending on the type of separation. For example, in case M&As are motivated
by cost reduction and consolidation considerations, layoffs are expected to materialize as
a by-product of the restructuring process. On the other hand, M&As induce uncertainty
for target employees and thus, an increase in voluntary exit of human capital is likely to
lead to a decline in employment even if the motivation of the takeover is unrelated to the
pursuit of efficiency gains. An important advantage of my administrative dataset is that
it contains unique information on the terminations of labor contracts which allows me to
disentangle involuntary from voluntary separations and, thus, document the precise manner
that employment adjustment takes place. Specifically, I present evidence that acquiring firms
predominantly reorganize the labor force in the target firm by significantly increasing lay-
offs and limiting hirings, consistent with the notion that M&As engage in efficiency-seeking
consolidation. In addition, the employment decline reflects a significant increase in the rate
of voluntary exit, reflecting the fact that M&As represent turbulent times for the employees
of target firms. Finally, I supplement my analysis by documenting that reorganization in-
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volves occupational consolidation, as the number of occupations declines in the post-takeover
period. This implies that acquiring firms not only decrease the number of workers within
a specific occupation, but also that there are occupations where layoffs are accompanied
by non-replacement of redundant workers, consistent with firms consolidating or limiting
unrelated occupational tasks.
Having established firm-level patterns in the employment flows of target firms, I turn to
an employee-level analysis to examine post-takeover changes in the demand for human cap-
ital. To the extent that acquiring firms actively reorganize human capital in the process of
resetting their boundaries in the post-takeover period, I should expect M&As to be followed
by heterogeneous effects on different groups of employees leading to changes in the compo-
sition of labor. For this purpose, I exploit cross-sectional variation in worker characteristics
and characterize the post-takeover change in the likelihood of exit and entry for different
groups of employees. To separate demand and supply side factors that affect the decision
to exit the firm, I use the information on the reason for the termination of employment
contracts and disentangle involuntary from voluntary exit. This cross-sectional analysis ex-
tends our understanding of the post-takeover readjustment process by providing evidence on
within-firm across-employees changes in the demand for human capital.
The selection of the employee-level variation that I explore is motivated by theoretical
predictions about the effects of M&As on firms. Specifically, I focus on the following hu-
man capital dimensions that are relevant to the reorganization decision of the acquiring
firm: level of skill defining as high-skilled the employees that have completed at least under-
graduate education, employees in managerial positions, occupational routine task intensity,
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and level of human capital overlap. The neoclassical merger theory is based on the view
that M&As are an efficient response to regime shifts (e.g. due to technological shocks) by
value-maximizing managers (e.g. Gort (1969); Mitchell and Mulherin (1996); Jovanovic,
Rousseau, et al. (2001)). Therefore, takeovers potentially lead to technological change and
adoption of automation, and to the extent that capital and high-skilled labor are comple-
ments, these theories would predict that M&As should generate an increase in the demand
for high-skilled and non-routine labor. In addition, synergy gains have long been consid-
ered as an important driver of M&As (e.g. Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001); Devos,
Kadapakkam, and Krishnamurthy (2008)). An important channel though which synergies
materialize is the existence of asset complementarities between the target and the acquiring
firm (e.g. Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008)). Therefore, these theories would predict an
increase in the likelihood of involuntary separation for workers in occupations that overlap
between the acquiring and the target firm.
Given the importance of high-skilled employees for firm productivity and value cre-
ation (Abowd, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, Lane, Lengermann, McCue, McKinney, and Sandusky
(2005)), I document that acquiring firms attempt to retain the target’s high-skilled employ-
ees, as there is no change in the post-takeover likelihood of involuntary separation. However,
given the highly liquid market for high-skilled employees and the job uncertainty associated
with M&As, high-skilled employees exhibit a 15% increase in the likelihood of voluntary exit
in the post-takeover period. On the contrary, given the abundance of low-skilled labor in
Brazil, I find that low-skilled workers are particularly affected in the post-merger reorgani-
zation by experiencing a 35% increase in the likelihood of involuntary separation. Moreover,
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there is a significant decline of 18% in the likelihood of hiring low-skilled employees, while
there is no impact on the likelihood of hiring high-skilled employees. These results imply
that the firm-level post-merger increase in layoffs and decrease in the hiring rate, docu-
mented previously, hit low-skilled workers disproportionally, while the increase in the rate of
voluntary exit corresponds to high-skilled human capital. Next, I examine the reorganization
decisions of acquiring firms regarding employees in managerial positions. I find that, unlike
the rest of the high-skilled employees, managers experience an increase in the post-takeover
likelihood of involuntary separation, while there is no change in the likelihood of voluntary
exit. This finding is in line with the Jensen and Ruback (1983) view that takeovers induce
competition for the right to manage resources and achieve efficiency by replacing managers
in target firms.
M&As are likely to reduce frictions associated with technology adoption and increase
automation for reasons ranging from inducing a more efficient use of capital (Jovanovic,
Rousseau, et al. (2001)) to alleviating financial constraints (e.g. Erel, Jang, and Weisbach
(2015)). Consistent with technological change and capital upgrade, I have shown that there
is an increase in the relative demand for high-skilled human capital. To further test this
hypothesis, I focus on cross-border M&As. Over 90% of cross-border M&A activity in Brazil
comes from developed countries, which implies that there is an increased potential for skill
and technology upgrade as a response to increased exposure to trade (Verhoogen (2008);
Bustos (2011)) and adoption of modern management practices (Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan,
McKenzie, and Roberts (2013)). Indeed, the results indicate that post-takeover restructuring
in cross-border M&As is indicative of routine-biased change with employees that perform
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routine tasks experiencing a 25% increase in the likelihood of involuntary separation. On
the contrary, in domestic M&As there is a similar increase in the likelihood of involuntary
separation for both routine and non-routine employees, implying that automation is not a
driver of the post-merger reorganization process.
Finally, I exploit information on the occupational profiles of acquiring and target firms to
construct a binary variable that takes the value of 1 for occupations that are present in both
firms involved and 0 otherwise. I document that the likelihood of involuntary separation
increases by 1.8% in the post-takeover period for employees in occupations that overlap
between the acquirer and the target. Thus, the labor reorganization process is motivated by
an attempt to eliminate employees in overlapping occupations consistent with consolidation
and cost-reduction being one of the primary drivers of takeovers.
The employee-level results indicate that takeovers lead to an increase in the relative
demand for high-skilled and non-routine labor in the post-takeover period. Turning to firm-
level analysis, I examine whether these post-takeover changes in the demand for different
groups of employees reflect firm-level compositional changes. I find that this is indeed the
case; target firms exhibit a 7% increase in the share of high-skilled labor and a 7.6% decline
in the share of routine labor. To provide additional evidence of technological change, I
document that target firms increase the share of employees in occupations related to R&D
by 1.2%. These compositional changes are suggestive of skill-biased and routine-biased
change and thus, are expected to differentially affect the average wages of high-skilled and
low-skilled employees and contribute to an increase in within-firm wage inequality. Indeed, I
find that corporate takeovers are associated with a 14.6% decline in the average wage for low-
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skilled workers and a 4.9% increase in the average wage for high-skilled workers. Moreover, I
document an increase in within-firm wage dispersion by 6.8% and the widening of the 90-10
wage gap by 13.3% in the post-takeover period, reflecting an increase in within-firm wage
inequality. Finally, I demonstrate that M&As with a higher potential for labor restructuring
lead to larger employment adjustments.
My essay contributes to the M&As literature that examines the post-takeover restructur-
ing process. Focusing on physical assets, Maksimovic, Phillips, and Prabhala (2011) examine
the magnitude and direction of restructuring in the 3-year post-merger period in manufac-
turing sectors using data from the Census LRD, and document that the restructuring process
involves 46% of target plants with 26% of the plants sold and 19% closed supporting the
notion that reorganization occurs in a manner that reinforces resource complementarity and
exploits the comparative advantages of the acquiring firm. Kaplan and Weisbach (1992)
examine long-term divestitures to document that 44% of their sample of mergers that take
place between 1971 and 1982 had been wholly divested by 1989. Unlike the previous studies
that focus on physical assets, my essay explores the post-takeover restructuring process of
human capital.
My essay contributes to the existing finance literature that links finance with labor market
(e.g. Agrawal and Matsa (2013), Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2014), Tate and Yang (2015),
Graham, Kim, Li, and Qiu (2016), Baghai, Silva, Thell, and Vig (2016)) and specifically,
the set of papers that examine the role of human capital and labor in corporate takeovers.
Dessaint, Golubov, and Volpin (2017) and John, Knyazeva, and Knyazeva (2015) exploit
variation induced by changes in labor regulations to provide evidence consistent with labor
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restructuring being a significant driver of M&As and synergy gains. Ouimet and Zarutskie
(2016) demonstrate that the acquisition of valuable human capital is a significant motivation
for corporate takeovers. Tate and Yang (2016) provide evidence that inter-industry mobility
explains diversifying acquisitions, while Lee, Mauer, and Xu (2017) show that human capital
complementarity is an important determinant of M&As. Li (2013) adds to the literature by
demonstrating that capital expenditures, wages per employee, and employment in public
target firms experience a decline in the 3-year period following the acquisition without a
decline in the output. Ma, Ouimet, and Simintzi (2017) document the role of M&A activity
as a catalyst for shifts in the occupational composition of industries and increase in wage
inequality. In the private equity literature, Davis, Haltiwanger, Handley, Jarmin, Lerner, and
Miranda (2014) document increased productivity and modest employment losses following a
private equity buyout, while Olsson and T̊ag (2017) focus on leveraged buyouts in Sweden
to provide evidence of job polarization. Agrawal and Tambe (2016) document that private
equity-induced investment in IT is beneficial for the career paths of employees of firms
targeted by private equity.
My essay complements this literature on three distinct dimensions. First, I offer the first
micro-level longitudinal analysis on the post-takeover labor restructuring process, an issue
that has long concerned economists. Notice that I abstain from arguing that takeovers are
exclusively motivated by labor restructuring purposes. Rather, I characterize the extent and
direction of post-takeover labor-related outcomes of the average firm targeted at a takeover
and highlight the role of M&As on exploiting labor-related inefficiencies. Pinning down the
sources of changes in net employment has been challenging due to either the use of sparse data
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or the lack of detailed information on labor flows. My employer-employee dataset mitigates
data limitations by tracking individuals over time and including information on the labor
contracts terminations and the employment decisions of firms. Second, the disaggregate view
of the labor force at the employee level allows me to document changes in the composition
of labor and test predictions of merger theories. Thus, I am able to identify potential
mechanisms that drive the post-takeover labor restructuring process. Third, consistent with
evidence on the relationship between within-firm wage inequality and firm size (e.g. Mueller,
Ouimet, and Simintzi (2017)) and in line with evidence on wage polarization (e.g. Autor and
Dorn (2013)), I document within-firm evidence of increase in wage inequality after takeovers.
The closest study is the paper by Ma, Ouimet, and Simintzi (2017) that uses establishment-
level data from the Occupational Employment Survey (OES) in U.S. to explore the impact
of horizontal M&As on occupational employment and wages and subsequently, link the find-
ings with within-industry occupational shifts that reflect skill- and routine-biased change.
My essay complements and adds to these findings by exploiting the disaggregate view of
my dataset at the firm and employee level which allows me to examine employment flows
(entry and exit of the labor force) and directly document changes in the labor demand in the
post-takeover period. Additionally, in my setting, I am able to track firms and employees
over time at an annual basis which allows me to capture and analyze the dynamics of com-
positional changes in the labor force around the M&A event. Finally, I am able to precisely
measure wage effects by exploiting individual-level information on wage changes and pin
down the underlying channels by examining the entry and exit of employees.
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1.1.1 M&A Market in Brazil
Brazil is currently the 9th largest economy in the world and is expected to experience sig-
nificant growth with a forecast to be the 5th largest economy in 2050. In the early 2000s
- following the successful implementation of the “Plano Real” in the mid 1990s along with
privatizations of state-owned monopolies and amidst a surge in commodity prices - Brazil
transitioned into a stable platform for economic growth by implementing sound fiscal policies
that effected a downward trend in inflation, an accumulation of foreign reserves, a reduction
in public debt, and a modernization of the credit and capital markets. As a result, Brazil
was part of the high-growth BRIC countries in 2002, that, at the time, were collectively
accounting for about 16% of the world’s GDP growth. Since then, BRIC economies’ con-
tribution to global growth has increased to 45%. In 2006 Brazil’s GDP outpaced inflation
for the first time in 50 years and in 2008 Brazil became a net external creditor. In 2010
the nation was rated investment grade, for the first time, by all three main rating agencies.
Thus, as a result of the fiscal, capital and credit structural reforms, Brazil has been the
subject of intense M&A activity since the early 2000s.
Figure 1.1 reports the number of announced and completed M&A transactions that
involve a Brazilian firm as a target, demonstrating the significant growth in the M&A market
in the period from 2002 to 2014.
Except for certain regulated sectors (including telecommunications, aviation and energy)
that prior authorization by the sector-specific regulatory body is required, there is no need
for regulatory approvals to carry out an acquisition, unless the transaction triggers legal
thresholds, and in which case the M&A transactions is generally subject to approval by the
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Antitrust Authority (CADE). According to Brazil’s Constitution, sectors that foreign capital
is either prohibited or permitted with certain restrictions are the following:
• Health Services: Brazil’s Constitution prohibits the direct or indirect participation
of foreign companies or foreign capital in healthcare, except in cases provided for by
law (Federal Constitution, Article 199, Paragraph 3). However, Federal Law 13,097,
of January 19 2015, has allowed participation, directly or indirectly, of foreign capital
in certain fields of healthcare.
• Media: Foreign ownership of open-broadcast (non-cable) media and print media out-
lets is limited to 30% (Federal Constitution, Article 222, First Paragraph), and 49%
in cable companies with the additional restriction that the foreign owner have had a
presence in Brazil for the previous ten years and the headquarters are located in Brazil.
• Aviation: At least 80% of the voting capital of airlines with concessions for domestic
flight routes must be held by Brazilian residents, with foreign investment therefore
limited to a maximum of 20% of said voting capital (Law 7,565 of November 19, 1986,
Article 181, item II).
The predominant process for a foreign investor to expand activities in Brazil is the direct
acquisition of an existing Brazilian entity, commonly using a preexisting Brazilian holding
company as the acquisition vehicle, which receives direct investment from the foreign entity
and is used as the vehicle for acquisition, and if necessary, for arranging funding. Upon
acquisition, the acquirer is exposed to labor succession, as - according to the doctrine of the
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Brazilian Labor Code (CLT) and the practice of labor courts - the successor company is
liable for the existing labor contracts.
1.1.2 Labor Regulation in Brazil
Brazil is considered to be one of the countries with the tightest labor regulations and highest
employment protection worldwide (Botero, Djankov, Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer
(2004)). Nevertheless, firing costs are not high in practice and there are no restrictions in
labor contract terminations without just cause. These are important in my essay, imply-
ing that M&As are associated with relatively low labor adjustment costs in an attempt to
reorganize the human capital resources of the target firm.
The majority of the employee rights in formal employment relationships is compiled
in what is known as the Brazilian Labor Code, or the CLT (“Consolidação das Leis do
Trabalho”), which provides a minimum standard for employment conditions. The CLT
establishes the regulations that provide for the primary labor rights granted to employees
in Brazil, including legal limits of regular working hours, minimum wages, benefits, and
workplace safety standards. The overwhelming majority of the labor contracts in the private
sector are open-ended contracts under CLT, requiring compliance with legal termination
procedures and severance compensation for employees dismissed without just cause. In
addition, under CLT, employers are subject to contributions to the Social Security System
(INSS), to an amount ranging from 20% to 31.8% of the payroll, and the Unemployment
Savings Fund (FGTS), to an amount equivalent to 8.0% of the employee’s monthly earnings
deposited in a blocked account at the Federal Savings Bank (“Caixa Econômica Federal”).
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The employee is entitled to withdraw deposits from the FGTS account in any case of contract
termination.
Generally there are no restrictions in labor contract terminations without just cause;
however there is a legal process that has to be followed. Specifically, the employer has to
provide a notification 30 days prior to the dismissal (“Aviso Prévio”). Nevertheless, the
norm adopted in the labor market is a practice called “Aviso Indenizado”, meaning that
the employer is willing to pay the employee an extra 30 days of work without the employee
working or being present on the premises so as to prevent problems from arising in the
company by the employee being aware of his/her dismissal. Furthermore, the employer is
subject to a fine of 50% of the total amount deposited into the employee’s FGTS account
during the period of employment. Of the 50% penalty, 40% goes to the employee and 10%
to the government.
Therefore, for the median target firm in my sample that engages in 30 firings in the
post-takeover period and with the median fired worker having a tenure of 11 months and an
average monthly salary of R$967, the total costs of terminations without just cause in the
two-year period following the M&A are equal to about R$14,500, thus reinforcing the notion
of low effective firing costs observed in practice.
1.2 Methods
1.2.1 Data
This essay uses multiple data sources to create my sample. First, I use Thomson’s SDC as the
primary source of information on M&As. Second, I use matched employer-employee records
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that consist of nearly the universe of formal employment in Brazil from the Relação Anual
de Informações Sociais (RAIS). Third, I utilize data on routine intensity of occupational
categories from Autor and Dorn (2013).
1.2.1.1 M&A Data
Information on M&A transactions that occurred in the period from 2004 to 2012 and involve
a Brazilian firm as target is obtained from Thomson’s SDC. SDC includes information on
both the announcement and the effective date of the transaction. I focus on both private
and public targets, and consider only the transactions that were completed and involved the
acquisition of a majority stake. Firms in Brazil are identified by a Tax Identifier and thus,
I use the names of the acquiring and target firms to manually extract the Tax Identifier
attached to the firm. The matching process involved manually scrutinizing information on
the M&A transactions either provided by firms associated with the deal in the form of
public announcements, or published in local government newspapers. For M&As where the
approval of the Antitrust Authority (CADE) was necessary, the CADE reports were used to
identify the firms associated with the transaction. I exclude M&As where the target appears
to have zero employment at the time of the transaction. My sample includes 2,058 M&A
transactions involving 2,264 target firms.
Figure 1.2 provides information on the number of M&As per year, demonstrating that
there is a decline in M&A activity during the financial crisis.
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1.2.1.2 RAIS Data
Information on linked employer-employee relationships is obtained from RAIS that is col-
lected by the Brazilian Ministry of Labor (Ministério de Trabalho e Emprego - MTE) since
1976. RAIS is a longitudinal comprehensive administrative dataset that is compiled at an
annual basis from information collected directly by formally-registered, public or private
firms, and includes labor contracts that were active for at least part of the previous calendar
year. The aim of the RAIS dataset is to administer and monitor access to unemployment
insurance and payment of benefits to eligible employees, and, therefore, firms have strong
incentives to provide comprehensive and accurate information in MTE. In addition, control
mechanisms are in place to ensure mandatory compliance to the requirements of RAIS. Based
on estimates of the Ministry of Labor, RAIS includes over 95% percent of formally-employed
individuals in Brazil.
The unit of observation in RAIS is a job entry that is identified by an employee-level
identifier (PIS) and a plant-level identifier (CNPJ) that enable me to track individuals over
time and across firms. The firm-level identifier is extracted in a systematic manner by
the plant-level identifier and is used to merge RAIS with the information collected from
Thomson’s SDC on the targets’ and acquirers’ firm identifiers. In addition, RAIS includes
information regarding start and ending dates of employment, occupation type, wage level,
and demographic characteristics. The ending date is available in a given year if the employee
was separated from the job in the specific year. The occupation type is coded according to the
Classificação Brasileira de Ocupaçc̃oes (CBO). RAIS contains a CBO code based on the 1994
classification and one based on the 2002 classification. Following the approach developed
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by Muendler, Poole, Ramey, and Wajnberg (2004), the 1994 CBO codes are mapped to the
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO).
At the plant-level, RAIS contains information on the geographical location of the plant,
and the sector that the specific plant operates. At the individual-level, available demographic
characteristics include gender, age, and education level. Although the data are collected on
an annual basis, the structure allows me to retrospectively analyze at a monthly frequency
utilizing the information on starting and ending month of the employer-employee relation-
ship. I restrict my sample to the years from 2002 to 2014 so that employee-level information
of at least 2 years before and after the M&A transaction is included.
The cases that an individual is reported multiple times in a specific year and the action
that I have followed are presented below:
• The individual is concurrently employed at multiple firms. Following Muendler and
Rauch (2011), the job entry with the earliest hiring date and the highest wage is
selected.
• The employment contract of an individual with a firm is terminated in a given year
and the individual is later hired by a firm. The job entry that responds to employment
at the month of interest is used for the specific year.
• The individual is transferred in a different plant of the firm. As my analysis is at the
firm-level and to preserve the succession nature of internal transfers, the latest job
entry of the specific year is used.
18
• The individual performs multiple occupation types in a specific firm throughout the
year. Following Muendler and Rauch (2011), the job entry with the earliest hiring date
and the highest wage is selected.
I restrict my sample to workers with an age ranging from 16 to 55 so as to mitigate
concerns regarding any potential impact of early retirement on entry and exit of workers in
the data.1
1.2.1.3 Routine Task Intensity Data
Information on the level of routine intensity of a specific occupational category is provided
by Autor and Dorn (2013). Autor and Dorn (2013) create an index that measures the
occupational routine task intensity (RTI) based on the types of tasks (abstract, manual,
routine) performed in a given occupational category. I take advantage of the crosswalk path
provided by Autor and Dorn (2013) that assigns RTI scores to Census Occupational Codes
(OCC1990DD), to perform a mapping of the CBO codes found in RAIS with RTI scores.
I consider an individual to perform a routine occupation if the RTI score is positive and a
non-routine occupation if the RTI score is negative. Alternatively, an occupation is defined
to be routine-task intensive if the occupation is in the top employment-weighted third of
routine-task intensity in a given year. The results are unchanged regardless of the definition
of routine workers (the correlation of the routine variables is 0.89).
1I use the same age restriction as Bustos, Caprettini, and Ponticelli (2016a).
19
1.2.1.4 Final Sample
My sample represents the intersection between Thomson’s SDC and RAIS including in total
2,058 M&A transactions involving 2,264 target firms. Figure 1.3 compares the share of
target firms by size category at the time of the transaction with the correspondent share
of the population of firms present in my data and not involved in M&A activity (around 5
million). I use the categorization used by the Brazilian National Statistical Institute (IBGE),
which is based on number of employees to sort firms in four size categories. The IBGE defines
as Micro firms that have between 1 and 9 employees, Small that have between 10 and 49
employees Medium that have between 50 and 99 employees, and Large firms with 100 or more
employees. As shown, target firms are on average larger. In particular, around 95% of target
firms have at least 10 employees compared to only 16.5% in the population. Furthermore,
Panel A of Table 1.1 demonstrates that target firms are not representative of the population
of firms in terms of employment-related characteristics.
In Panel B of Table 1.1 I provide information on firm-level employment-related variables
for target and acquiring firms at the time of the transaction. Relative to target firms, acquir-
ing firms are on average three times larger in terms of total employment and have a higher
share of high-skilled and non-routine human capital at the time of the M&A transaction.
Panel C of Table 1.1 provides information on the deal characteristics. Notice that only
4% of the firms targeted at an M&A transaction in Brazil are publicly listed, while 40%
of the M&A activity is cross-border demonstrating the increased interest in the Brazilian
economy from foreign investors.
In terms of the sector targeted at M&A activity, Table 1.2 provides information on the
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sectors affected by the merger activity in Brazil. I base my sector information on the 2-
digit CNAE classification found in RAIS. M&A activity in Brazil has been largely driven by
the commodity boom and followed domestic consumption patterns being concentrated on
activities related to Business Services, IT and the Food and Beverage Manufacturing.
1.2.2 Empirical Methodology
For the purposes of my empirical analysis, I follow previous studies in the M&A literature
that have used micro data at the plant level (e.g. Maksimovic, Phillips, and Prabhala
(2011); Li (2013); Davis, Haltiwanger, Handley, Jarmin, Lerner, and Miranda (2014)) and
hypothesize that M&As represent a shock to the target firm. Thus, I use the target firm
as the unit of analysis. I employ a difference-in-differences approach around the timing of
the M&A transaction to examine the impact of M&A activity on labor-related outcomes of
target firms. I focus on a four-year window around the timing of the M&A transaction. In
selecting the timing of the M&A, I use the effective date that the M&A transaction occurred
provided by Thomson’s SDC. However, the assignment of firms as targets of M&A activity is
not random. Therefore, the primary econometric concern is selection bias reflecting the non-
random nature of the distribution of M&A activity across industries and firm characteristics.
Indeed, target firms in my sample are disproportionally larger than the average firm and are
concentrated in specific industries. In order to address the potential selection issue, I allow
for nonlinear and nonparametric methods with the use of matching estimators. The rationale
of a matching estimator approach is to achieve optimal matching of treated firms with control
firms based on multiple observable characteristics so as to restrict the set of counterfactuals
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to the matched controls, or in other words, identify a set of control firms that are expected to
follow a similar path to the treatment group in the absence of treatment. A plausibly causal
interpretation of the estimated treatment effect is based on the parallel trend assumption.
The parallel trend assumption requires that the treated and control groups would have
followed parallel trends in the absence of treatment. As the counterfactual outcomes are
unobservable, I assess the plausibility of the assumption by comparing pre-trends of my
variables. In my empirical analysis, I present results from a dynamic difference-in-differences
specification that shows that treated and control firms follow parallel paths in the pre-
takeover period. To reinforce the M&A-related interpretation of the results, I augment the
empirical analysis by documenting that there are no employment effects on withdrawn M&As
for reasons unrelated to labor considerations.
To construct the set of counterfactual firms, I closely follow Davis, Haltiwanger, Handley,
Jarmin, Lerner, and Miranda (2014) and take advantage of the large number of firms in
RAIS so as to control for a set of interactions among size, industry, business type, multi-
establishment status, productivity and year of the transaction. Specifically, target firms
are sorted into cells defined by the cross-product of the aforementioned characteristics at
the time of the transaction and matched with a set of control firms that fall into the same
cell and have never been involved in M&A activity either as a target or as an acquirer. In
order to end up with a manageable sample for my employee-level specifications, I restrict
the number of control firms to be at most 20 firms by ranking the set of potential control
firms based on the absolute difference of total employment between the control and the
treated firm and selecting at most the first 20 firms. To empirically categorize firms into
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productivity types, I apply the methodology of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) and
instrument for productivity by using the distribution of the firm-specific wage premium.
The definition of potential high-productivity firms as high-wage firms is consistent with
numerous recent models of frictional labor markets (e.g., Christensen, Lentz, Mortensen,
Neumann, and Werwatz (2005)), in which higher-productivity firms pay higher wages for
equivalent workers.
My empirical work aims to characterize the extent and direction of post-takeover reorga-
nization of human capital to document the decisions that acquiring firms make in readjusting
the boundaries of the firm. I begin my empirical analysis by examining the impact of M&As
on total employment and total wage bill of target firms to demonstrate the extent of post-
takeover restructuring. I continue by exploring the sources of this adjustment in employment.
To this end, I focus on the rates of firing, hiring, and voluntary separations, and the number
of occupations. In a third step, I investigate how this adjustment affects different groups of
workers using worker-level data. The outcomes of interest in the worker-level analysis involve
binary variables that take the value of 1 in case there is a specific type of separation from the
firm. I define a worker’s separation as a quit (voluntary) or a layoff (involuntary) from the
last formal employment in the calendar year. When I infer separations, I exclude transfers
across plants within the same firm, as well as retirements and reported deaths on the job.
The disaggregate nature of the separation variable is particularly useful as it allows me to
disentangle involuntary from voluntary separations. Furthermore, in transactions where the
information on the acquiring firm is available, I consider employees of the target firms that
transfer to the acquirer as an internal transfer. Finally, I return to the firm-level analysis to
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examine whether changes in the demand for different employee groups induced by takeovers
lead to firm-level changes in the composition of labor, average wages and measures capturing
the level of within-firm wage inequality. In addition, I test whether different M&A types
lead to a more rigorous labor restructuring process.
1.2.2.1 Estimation of the AKM Wage Model and Productivity Measure
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) provide a methodology to quantify the relative impor-
tance of worker versus firm components in determining wages. Using longitudinal matched
employer-employee datasets, AKM estimates a wage regression that decomposes log-wages in
a person and a firm fixed effect. Formally, following Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999),
I specify a loglinear statistical model of wages as follows:
wiJ(i,t) = θi +X
′
itβ + ψJ(i,t) + µt + εit, (1.1)
where J(i, t) is the firm for which person i works at time t. The person fixed effect, θi,
captures the contribution of unobservable time-invariant individual characteristics on wages.
X
′
itβ captures the effect of person-specific time-varying factors. I include age, education and
gender. The term ψJ(i,t) captures the effect of unobservable time-invariant firm characteris-
tics on wages of all employees of firm j (all i with J(i, t) = j). Finally, εit is the error term.
The AKM model assumes that the assignment of employees to firms is uncorrelated with
the error term. To identify the person and firm fixed effects, the AKM specification requires
the presence of employees that switch firms in matched employer-employee datasets. In the
absence of movers, separating the effect of individual from firm effects would be improba-
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ble. Yet the presence of movers does not guarantee identification of all fixed effects. AKM
provides an algorithm that exploits mobility to construct sets of firms and employees whose
fixed effects are identifiable (the “connected set”). In typical matched employer-employee
datasets, the largest group comprises consists of over 95% of the observations. Thus, re-
stricting attention to the largest group of the sample is not a significant limitation.
I use the distribution of the firm-specific fixed effect extracted from the AKM method-
ology to instrument for productivity of firms. The definition of potential high-productivity
firms as high-wage firms is consistent with numerous recent models of frictional labor mar-
kets (e.g., Christensen, Lentz, Mortensen, Neumann, and Werwatz (2005)), in which higher-
productivity firms pay higher wages for equivalent workers, and has been extensively used in
empirical studies (e.g. Serafinelli (2017)). Notice that the productivity measure that I use is
time-invariant and thus, I cannot track changes in productivity in the post-takeover period.
I closely follow Lopes de Melo (2018) to apply the AKM methodology to RAIS data.
Specifically, I restrict my focus to full-time employees within an age range from 16 to 55
that have at least completed basic education for the 12-year period from 2002 to 2014. To
account for informality effects, I exclude individuals with available information for less than
5 of the 12 years, and who have been employed in more than three firms per year. The largest
connected set includes 98.2% of the sample. Then, I categorize firms into three productivity
types based on the distribution of the firm-specific fixed effect component.
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1.2.2.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1.3 presents firm- and worker-level summary statistics for treated and control firms.
Panel A reports firm-level employment-related characteristics for the pre-takeover period
and documents that control and treated firms are similar in terms of total employment,
total wage bill and the human capital structure. Panel B and C of Table 1.3 present firm-
level and worker-level descriptive statistics as observed at the time of the M&A transaction.
In Panel B, I report firm-level summary statistics based on 2,204 unique treated firms and
20,257 control firms. As shown, treated firms and control firms are similar at the time of the
M&A event. This is consistent with my matching procedure finding similar counterfactuals.
In Panel C, I report summary statistics at worker-level, which are based on 2,281,039 unique
workers of treated firms and 9,021,397 unique workers of control firms. As shown, workers
display similar characteristics in terms of education, gender, age, tenure and average log
wage.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Firm-Level Analysis of Total Employment and Total Wages
The objective of this section is to document the main effects of being targeted at a takeover
on employment-related outcomes. To this end, the firm is used as the unit of analysis and
the following difference-in-differences empirical specification is employed:
Yitpm = αi + αmt + γPostp + βPostp × I treatedi + εitpm (1.2)
26
where i indexes firms, t indexes the calendar year, p indexes normalized time expressed in
years around the M&A transaction ranging from -2 to +2 and m indexes municipalities.
Postp is a dummy equal to 1 for the two-year period following the M&A transaction, and
zero for the the two-year period prior to the M&A transaction. Finally, the variable I treatedi is
an indicator function equal to 1 for firms that have been targeted in an M&A transaction at
any point in time, and equal to 0 for control firms that have never been involved in a M&A
transaction either as targets or acquirers during the period under study. The coefficient of
interest is β, which captures the average difference in the outcome variable between treated
and control firms in the two-year period after the M&A transaction relative to the period
before the transaction. I employ firm and municipality × year. The standard errors are
clustered at the transaction level so as to account for correlation between the different target
firms that are involved in an M&A transaction.
I begin my analysis by examining the evolution of total employment in target firms
following the M&A transaction. Specifically, I measure total firm-level employment as the
logarithm of the number of employees in a firm. In case M&As are motivated by a value-
maximizing perspective in the pursuit of synergy gains through consolidation and cost-
reduction, human capital restructuring is expected to be extensive involving a downsizing in
employment. The results of estimating equation (1.2) are reported in Column (1) of Table
1.4. As shown in Column (1), treated firms experience a statistically significant decline in the
level of employment with respect to comparable firms never engaged in M&A activity in the
period under study. The magnitude of my estimates indicate that target firms experience,
on average, a decline of 29% in total employment. In particular, the employment level of
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the median target firm reduces from 139 employees at the time of the takeover to 96 in the
post-merger period.
I next explore the evolution of total wage bill in target firms after the M&A transaction.
I expect the decline in employment in the post-takeover period for target firms to be followed
by a decline in the wage bill. Indeed, Column (2) of Table 1.4 reports the results on total
wages. The findings in Column (2) demonstrate that the decrease of total wages in target
firms is 17% larger than in control firms.
Finally, I further complement the firm-level analysis by focusing on the direction of the
post-merger level of wage per worker. The results are reported in Column (3) of Table 1.4.
Interestingly, as shown in column (3), I find that wage per worker exhibits on average an
increase of 14% for target firms in the post-merger period, implying the existence of changes
in the composition of labor leading to an increase in the wage level of the remaining and/or
incoming employees, or both.
In order to provide further insight into the evolution of employment and wage outcomes,
I estimate firm-level dynamic effects of M&As by employing the following non-parametric
event-study specification:






βpTp × (I treatedi ) + εitpm (1.3)
where i indexes firms, t indexes the calendar year, p indexes normalized time expressed in
years around the M&A transaction ranging from -2 to +2 and m indexes municipalities.
Tp is a dummy equal to 1 if Tp = p. Finally, the variable I
treated
i is an indicator function
equal to 1 for firms that have been targeted in an M&A transaction at any point in time,
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and equal to 0 for control firms that are never targets or acquirers during the period under
study. The coefficient of interest is βp, which captures the average difference in the outcome
variable between treated and control firms when Tp = p. The specification includes firm and
municipality × year so as to absorb time-invariant differences across firms, municipalities
and years. The standard errors are clustered at the transaction level.
The results are presented in Figures 1.4 and 1.5. As illustrated, there are no differential
pre-trends between treated and control firms in terms of total employment and total wage
bill up to the time of the transaction. This is expected as the purpose of the matching
process is to mitigate any pre-trend differences in the matching variables. However, there is
a sharp decline in employment in the two-year post-takeover period.
1.3.2 Firm-Level Analysis of Employment Flows
The net employment results demonstrate that corporate takeovers in Brazil are associated
with extensive human capital restructuring. Although net employment results are informa-
tive of the direction of the post-takeover restructuring, a decline in net employment relative
to the set of control firms is likely to reflect an increase in separations and/or a decline in
hirings. Most importantly, an increase in separations is likely to reflect both voluntary and
involuntary departures, leading to a different interpretation of the post-takeover labor-related
outcomes depending on the type of separation. For example, in case M&As are motivated
by cost reduction and consolidation considerations, layoffs are expected to materialize as
a by-product of the restructuring process. On the other hand, M&As represent turbulent
times for the employees of the target firm and thus, an increase in voluntary exit of human
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capital is likely to lead to a decline in employment even if the motivation of the takeover is
unrelated to the pursuit of efficiency gains. To shed light on the sources of the adjustment
in net employment, I transition my focus on employment flows. An important advantage
of my administrative dataset is that it contains unique information on the terminations of
labor contracts which allows me to disentangle involuntary from voluntary separations and,
thus, document the precise manner that employment adjustment takes place. Voluntary
separation refers to employee-induced terminations (e.g. resignations), while involuntary
separation refers to employer-induced terminations including both layoffs and fixed-contract
terminations without a subsequent renewal. In inferring separations, I exclude within-firm
transfers, as well as retirements and reported deaths. Furthermore, in transactions where
the information on the acquiring firm is available, I consider any post-takeover employment
flows that involve the acquiring and the target firm as an internal transfer. In addition,
I exploit information on occupational codes to create a variable that captures the number
of occupations at the firm level as an additional variable of interest. Specifically, examin-
ing changes in the number of occupations is informative of restructuring actions related to
consolidation.
For the purposes of my analysis, I take advantage of the firm-level empirical specification
of the previous section. The variables of interest that refer to employment-related flows are
divided by total employment. The results are reported in Table 1.5.
In column (1), I focus on total separations disregarding information on whether the
separation has been initiated by the employer or the employee, and document that there is
a statistically significant positive relation between being targeted at an M&A transaction
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and the rate of separations. The magnitudes of my estimates indicate that target firms
experience an increase of 38% in separation rates in the post-takeover period compared to
firms never involved in M&A activity in the period under examination. Columns (2) and
(3) delve deeper in the direction of separations, and document that corporate takeovers are
primarily associated with an increase in the rate of involuntary separations. Indeed, there
is a statistically significant increase in layoffs by 32.6%, while the change in the rate of
voluntary separations significantly increases by 5.4%. Specifically, in absolute terms, the
median target firm experiences a decline in the number of employees, 75% of which is due to
layoffs and 25% is due to voluntary exit. In Column (4) I transition my focus on the post-
takeover hiring rates to document that increased post-takeover layoffs are also accompanied
by limited hiring activity. Indeed, target firms decrease hiring rates by 32% compared to
control firms.
Therefore, acquiring firms predominantly reorganize the labor force in the target firm
by increasing layoffs and limiting hirings, consistent with the notion that M&As engage in
efficiency-seeking consolidation; however, at the same they experience an increased rate of
voluntary exit of human capital. I further supplement my findings by exploring the impact
of M&As on the number of occupations present in target firms. In particular, the observed
increase in layoffs and the decline in hirings is likely to reflect occupational consolidation,
implying that layoffs are accompanied by non-replacement of redundant workers, consistent
with firms consolidating or limiting unrelated occupational tasks. Column (5) reports the
results demonstrating that target firms are associated with a 11% decrease in the number of
occupations in the post-takeover period.
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1.3.3 Worker-Level Analysis on Labor Restructuring
Having established firm-level patterns in the labor flows of target firms, I turn to an employee-
level analysis to examine post-takeover changes in the demand for human capital. To the
extent that acquiring firms actively reorganize human capital in the process of resetting
their boundaries in the post-takeover period, I should expect M&As to be followed by het-
erogeneous effects on different groups of employees leading to changes in the composition of
labor. For this purpose, I exploit cross-sectional variation in worker characteristics and char-
acterize the post-takeover change in the likelihood of exit for different groups of employees.
To separate demand and supply side factors that affect the decision to exit the firm, I use
the information on the reason for the termination of employment contracts and disentangle
involuntary from voluntary exit. This cross-sectional analysis extends our understanding
of the post-takeover readjustment process by linking heterogeneous post-merger outcomes
on different groups of employees with theoretical predictions emerging from theories that
attempt to explain how M&As emerge and what are the effects on firms.
For the purposes of the worker-level analysis, the individual is used as the unit of analysis
and the empirical specification has the following form:




j × Postp) +X
′
jθ + εijptm (1.4)
where i indexes firms, j indexes workers, p indexes normalized time expressed in years around
the M&A transaction ranging from -2 to +2, t indexes the calendar year and m indexes
municipalities. The variable I treatedj is an indicator function equal to 1 for individuals that
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have been employed in a firm i that was the target of an M&A transaction at any point in
time, and equal to 0 for the individuals of control firms. Finally, Postp is a dummy equal to 1
for the two-year period following the M&A transaction, and zero for the the two-year period
prior to the M&A transaction. The coefficient of interest is β, which captures the average
difference in the outcome variable between treated and control firms in the two-year period
after the M&A transaction relative to the period before the transaction. X
′
j is a vector
of individual controls that includes age, gender, education and tenure. The specification
includes employ employee, municipality and year fixed effects. The standard errors are
clustered at the transaction level. The dependent variable is a binary variable denoting the
occurrence of specific type of separation from the firm. The type of separation includes
voluntary departure from the firm and involuntary separation that includes dismissals or
fixed contract terminations without renewal.
The selection of the employee-level variation that I explore is motivated by theoretical
predictions about the effects of M&As on firms. Specifically, I focus on the following human
capital dimensions that are relevant to the reorganization decision of the acquiring firm:
level of skill, employees in managerial positions, occupational routine task intensity, and
level of human capital overlap. The neoclassical merger theory is based on the view that
M&As are an efficient response to regime shifts (e.g. due to technological shocks) by value-
maximizing managers (e.g. Gort (1969); Mitchell and Mulherin (1996); Jovanovic, Rousseau,
et al. (2001)). Therefore, takeovers potentially lead to technological change and adoption
of automation, and to the extent that capital and high-skilled labor are complements, these
theories would predict that M&As should generate an increase in the demand for high-skilled
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and non-routine labor. In addition, synergy gains have long been considered as an important
driver of M&As (e.g. Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001); Devos, Kadapakkam, and
Krishnamurthy (2008)). An important channel though which synergies materialize is the
existence of asset complementarities between the target and the acquiring firm (e.g. Rhodes-
Kropf and Robinson (2008)). Therefore, these theories would predict an increase in the
likelihood of involuntary separation for workers in occupations that overlap between the
acquiring and the target firm.
1.3.3.1 High-Skilled and Low-Skilled Labor
I begin my worker-level analysis by exploring the post-merger demand for high-skilled and
low-skilled workers. High-skilled workers are considered to be a scarce and redeployable re-
source, instrumental for firm productivity and value creation (Abowd, Haltiwanger, Jarmin,
Lane, Lengermann, McCue, McKinney, and Sandusky (2005)). Thus, I expect acquiring
firms to attempt to retain the target’s high-skilled employees. On the other hand, in case
M&As are motivated by cost reduction and consolidation considerations, layoffs of high-
skilled workers are likely to materialize as a by-product of the consolidation process. In
addition, M&As are a source of disruption for target firms associated with an increase in
uncertainty related to employment prospects, and given the highly liquid market for high-
skilled employees, I expect M&As to generate an increased likelihood in voluntary exit for
high-skilled workers. On the contrary, given the abundance of low-skilled labor in Brazil
and the lower labor adjustment costs, the role of low-skilled employees in the restructuring
process is expected to be less pronounced - if any.
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I proxy for skill by taking advantage of information on the educational level of employees.
Specifically, I define as high-skilled any employee that has completed at least undergraduate
education, while I define as low-skilled any employee having completed at most high-school
education. I begin my analysis by examining involuntary separations. The dependent vari-
able is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 for the year that an employee experiences
employer-induced separation and 0 otherwise. The results are reported in Column (1) and
(3) of Table 1.6. Column (1) focuses on the subsample of high-skilled labor, while column
(3) examines the impact on low-skilled labor. As demonstrated, acquiring firms attempt
to retain the target’s high-skilled labor, as the likelihood of involuntary separation in the
post-takeover period is not statistically significant. On the contrary, low-skilled labor is
particularly affected by labor restructuring experiencing a higher likelihood of involuntary
separation following an M&A transaction. The magnitudes of my estimates indicate that
low-skilled labor is associated with an increase of 5.9% in the likelihood of involuntary separa-
tion. Relative to the average effect of 16.9%, the estimate implies that low-skilled employees
are 35% more likely to be fired in the post-merger period. This implies that the observed
post-merger increase in layoffs hits low-skilled workers disproportionally.
Given that M&As induce occupational uncertainty, the post-takeover period represents
uncharted territory for the labor force of target firms, potentially leading to voluntary exit.
Therefore, in Columns (2) and (4) of Table 1.6, I focus my attention to voluntary separations
to explore the heterogeneous response of high- and low-skilled employees. High-skilled labor,
faced with a better outside option, has the opportunity to exploit the highly liquid labor
market and depart from the target firm after the takeover. On the contrary, low-skilled is
35
less likely to exhibit any sensitivity to the merger shock. Indeed, Column (2) demonstrates
that treated firms face a 1% increase in the likelihood of high-skilled employees exiting the
target firm; however, as shown in column (4), there is no effect for low-skilled labor. In terms
of magnitude, relative to the average likelihood of voluntary separation of 6.8%, high-skilled
employees exhibit a 15% increase in the likelihood of voluntary exit in the post-takeover.
1.3.3.2 Employees in Managerial Positions
Next, I examine the reorganization decisions of acquiring firms regarding employees in man-
agerial positions. Predicting the impact of M&As on managers is less straightforward. On
the one hand, acquiring firms may have the incentive to replace managers so as to appoint
their own in an effort to instill their management practices and corporate culture. In ad-
dition, managers may be deemed redundant as part of the consolidation process. On the
other hand, retaining the managers of the target firms may be beneficial for the integration
process due to deeper knowledge of the internal processes of the target firm. Therefore, it
is unclear what is expected to be the direction of the reorganization process. I argue that
cross-border M&As represent a subsample where the benefits of maintaining the managers
of the target firm is beneficial. Specifically, expanding in a new geographical market is fol-
lowed by increased uncertainty, and managerial knowledge on local business practices may
be beneficial to alleviate such concerns.
I identify managerial positions by exploiting information on the occupational code of each
employee. Following the approach developed by Muendler, Poole, Ramey, and Wajnberg
(2004), I map CBO codes to International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO)
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codes, and I exploit the ISCO-88 codes of the employees to identify managers. The results are
reported in 1.7. Columns (1) to (3) focus on the likelihood of involuntary separation. I find
that, unlike the rest of the high-skilled employees, managers experience an increase in the
post-takeover likelihood of involuntary separation in transactions that involve domestic firms.
The point estimates indicate a 4% increase in the likelihood of involuntary separation for
managers in domestic M&As. This finding is in line with the Jensen and Ruback (1983) view
that takeovers induce competition for the right to manage resources and achieve efficiency by
replacing managers in target firms. On the contrary, cross-border acquirers appear to retain
the managers of target firms consistent with the notion that cross-border acquirers benefit
from managerial knowledge of both the local business environment and the internal processes
of the target firm. Interestingly, I exploit information on the nationality of employees and
I observe that in 26% of cross-border transactions, acquirers appoint a foreign manager
potentially to supervise the process in an effort to instill the corporate culture and apply
the management practices of the acquirer. In Columns (4) to (6) I explore changes in the
likelihood of voluntary exit, and find that there is no change in the likelihood of voluntary
exit after the takeover.
1.3.3.3 Routine-Biased Change
The neoclassical theory on M&As emphasizes the role of M&As as an efficient response to
regime shifts, generating technological change (e.g. Jovanovic, Rousseau, et al. (2001), Jo-
vanovic and Rousseau (2008)). In addition, Ma, Ouimet, and Simintzi (2017) link industry-
level intensity in M&A activity with within-industry occupational shifts that reflect routine-
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biased change. Indeed, M&As are likely to reduce frictions associated with technology
adoption and increase automation for reasons ranging from the pursuit of efficiency gains
(Mitchell and Mulherin (1996)) to alleviating financial constraints (e.g. Erel, Jang, and
Weisbach (2015)). To test this hypothesis, I focus on cross-border M&A transactions. Over
90% of cross-border M&A activity in Brazil involves acquiring firms from developed coun-
tries, implying that M&As are likely to constitute a vehicle of technological and organiza-
tional change. Indeed, the MNE literature has highlighted that MNEs consist of superior
knowledge-based assets and possess competitive advantages transferable to the market of the
host country (e.g. Hymer (1976)), while the trade literature has demonstrated the benefits
of increased exposure to trade in terms of skill and technology upgrade (Verhoogen (2008);
Bustos (2011)). Therefore, a Brazilian firm is likely to experience a decline in the frictions
associated with technology adoption and increase in automation for various reasons includ-
ing increased access to capital, transfer and upgrade of technology and greater adoption of
modern management practices. In such cases, the target firm is bound to experience changes
in labor demand induced by routine-biased technological change.
I exploit occupational information on routine intensity by Autor and Dorn (2013). An
employee is considered to perform a routine occupation if the routine task intensity (RTI)
score is positive and a non-routine occupation if the RTI score is negative. Alternatively, an
occupation is defined to be routine-task intensive if the occupation is in the top employment-
weighted third of routine-task intensity in a given year. The results are unchanged regardless
of the definition of routine workers (the correlation of the routine variables is 0.89).
The results are presented in Table 1.8. Columns (1) and (4) report the results for the
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full sample of M&As in Brazil and document that there is a post-takeover increase in the
likelihood of involuntary separation for both routine and non-routine employees. Specifically,
the magnitudes of my estimates indicate that workers performing non-routine tasks are
associated with a 2.7% increase in the likelihood of involuntary separation, while routine
workers experience a 6% increase.
Nevertheless, in Columns (3) and (6), I repeat the analysis for the subsample of cross-
border M&As, where I argue that automation and routine-biased change is more likely to
occur. Indeed, the results indicate that post-takeover restructuring in cross-border M&As is
indicative of routine-biased change with employees that perform routine tasks experiencing
a 25% increase in the likelihood of involuntary separation. Non-routine employees exhibit
no change in the post-takeover likelihood of involuntary separation. On the contrary, the
likelihood of involuntary separation increases for both routine and non-routine employees,
though at a higher rate for routine employees. Specifically, the likelihood of involuntary
separation increases by 7.1% for routine employees and 3.7% for non-routine employees.
1.3.3.4 Hirings
Next, I turn to the analysis of the reorganization decisions of target firms in terms of hirings.
M&As are associated with involuntary separations of low-skilled and routine employees at
the target firms and experience voluntary exit of high-skilled employees. Examining their
hiring decisions is important to shed light into the incentives of the firms involved in M&A
activity in terms of the direction of the composition of human capital. To analyze the
hiring decisions at target firms, I estimate specification (1.5) using as dependent variable
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an indicator that takes the value of 1 in the period an employee is hired by the firm and 0
otherwise.
The results are presented in Table 1.9. Columns (1) and (2) report the results for low-
skilled and high-skilled human capital, while Columns (3) and (4) examine the hiring de-
cisions regarding routine and non-routine employees. The results document that there is
a post-takeover significant decline in the hiring likelihood only for low-skilled and routine
employees. Specifically, the magnitudes of my estimates indicate that low-skilled workers are
associated with a 5.5% decline in the likelihood of being hired, while workers performing rou-
tine tasks experience a 4.4% decline. Combined with the previous findings that low-skilled
and routine human capital is particularly affected in the post-takeover period through forced
displacements, these results imply that acquiring firms actively aim at reducing the level of
low-skilled employment and inducing automation at the target firms. On the contrary, there
is no decline in the hiring rate of high-skilled and non-routine employees, suggesting that
target firms actively decide to alter the composition of human capital and operate with a
larger share of high-skilled and non-routine labor.
1.3.3.5 Occupational Overlap
In neoclassical M&A theories, asset and product-market complementarities motivate corpo-
rate takeovers (Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008); Hoberg and Phillips (2010)) due to an
increase in the potential for synergy gains. Lee, Mauer, and Xu (2017) empirically extend
these theories to human capital by constructing an industry-level measure of human capi-
tal relatedness to demonstrate that human capital complementarities also motivate M&As.
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This evidence suggests that human capital overlap is likely to partially explain the observed
patterns of labor restructuring. To test this hypothesis, I focus on M&A transactions where
the identities of both the target and the acquiring firm are available and exploit information
on the occupational profiles of the acquiring and the target firm at the time of the takeover
to construct a binary variable that takes the value of 1 for occupations that are present in
both firms involved in the transaction at the time of the takeover.
To perform my empirical analysis, I restrict my sample to the employees of target and
acquiring firms in the post-takeover period and employ the empirical specification presented
below.




jθ + εjptm (1.5)
where j indexes workers, p indexes normalized time expressed in years around the M&A
transaction ranging from -2 to +2, t indexes the calendar year and m indexes municipalities.
The variable Ioverlapj is an indicator function equal to 1 for individuals that perform an
occupation that exists in the occupational profile of the acquiring firm at the time of the
M&A transaction. Finally, X
′
j is a vector of individual controls that includes age, gender,
wage and tenure. The specification includes employee, municipality and year fixed effects.
The standard errors are clustered at the transaction level. The dependent variable is a binary
variable that takes the value of 1 for the occurrence of a specific type of separation from the
firm at a specific point in time. The type of separation includes voluntary departure from
the firm and involuntary separation either in the form of a contract termination without just
cause or a fixed contract termination without renewal. Notice that the specification does
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not use a control group.
The results are reported in Table 1.10. Columns (1)-(3) report the results for the employ-
ees of the target firms in the post-takeover period, while Columns (4)-(6) report the results
for the employees of the acquiring firms. In Columns (1) and (4) the dependent variable is
a binary variable that captures voluntary separations, while in Columns (2), (3), (5) and
(6) the dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 in the case of an
involuntary separation. The results demonstrate that the likelihood of involuntary separa-
tion increases for target employees with an overlapping occupation by 1.5% to 1.8% in the
post-takeover period, while there is no effect for employees in acquiring firms. In addition,
occupational overlap has no effect in the likelihood of voluntary separations. Columns (3)
and (6) present the results of introducing a variable that takes the value of 1 low-skilled
employees and the interaction with human capital overlap variable, demonstrating that low-
skilled employees in target firms in overlapping occupations are disproportionally affected.
This evidence suggests that occupational overlap is a key channel of increased layoffs in
target firms in the post-takeover reorganization process, consistent with consolidation and
cost-reduction being one of the primary drivers of takeovers.
1.3.4 Technological Change and Automation
The employee-level results indicate that takeovers lead to an increase in the relative demand
for high-skilled and non-routine labor in the post-takeover period. Therefore, I turn to firm-
level analysis to further document whether these changes in the demand for different groups
of employees lead to firm-level changes in the composition of labor. To perform the empirical
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analysis, I use the firm-level empirical specification (1.2) with the dependent variable being
firm-level labor shares of different groups of employees. The employee groups that I consider
are the share of high-skilled employees, the share of routine employees and the share of
employees performing R&D-related tasks.
The results are reported in Table 1.11 and are suggestive of skill-biased and routine-
biased compositional changes in line with the employee-level results in changes in the relative
demand for different groups of employees. In Column (1) the dependent variable is the share
of high-skilled labor at the firm level, while in Column (2) the dependent variable is the firm-
level share of routine labor. The results demonstrate an increase in the share of high-skilled
labor of 7% and a decline in the share of routine labor by 7.6%.
In order to provide additional evidence of technological change and investment in tech-
nology, I explore whether there is an increase in the share of employees that perform R&D-
related tasks. To this end, I exploit the detailed nature of the occupational classification
in my dataset and identify the employees that are occupied in positions with R&D being
the primary task. Column (3) of Table 1.11 presents the results, showing that there is a
statistically significant post-takeover increase by 1.2% in the firm-level share of employees in
occupational tasks related to R&D.
1.3.5 Average Wages and Wage Inequality
My results demonstrate an increase in the relative demand for high-skilled and non-routine
labor that are reflected to firm-level changes in the composition of labor after the takeover.
These changes are likely to disproportionally affect the average wages of high-skilled and
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low-skilled employees. I find that this is indeed the case. In Column (1) and (2) of Table
1.12 I use the firm-level empirical specification (1.2) with firm-level average wages as the
dependent variable, to document the impact of corporate takeovers on average wages. As
reported in Column (2), M&As are associated with a decline in average wages for low-skilled
workers; however, as shown in Column (1), high-skilled employees experience an increase in
the average wage by 4.9% in the post-takeover period.
In addition, Autor and Dorn (2013) document that routine-intensive occupations are
concentrated in the middle of the distribution of skill, implying that job polarization is
accompanied by wage polarization. Therefore, I expect that job polarization and the relative
increase in labor demand for skilled workers in the post-takeover period are expected to
contribute to an increase in within-firm wage inequality in target firms.
To perform the analysis, I use the firm-level empirical specification (1.6) presented below.
Inequalityitpm = αi + αmt + γPostp + βPostp × I treatedi + εitpm (1.6)
The measures of wage inequality that I use as dependent variables are the standard
deviation of (log) wages and the ratio of the 90th wage percentile to the 10th wage percentile.
The results are reported in Table 1.13 and document a strong statistically significant positive
relationship in the post-takeover period. Column (1) focuses on the the standard deviation
of (log) wages as the inequality measure and demonstrates that M&As are associated with an
increase in wage dispersion of 6.8%, while Column (2) uses the 90-10 wage ratio and confirms
that takeovers lead to an increase in within-firm wage inequality in the post-takeover period.
The point estimates for the 90-10 wage ratio indicate that M&As increase the 90-10 wage
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inequality gap by 13.3%.
1.3.6 Combined Entity
Thus far, my results indicate that there is substantial post-takeover restructuring of the
human capital at target firms that is indicative of skill-biased and routine-biased change.
However, reorganization decisions in M&As are guided by labor considerations related to
the human capital of the acquiring firms as well and, thus are expected to involve and
affect the human capital of the combined entity. To this end, I next explore if the observed
firm-level employment outcomes and changes in the composition of labor at target firms
are reflected in the combined entity by analyzing changes in aggregate employment-related
outcomes and the human capital profile of the combined entity. For this purpose, I repeat
the firm-level analysis by considering the acquiring and the acquired firms involved in a
M&A transaction as a single entity. The results are reported in Table 1.14 and, in total,
demonstrate that M&As do lead to a decline in employment and labor expenses, an increase
in wage inequality and do induce compositional changes in the human capital profile of the
combined entity that reflect technological change and automation.
Specifically, I begin my analysis by examining the evolution of total employment and
labor expenses in the combined entity following the M&A transaction. The results of es-
timating specification (1.2) for the combined entity are reported in Columns (1) and (2)
of Table 1.14 and show that M&A firms experience a statistically significant decline in the
level of employment and labor expenses with respect to comparable firms never engaged in
M&A activity in the period under study. The magnitudes of my estimates indicate that the
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combined entity experiences, on average, a decline of 12.9% in total employment and 9.9%
in total wages.
In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.14 I focus on the share of high-skilled and routine
human capital in the combined entity in the post-takeover period and demonstrate M&As
are associated with technological change and automation. Specifically, the changes in the
composition of human capital point to a 4.3% increase in the share of high-skilled labor and
a 4.8% decline in the share of routine employment. As shown in Column (5), these changes
lead to a 9.6% post-takeover increase in within-firm wage inequality in the combined entity.
1.3.7 Takeover Types
In this section, I classify the post-takeover decisions on the reorganization of human capital
by the type of the takeover. My empirical analysis is motivated by the fact that there are
different predictions for the impact of M&As on the level of reorganization of assets depend-
ing on the type of the takeover. For example, focused takeovers are likely to be motivated by
the potential of synergy gains through cost savings and consolidation, and therefore larger
post-takeover employment losses and reductions in labor expenses are expected to materi-
alize relative to combined pre-takeover levels compared to diversifying M&As. Therefore,
I categorize M&As into focused and diversifying. For the takeovers that information on
the acquiring firm is available, I follow Tate and Yang (2016) and identify a takeover as
diversifying if there is no overlap in the establishment-level industries in which the acquiring
and target firms operate at the time of the transaction. For the takeovers that there is no
information on the acquiring firm, I use the three-digit SIC code, as reported in SDC, to
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classify M&As between firms in the same industry as focused. In my sample of M&As in
Brazil, 83% are focused and 17% are diversifying.
For the empirical analysis, I estimate equation (1.2) separately for focused and diversi-
fying takeovers, and examine the evolution of total employment and labor expenses in the
combined entity following the M&A transaction. The results are reported in Table 1.15.
In Columns (1) and (2) I examine the impact of the type of takeover on total employment,
while in Columns (3) and (4) I focus on the impact on the total wage bill. The results
demonstrate that only firms involved in focused M&As experience a statistically significant
decline in the level of employment and labor expenses with respect to comparable firms
never engaged in M&A activity in the period under study. The magnitudes of my estimates
indicate that there is a significant decline of 15.3% in total employment and 11.7% in the
total wage bill for firms that engage in focused takeover. On the contrary, firms involved in
diversifying M&As demonstrate no employment and wage effects.
1.3.8 Human Capital Relatedness
Lee, Mauer, and Xu (2017) empirically extend neoclassical M&A theories of asset com-
plementarities to human capital by constructing an industry-level measure of human capital
relatedness to demonstrate that human capital complementarities also motivate M&As. This
evidence suggests that the level of human capital relatedness is likely to affect the level of
employment adjustment in the post-takeover. To test this hypothesis, I focus on M&A
transactions where the identity of both the target and the acquirer is available and exploit
information on the occupational profiles of the acquiring and the target firm at the time of
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the takeover to construct a variable of human capital relatedness. Specifically, I follow Lee,
Mauer, and Xu (2017) and construct a measure of human capital relatedness (HCR) between
the acquiring firm i and the target firm j as the scalar product of the firms’ occupational









The HCR measure is bounded between 0 and 1. It is 1 for merging firms with identical
occupational profiles, and 0 for firms with orthogonal human capital profiles. To perform
my empirical analysis, I restrict my sample to the combined entity and employ the empirical
specification (1.2). I classify takeovers into two categories based on the level of the human
capital relatedness measure. The results are reported in Table 1.16.
In Columns (1) and (2) I examine the impact of human capital relatedness on total
employment, while in Columns (3) and (4) I focus on the impact on the total wage bill. The
results demonstrate that merging firms with higher human capital relatedness experience a
larger decline in the level of employment and labor expenses compared to merging firms with
a lower level of human capital relatedness. The magnitudes of my estimates indicate that
there is a significant decline of 19.3% in total employment and 16.4% in the total wage bill
for M&As where the firms involved have a high human capital relatedness, while in M&As
where the firms involved have a low human capital relatedness, the decline in employment
is 9.5% and the decline in the total wage bill is 4.1%.
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1.3.9 Withdrawn M&As
The empirical methodology relies on the use of matching estimators to alleviate concerns
related to selection. The assumption is that the random assignment to treatment requirement
is more likely to hold within the matching cells than across the population. In an attempt to
mitigate the issue of common shocks affecting both the selection of takeover targets and labor
restructuring outcomes and reinforce the M&A-driven interpretation of the results, I exploit
information on withdrawn M&A deals. Specifically, I identify the deals from SDC that
were announced and eventually withdrawn, excluding any deals that include firms that were
eventually acquired and deals that were withdrawn for labor-related reason. In particular, for
each withdrawn deal, I use either news reports or the anti-trust authority report to identify
the reason for the takeover withdrawal. The final sample includes 67 withdrawn M&As. I
repeat the analysis for total employment and total wage bill by identifying a relevant set of
control firms following the same methodological process that I used in the main empirical
analysis.
Table 1.17 presents the results. I find that there is no statistically significant relationship
between withdrawn M&As and total employment and total wage bill. These results provide
additional evidence against concerns that the results are driven by selection into treatment.
1.3.10 Investment in Capital and Stock Market Reaction
Post-takeover restructuring is followed by an increase in the relative demand for high-skilled
and non-routine labor. Since capital and high-skilled labor are complements and routine-
biased change is related to investment in automation, I expect firms to increase investment
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in capital in the post-takeover period. Indeed, although my dataset provides no information
on the financial performance of firms, I have documented a post-takeover increase in the
share of labor in occupational tasks related to R&D which is indicative of an increase in firm
investment in technology. To further complement my analysis, I focus on public firms that
financial information is reported in Compustat to provide suggestive evidence of an increase
in investment in capital. The majority of target firms in Brazil are private; however there
are 82 public firms that have been targeted at M&As from 2004 to 2012. For these firms,
I identify public firms in the same two-digit SIC industry that have never been involved in
M&A activity and compare changes in measures of investment before and after the takeover.
Panel A of Table 1.18 provides descriptive statistics of treated and control firms, demon-
strating that there are no statistically significant differences between treated and control
firms. Next I turn to a multivariate regression analysis to formally test post-takeover changes
in investment in capital. For the empirical analysis, I use the firm-level empirical specification
(1.8) presented below.
Investment in Capitalitpm = αi + αm + αt + γPostp + βPostp × I treatedi +X
′
iθ + εitpm (1.8)
The measures of investment in capital that are used as dependent variables are the ratio
of capital expenditure to beginning-of-year total assets, the growth in Property, Plant and
Equipment (PPE) and the growth in intangible assets. The results are reported in Panel B of
Table 1.18 and document a strong positive relationship in the post-takeover period. Column
(1) focuses on the growth in intangible assets as the dependent variable and demonstrates
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that M&As are associated with an increase in the growth of intangible assets, Column (2)
uses PPE growth and confirms that takeovers lead to an increase in investment in capital
in the post-takeover period, while Column (3) focuses on the ratio of capital expenditure to
beginning-of-year total assets as the dependent variable and demonstrates that M&As are
associated with an increase in CapEx of 2.7%.
Finally, focusing on the stock market reaction, the three-day abnormal return CAR(-
1,1) is 6.37% significantly positive for the 78 publicly listed targets and 1.19% significantly
positive for the 654 publicly listed acquirers, implying that the restructuring process in the
post-takeover period leads to value creation.
1.3.11 Labor Restructuring and Employment Outcomes
My results demonstrate that M&As are associated with a large adjustment in employment
for target firms that disproportionally affect specific types of human capital. In this section,
I transition my focus on the impact of M&As on the subsequent employment outcomes of
displaced employees by analyzing labor mobility in the post-takeover period for low-skilled
and high-skilled employees. The RAIS dataset allows me to follow firms and employees
over time and track their employments decisions. Therefore, I measure employment-related
outcomes for the human capital of target firms displaced after takeovers for the two-year
post-separation period.
Specifically, I begin by documenting the impact of M&As on the incidence of unemploy-
ment. For the empirical analysis, I estimate specification (1.5) using as dependent variable
an indicator variable that equals 1 for employees that have experienced displacement and
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unemployment in the two-year period after their displacement and 0 otherwise for treated
and control firms. Columns (1) and (4) in Table 1.19 present the results on unemployment
incidence for low-skilled and high-skilled employees, documenting that M&As lead to a sta-
tistically significant increase in the unemployment incidence only for low-skilled employees
by 3.3%. Columns (2) and (5) focus on unemployment spells as the dependent variable.
Unemployment spells are estimated as the number of months of unemployment a displaced
employee experiences in the two-year period after their departure from a firm in my sample.
Notice that any effect on the total unemployment months combines the effect on unemploy-
ment incidence and unemployment duration. The results demonstrate that only target firms’
low-skilled employees experience a significant increase in unemployment spells in the post-
takeover period. The magnitudes of my estimates indicate that displaced target employees
experience an increase of 25% in unemployment duration, relative to the average effect in
my sample which is 2 months.
Next, I turn to job turnover by estimating the number of jobs displaced employees have
had in the two-year period after their displacement. Columns (3) and (7) in Table 1.19
present the results on job turnover for low-skilled and high-skilled employees, documenting
that M&As lead to a statistically significant increase in job turnover only for low-skilled
employees. Relative to the average effect, displaced target employees experience an increase
of 15% in the number of job changes after takeovers.
Finally, I examine the impact of M&As on the average monthly wage during a year. Notice
that any treatment effects documented incorporate wage changes due to unemployment,
changes in employment between firms, and changes in earnings at the current job. Columns
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(4) and (8) in Table 1.19 indicate that only low-skilled employees experience a statistically
significant wage decline relative to comparable employees in control firms. In total, the
results in Table 1.19 confirm that low-skilled employees in target firms, on average, experience
unfavorable labor outcomes in the post-takeover period.
1.4 Conclusion
I analyze the extent and direction of the labor reorganization process in firms targeted at
takeovers in Brazil from 2004 to 2012. I demonstrate that corporate takeovers are associated
with extensive labor restructuring at the target firm. Specifically, I find that target firms
experience a large decline in total employment and total wage bill relative to control firms in
the two-year post-takeover period. This adjustment in employment occurs by increasing lay-
offs and limiting hirings, consistent with the notion that M&As engage in efficiency-seeking
consolidation. I further supplement my findings by documenting that reorganization involves
occupational consolidation, as the number of occupations declines in the post-takeover pe-
riod.
Having established firm-level patterns in the employment flows of target firms, I turn
to an employee-level analysis to examine post-takeover changes in the demand for human
capital. For this purpose, I exploit cross-sectional variation in worker characteristics and
characterize the post-takeover change in the likelihood of exit for different groups of employ-
ees. To separate demand and supply side factors that affect the decision to exit the firm, I
use the information on the reason for the termination of employment contracts and disentan-
gle involuntary from voluntary exit. My findings show that the post-takeover restructuring
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process is indicative of skill-biased and routine-biased technological change, consistent with
empirical findings that highlight the importance of high-skilled labor for firm productivity
and value creation, and theoretical predictions that link M&As with automation and tech-
nological change. In addition, I provide evidence that occupational overlap is a key channel
of increased layoffs.
The employee-level results indicate that takeovers lead to an increase in the relative
demand for high-skilled and non-routine labor in the post-takeover period. I show that these
demand changes lead to changes in the firm-level composition of labor, as the share of high-
skilled labor increases by 7%, while the share of routine labor decreases by 7.6%. In order
to provide additional evidence of technological change, I show that there is a post-takeover
increase in the firm-level share of labor in occupational tasks related to R&D.
Finally, I focus on wages and document that average wages decline only for low-skilled
labor. This heterogeneous change in wages in the post-takeover period along with the relative
increase in demand for skilled and non-routine workers contribute to an increase in within-
firm wage inequality.
My findings have broader implications about how acquiring firms redraw their boundaries
after takeovers. Given the extent of post-takeover labor restructuring, takeovers should
be viewed as a vehicle of an extensive organizational change that resets the boundaries
of the firms in a manner that is indicative of technological change and efficiency-seeking
consolidation.
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1.5 Figures and Tables
1.5.1 Figures
Figure 1.1: Publicly Announced and Completed M&A Transactions in Brazil, Including Majority
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics - M&As
Panel A: Firm Characteristics
Treated Firms Population
Variables p50 Mean Std Dev. p50 Mean Std Dev.
Number of Employees 139 678 1,672 2 15 894
Total Wage Bill (R$) 231,753 1,301,086 4,135,980 1,568 19,759 1,184,941
Log Employment 4.9 4.9 1.7 1.1 1.4 1.1
Log Total Wage Bill 12 12 1.9 7.4 6.8 2.9
Number of Firms 2,204 5,056,407
Panel B: Target Vs. Acquirer Characteristics
Target Firms Acquiring Firms
Variables p50 Mean Std Dev. p50 Mean Std Dev.
Number of Employees 142 648 2,636 396 2,602 5,203
Total Wage Bill (R$) 268,153 1,265,115 5,264,600 904,683 6,352,138 26,095,079
Log Employment 5 5 1.7 6 5.8 2.3
Log Total Wage Bill 12 12 1.8 14 13 3.4
Routine Share 0.79 0.71 0.24 0.72 0.64 0.25
High-Skilled Share 0.16 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.35 0.29
Number of Firms 1,564 1,381
Panel C: Deal Characteristics
Variables N Mean Std Dev.
Deal Value ($M) 812 229.23 709.01
Cross-Border 2,058 0.40 0.49
Public Acquirer 2,058 0.35 0.48
Public Target 2,264 0.04 0.18
Diversifying 2,058 0.17 0.38
Friendly 2,058 0.98 0.15
Notes: The table reports firm-level descriptive statistics for treated firms and the population of firms. The
data refer to the time of the M&A Transaction.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.2: M&A Target Firms by Sector of Operation
M&A Target Firms
Sector Domestic Cross-Border Total (%)
Agriculture 25 19 1.90%
Forestry 4 0 0.17%
Oil and Natural Gas Extraction 1 6 0.30%
Metallic Mineral Mining 7 6 0.56%
Non-Metallic Mineral Mining 5 2 0.30%
Food and Beverage Manufacturing 108 62 7.35%
Tobacco Products Manufacturing 1 1 0.09%
Textile Products Manufacturing 12 3 0.65%
Apparel Manufacturing 6 4 0.43%
Leather Processing, Luggage and Footwear Manufacturing 5 4 0.39%
Wood Products Manufacturing 2 2 0.17%
Pulp, Paper and Paper Products Manufacturing 22 20 1.82%
Publishing, Printing and Reproduction of Recordings 24 16 1.73%
Coal and Nuclear Products, Oil Refining and Alcohol Production 12 7 0.82%
Chemical Products Manufacturing 67 75 6.14%
Rubber and Plastics Product Manufacturing 15 30 1.94%
Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 23 10 1.43%
Metals Production and Basic Processing 9 12 0.91%
Metal Product Manufacturing 10 28 1.64%
Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 24 43 2.90%
Office and Data Processing Equipment Manufacturing 2 6 0.35%
Electrical Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 6 18 1.04%
Electronic Components Manufacturing 7 10 0.73%
Medical Equipment, Optical and Precision Instruments 4 12 0.69%
Motor Vehicle Assembly and Manufacturing 7 13 0.86%
Other Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 3 6 0.39%
Furniture and Miscellaneome Manufacturing 4 2 0.26%
Recycling 1 1 0.09%
Production and Distribution of Energy 27 17 1.90%
Treatment and Distribution of Water 5 0 0.22%
Construction Services 27 18 1.94%
Automotives and Fuels Trade 14 9 0.99%
Wholesale Trade 74 87 6.96%
Retail Trade and Repairs 82 44 5.45%
Hospitality and Food 12 13 1.08%
Ground Transportation 26 6 1.38%
Maritime Transportation 1 2 0.13%
Aviation 9 5 0.61%
Auxiliary Transportation 70 18 3.80%
Telecommunications 34 10 1.90%
Financial Services 35 10 1.94%
Insurance 29 17 1.99%
Auxiliary Financial Services 19 20 1.69%
Real Estate Services 52 6 2.51%
Rentals 8 3 0.48%
IT and Software Related Activities 100 71 7.39%
R&D 2 2 0.17%
Advertising, Auditing, Consulting and Other Corporate Services 128 152 12.10%
Public Administration, Defense, and Social Security 2 1 0.13%
Education 90 11 4.36%
Health and Social Services 70 1 3.07%
Sewage and Cleaning Services 6 1 0.30%
Associative Activities 3 6 0.39%
Recreational, Cultural and Sports Activities 16 5 0.91%
Laundry, Dry Cleaning and Fitness Activities 2 2 0.17%
Notes: Sector of Operation (2-Digit CNAE) at the Time of the M&A Transaction.
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics - Treated Vs. Control Firms
Panel A: Firm Characteristics - Pre-Period
Treated Firms Control Firms
Variables p50 Mean Std Dev. p50 Mean Std Dev. Difference
Number of Employees 118 613 1,691 123 568 1,285 45
Total Wage Bill (R$) 224,070 1,216,405 4,570,886 187,602 1,156,268 3,907,803 36,468
Log Employment 4.8 4.8 1.8 4.9 4.8 1.7 0
Log Total Wage Bill 12 12 2 12 12 1.8 0
Routine Share 0.80 0.72 0.24 0.78 0.72 0.18 0
High-Skilled Share 0.16 0.26 0.26 0.14 0.23 0.21 0.03
Number of Firms 2,204 20,257
Panel B: Firm Characteristics (t = 0)
Treated Firms Control Firms
Variables p50 Mean Std Dev. p50 Mean Std Dev. Difference
Number of Employees 139 678 1,672 132 581 1,305 97
Total Wage Bill (R$) 231,753 1,301,086 4,135,980 215,063 1,063,845 3,791,463 237,241
Log Employment 4.9 4.9 1.7 4.9 4.9 1.6 0
Log Total Wage Bill 12 12 1.8 12 12 1.8 0
Routine Share 0.79 0.72 0.24 0.80 0.74 0.18 -0.02
High-Skilled Share 0.16 0.27 0.26 0.14 0.24 0.22 0.03
Number of Firms 2,204 20,257
Panel C: Workers’ Characteristics (t = 0)
Treated Employees Control Employees
Variables p50 Mean Std Dev. p50 Mean Std Dev. Difference
Education 7 6.4 1.9 7 6.1 1.9 0.3
Male 1 0.65 0.52 1 0.63 0.48 0.2
Age 30 32 9.1 30 32 9.3 0
Tenure (in Months) 14 37 57 13 32 48 5
Log(Wage) 6.9 7 1.3 6.8 6.9 1.1 0.1
Number of Workers 2,281,039 9,021,397
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics: (I) at the firm-level for the pre-takeover period (Panel
A), (II) at the firm-level at the time of the M&A transaction (Panel B) and, (III) at the worker-level at
the time of the M&A transaction (Panel C). Education takes values from 1 to 11 ranging from Illiteracy to
Doctoral Degree. An education level of 7 reflects completion of high school education.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.4: Total Employment and Wages
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Log(L) Log(Wages) Log(Wages/L)
Post -0.036*** -0.105*** -0.030***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.003)
Post ×ITreatedi -0.288*** -0.174*** 0.143***
(0.019) (0.031) (0.008)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Municipality x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 148,060 148,060 148,060
Adjusted R2 0.89 0.81 0.66
Notes: In Column (1) the dependent variable is firm-level employment. In Column (2) the dependent
variable is firm-level log wages. In Column (3) the dependent variable is the firm-level log wage per employee.
Employment is measured as the log number of employees in the firm. Post is a dummy that equals 1 for the
two-year period after the M&A transaction, and 0 for the the two-year period prior to the M&A transaction.
ITreatedi is an indicator function equal to 1 for firms that have been targeted at an M&A transaction at any
point in time, and equal to 0 for control firms that have never been involved in a M&A transaction either
as targets or acquirers during the period under study. Standard errors are clustered at the transaction level.
The sample period is from 2002 to 2014.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.5: Labor Restructuring and Labor Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Separation Firing Voluntary Hiring Log(Occupations)
Rate Rate Rate Rate
Post -0.039*** -0.030*** -0.009 -0.062*** -0.035***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003)
Post ×ITreatedi 0.379*** 0.326*** 0.054*** -0.318** -0.108***
(0.038) (0.034) (0.008) (0.156) (0.011)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 146,874 146,874 146,874 146,874 148,060
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.30 0.21 0.18 0.89
Notes: In Column (1) the dependent variable is the firm-level ratio of the number of separations at a
specific year over employment in the previous year. In Column (2) the dependent variable is the firm-level
ratio of the number of involuntary separations at a specific year over employment in the previous year.
In Column (3) the dependent variable is the firm-level ratio of the number of voluntary separations at a
specific year over employment in the previous year. In Column (4) the dependent variable is the firm-level
ratio of the number of hirings at a specific year over employment in the previous year. In Column (5) the
dependent variable is the log number of distinct occupational codes at a specific year. Post is a dummy that
equals 1 for the two-year period after the M&A transaction, and 0 for the the two-year period prior to the
M&A transaction. ITreatedi is an indicator function equal to 1 for firms that have been targeted at an M&A
transaction at any point in time, and equal to 0 for control firms that have never been involved in a M&A
transaction either as targets or acquirers during the period under study. Standard errors are clustered at
the transaction level. The sample period is from 2002 to 2014.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.6: Labor Restructuring and Level of Skill
High-Skilled Labor Low-Skilled Labor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Involuntary Voluntary Involuntary Voluntary
Post 0.050*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.007***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001)
Post ×ITreatedj 0.012 0.010*** 0.059*** 0.002
(0.012) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004)
Employee Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,209,866 5,209,866 28,896,450 28,896,450
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.30 0.35 0.39
Notes: In Columns (1) and (3) the dependent variable is an employee-level binary variable that equals 1
for involuntary separation at a specific year and 0 otherwise. In Columns (2) and (4) the dependent variable
is an employee-level binary variable that equals 1 for voluntary separation at a specific year and 0 otherwise
Columns (1) and (2) refer to the sample that includes only high-skilled labor, while Columns (3) and (4) refer
to the sample that includes only low-skilled employees. High-skilled labor includes employees that have at
least completed an undergraduate degree. Low-skilled labor includes employees that have at most received
high-school education. Post is a dummy that equals 1 for the two-year period after the M&A transaction,
and 0 for the the two-year period prior to the M&A transaction. ITreatedj is an indicator function equal to 1
for individuals that have been employed in a firm that was the target of an M&A transaction at any point in
time, and equal to 0 for the individuals of control firms. Employee controls include age, gender, tenure and
education. Standard errors are clustered at the transaction level. The sample period is from 2002 to 2014.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.7: Labor Restructuring and Managers
Involuntary Voluntary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Full Sample Domestic Cross-Border Full Sample Domestic Cross-Border
Post 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.048*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Post ×ITreatedj 0.032*** 0.040*** 0.018 0.005 0.004 0.006
(0.008) (0.010) (0.019) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Employee Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,685,446 882,692 802,663 1,685,446 882,692 802,663
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.26 0.32 0.30 0.25 0.32
Notes: The sample includes employees in managerial positions. Managerial positions are occupations with
a two-digit ISCO code equal to 12. In Columns (1)-(3) the dependent variable is an employee-level binary
variable that equals 1 for involuntary separation at a specific year and 0 otherwise. In Columns (4)-(6) the
dependent variable is an employee-level binary variable that equals 1 for voluntary separation at a specific
year and 0 otherwise. Columns (1) and (4) examine the full sample of M&As. Columns (2) and (5) examine
the sample of Domestic M&As, while Column (3) and (6) examine the sample of Cross-Border M&As. Post
is a dummy that equals 1 for the two-year period after the M&A transaction, and 0 for the the two-year
period prior to the M&A transaction. ITreatedj is an indicator function equal to 1 for individuals that have
been employed in a firm that was the target of an M&A transaction at any point in time, and equal to 0
for the individuals of control firms. Employee controls include age, gender, tenure and education. Standard
errors are clustered at the transaction level. The sample period is from 2002 to 2014.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.8: Labor Restructuring and Routine-Biased Change
Involuntary Separation
Non-Routine Routine
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Full Sample Domestic Cross-Border Full Sample Domestic Cross-Border
Post 0.053*** 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.014*** 0.004 0.019**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008)
Post ×ITreatedj 0.027** 0.037** 0.018 0.060*** 0.071*** 0.049***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.021) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
Employee Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,009,071 4,360,902 3,422,026 25,691,547 12,848,318 12,102,520
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.34 0.38 0.34 0.27 0.36
Notes: The dependent variable is an employee-level binary variable that equals 1 for involuntary separation
at a specific year and 0 otherwise. Columns (1)-(3) refer to the sample that includes only routine employees,
while Columns (4)-(6) refer to the sample that includes only non-routine employees. Employees are catego-
rized as Routine or Non-Routine based on their occupational Routine Task Intensity (RTI) Score. Routine
employees have a positive RTI, while non-routine employees have a negative RTI. Columns (1) and (4) ex-
amine the full sample of M&As. Columns (2) and (5) examine the sample of Domestic M&As, while Column
(3) and (6) examine the sample of Cross-Border M&As. Post is a dummy that equals 1 for the two-year
period after the M&A transaction, and 0 for the the two-year period prior to the M&A transaction. ITreatedj
is an indicator function equal to 1 for individuals that have been employed in a firm that was the target
of an M&A transaction at any point in time, and equal to 0 for the individuals of control firms. Employee
controls include age, gender, tenure and education. Standard errors are clustered at the transaction level.
The sample period is from 2002 to 2014.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.9: Labor Restructuring - Hirings
Skill Level Routine Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Low-Skilled High-Skilled Routine Non-Routine
Post -0.017*** 0.009 -0.011* 0.001
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011)
Post ×ITreatedj -0.055*** -0.009 -0.044*** -0.011
(0.009) (0.018) (0.010) (0.024)
Employee Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 28,896,486 5,209,967 25,691,547 8,009,071
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.31 0.34 0.35
Notes: The table reports the effect of M&A on hirings. Columns (1) and (2) focus on high-skilled versus
low-skilled employees, while Columns (3) and (4) focus on routine versus non-routine employees. Post is a
dummy that equals 1 for the two-year period after the M&A transaction, and 0 for the the two-year period
prior to the M&A transaction. ITreatedj is an indicator function equal to 1 for employees that have been
employed at a firm targeted at an M&A transaction at any point in time, and equal to 0 for employees of
control firms that have never been involved in a M&A transaction either as targets or acquirers during the
period under study. Standard errors are clustered at the transaction level. The sample period is from 2002
to 2014.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.10: Human Capital Overlap
Target Employees Acquirer Employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Voluntary Involuntary Involuntary Voluntary Involuntary Involuntary
Overlap 0.001 0.015*** 0.018** 0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
Low-Skilled 0.080*** 0.042***
(0.020) (0.006)
Low-Skilled × Overlap 0.010** 0.005
(0.005) (0.004)
Employee Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,394,702 3,394,702 3,394,702 29,050,925 29,050,925 29,050,925
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.42 0.44 0.48 0.41 0.42
Notes: The table reports the impact of human capital overlap on the likelihood of voluntary and involuntary
separation in the post-takeover period. Columns (1)-(3) use the subsample of target employees in the post-
takeover period, while (4)-(6) use the subsample of acquirer employees in the post-takeover period. In
Columns (1) and (4) the dependent variable is an employee-level binary variable that equals 1 for voluntary
separation at a specific year and 0 otherwise. In Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) the dependent variable is an
employee-level binary variable that equals 1 for involuntary separation at a specific year and 0 otherwise.
Low-skilled labor includes employees that have at most received high-school education.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.11: Skill-Biased and Routine-Biased Change
(1) (2) (3)
Variables High-Skilled Share Routine Share R&D Share
Post -0.002 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Post ×ITreatedi 0.070*** -0.076*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Municipality x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 148,060 148,060 148,060
Adjusted R2 0.91 0.88 0.62
Notes: In Column (1) the dependent variable is the share of high-skilled labor at the firm level. In Column
(2) the dependent variable is the firm-level share of routine labor. In Column (3) the dependent variable
is the firm-level share of labor in occupational tasks related to R&D. High-skilled labor includes employees
that have at least completed an undergraduate degree. Routine labor includes employees that the Routine
Task Intensity (RTI) Score is positive. The categorization in R&D occupations is based on the occupational
code reported in RAIS. Post is a dummy that equals 1 for the two-year period after the M&A transaction,
and 0 for the the two-year period prior to the M&A transaction. ITreatedi is an indicator function equal to
1 for firms that have been targeted at an M&A transaction at any point in time, and equal to 0 for control
firms that have never been involved in a M&A transaction either as targets or acquirers during the period
under study. Standard errors are clustered at the transaction level. The sample period is from 2002 to 2014.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.12: Labor Restructuring and Average Wages
Average Wage
(1) (2)
Variables High-Skilled Labor Low-Skilled Labor
Post -0.007*** -0.034***
(0.003) (0.003)
Post ×ITreatedi 0.049*** -0.146***
(0.008) (0.028)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Municipality x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 148,060 148,060
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.62
Notes: The dependent variable is average log wage at the firm-level. In Column (1) the dependent variable
is measured including only the high-skilled labor of the firm. In Column (2) the dependent variable is
measured including only the low-skilled labor of the firm. High-skilled labor includes employees that have at
least completed an undergraduate degree. Low-skilled labor includes employees that have at most received
high-school education. Post is a dummy that equals 1 for the two-year period after the M&A transaction,
and 0 for the the two-year period prior to the M&A transaction. ITreatedi is an indicator function equal to
1 for firms that have been targeted at an M&A transaction at any point in time, and equal to 0 for control
firms that have never been involved in a M&A transaction either as targets or acquirers during the period
under study. Standard errors are clustered at the transaction level. The sample period is from 2002 to 2014.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.13: Labor Restructuring and Wage Inequality
(1) (2)
Variables Standard Deviation of Log Wages 90-10 Wage Ratio
Post -0.009 0.008
(0.008) (0.014)
Post ×ITreatedi 0.068*** 0.133***
(0.012) (0.026)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Municipality x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 148,060 148,060
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.68
Notes: The dependent variable is a measure of wage inequality. In Column (1) the relevant measure is the
standard deviation of log wages at the firm level, while in Column (2) the firm-level ratio of the 90th wage
percentile to the 10th wage percentile (Column (2)). Post is a dummy that equals 1 for the two-year period
after the M&A transaction, and 0 for the the two-year period prior to the M&A transaction. ITreatedi is an
indicator function equal to 1 for firms that have been targeted at an M&A transaction at any point in time,
and equal to 0 for control firms that have never been involved in a M&A transaction either as targets or
acquirers during the period under study. Standard errors are clustered at the transaction level. The sample
period is from 2002 to 2014.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.14: Combined Entity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Log(L) Log(Wages) High-Skilled Routine 90-10 Wage
Share Share Ratio
Post -0.080*** -0.113*** -0.002 0.003 0.004
(0.012) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012)
Post ×ITreatedi -0.129*** -0.099*** 0.043*** -0.048*** 0.096***
(0.025) (0.029) (0.002) (0.002) (0.023)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 219,469 219,469 219,469 219,469 219,469
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.80 0.90 0.85 0.71
Notes: The dependent variable is one of the following: log employment (Column (1)), log wages (Column
(2)), share of high-skilled employees (Column (3)), share of routine employees (Column (4)), and wage
inequality (Column (5)). Post is a dummy that equals 1 for the two-year period after the M&A transaction
was withdrawn, and 0 for the the two-year period prior to the withdrawal of the M&A transaction. ITreatedi
is an indicator function equal to 1 for firms that have been targeted at an M&A transaction at any point in
time that has been subsequently withdrawn, and equal to 0 for control firms that have never been involved
in a M&A transaction either as targets or acquirers during the period under study. Standard errors are
clustered at the transaction level. The sample period is from 2002 to 2014.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.15: Labor Restructuring - Takeover Types
Combined Entity
Log(L) Log(Wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Focused Diversifying Focused Diversifying
M&As M&As M&As M&As
Post -0.087*** -0.051*** -0.116*** -0.092***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016)
Post ×ITreatedi -0.153*** 0.025 -0.117*** 0.039
(0.028) (0.048) (0.038) (0.041)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 179,908 39,517 179,908 39,517
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.91 0.80 0.84
Notes: The table reports the effect of different types of M&As on total employment and total wage bill of
the combined entity. In Columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is the log number of employees, while
in Columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is the log total wage bill. Columns (1) and (3) present results
for focused M&As and Columns (2) and (4) present results for diversifying M&As. Post is a dummy that
equals 1 for the two-year period after the M&A transaction, and 0 for the the two-year period prior to the
M&A transaction. ITreatedi is an indicator function equal to 1 for firms that have been targeted at an M&A
transaction at any point in time, and equal to 0 for control firms that have never been involved in a M&A
transaction either as targets or acquirers during the period under study. Standard errors are clustered at
the transaction level. The sample period is from 2002 to 2014.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.16: Labor Restructuring - Human Capital Relatedness
Combined Entity
Log(L) Log(Wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables High HCR Low HCR High HCR Low HCR
M&As M&As M&As M&As
Post -0.024** -0.081*** -0.107*** -0.090***
(0.012) (0.017) (0.024) (0.016)
Post ×ITreatedi -0.193*** -0.095** -0.164*** -0.041***
(0.036) (0.046) (0.048) (0.006)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 92,247 83,513 92,247 83,513
Adjusted R2 0.89 0.89 0.81 0.81
Notes: The table reports the effect of M&As with different level of Human Capital Relatedness on total
employment and total wage bill of the combined entity. In Columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is
the log number of employees, while in Columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is the log total wage bill.
Columns (1) and (3) present results for M&As with a high level of human capital relatedness and Columns
(2) and (4) present results for M&As with a low level of human capital relatedness. Post is a dummy that
equals 1 for the two-year period after the M&A transaction, and 0 for the the two-year period prior to the
M&A transaction. ITreatedi is an indicator function equal to 1 for firms that have been targeted at an M&A
transaction at any point in time, and equal to 0 for control firms that have never been involved in a M&A
transaction either as targets or acquirers during the period under study. Standard errors are clustered at
the transaction level. The sample period is from 2002 to 2014.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Post ×ITreatedi -0.007 0.063
(0.020) (0.107)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Municipality x Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 51,519 51,519
Adjusted R2 0.93 0.86
Notes: The dependent variable is either log employment or log wages. Post is a dummy that equals 1 for
the two-year period after the M&A transaction was withdrawn, and 0 for the the two-year period prior to
the withdrawal of the M&A transaction. ITreatedi is an indicator function equal to 1 for firms that have been
targeted at an M&A transaction at any point in time that has been subsequently withdrawn, and equal to
0 for control firms that have never been involved in a M&A transaction either as targets or acquirers during
the period under study. Standard errors are clustered at the transaction level. The sample period is from
2002 to 2014.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.18: Investment in Capital
Panel A: Summary Statistics at t = 0
Treated Firms Control Firms
Variables Mean p50 Std Dev. Mean p50 Std Dev. Difference
Log(Assets) 7.46 7.74 7.46 1.66 7.36 7.72 1.85 0.10
Leverage 0.33 0.29 0.42 0.32 0.28 0.50 0.01
Cash 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.01
CapEx 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.11 0
PPE Growth 0.05 -0.02 0.16 0.06 -0.01 0.24 -0.01
Intangible Assets Growth 0.06 0.00 0.16 0.04 -0.01 42.56 0.02
Number of Firms 82 421
Panel B: Regression Analysis
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Intangible Assets Growth PPE Growth CapEx
Post -5.15 -4.40 -0.01
(10.09) (3.39) (0.01)
Post ×ITreatedi 55.02** 3.46** 0.027**
(26.73) (1.74) (0.13)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Municipality Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,151 3,156 2,111
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.43 0.34
Notes: Panel A reports descriptive statistics of firm-level financial variables for public firms included
in Compustat. The variables included are the natural logarithm of total assets (Compustat Item AT),
leverage ((Compustat Item DLC + Compustat Item DLTT)/Compustat Item AT), cash (Compustat Item
CHE)/Compustat Item AT), CapEx (Compustat Item CAPX)/Compustat Item AT(t-1)) and PPE growth
(Compustat Item PPENT/Compustat Item PPENT(t-1) -1). Panel B reports the results of a univariate
analysis that compares the change in capital expenditures between treated and control firms in the period
before and after the takeover. Panel C report firm-level regression results for the sample of public firms. In
Column (1) the dependent variable is Intangible Assets Growth, in Column (2) the dependent variable is
PPE growth, while in Column (3) the dependent variable is CapEx. Post is a dummy that equals 1 for the
two-year period after the M&A transaction, and 0 for the the two-year period prior to the M&A transaction.
ITreatedi is an indicator function equal to 1 for firms that have been targeted at an M&A transaction at any
point in time, and equal to 0 for control firms that have never been involved in a M&A transaction either as
targets or acquirers during the period under study. Firms controls include leverage, cash and sales growth
(Compustat Item SALE).
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.19: Labor Restructuring and Unemployment
Labor Outcomes
Low-Skilled High-Skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Unemployed Spell Turnover Log(Wage) Unemployed Spell Turnover Log(Wage)
Post 0.041*** 0.441*** 0.079*** -0.059*** 0.036*** 0.366*** 0.095*** -0.110***
(0.004) (0.041) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.029) (0.007) (0.007)
Post ×ITreatedj 0.033*** 0.430*** 0.053*** -0.056** 0.009 0.110 0.018 -0.021
(0.007) (0.078) (0.016) (0.024) (0.008) (0.056) (0.013) (0.019)
Employee Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 28,896,486 28,896,486 28,896,486 28,896,486 5,209,967 5,209,967 5,209,967 5,209,967
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.42 0.47 0.50 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.48
Notes: The table reports results on employment outcomes of target employees in the post-takeover period.
Columns (1)-(4) focus on low-skilled employees, while Columns (5)-(8) focus on high-skilled employees. The
dependent variable is: (I) in Columns (1) and (5) an indicator variable that equals 1 for employees that have
experienced displacement and unemployment in the 2-year period after their displacement and 0 otherwise,
(II) in Columns (2) and (6) the sum of unemployment spells in months for employees that have experienced
displacement and unemployment in the 2-year period after their displacement and 0 otherwise, (III) in
Columns (3) and (7) the number of jobs for employees that have experienced displacement in the 2-year
period after their displacement and 0 otherwise, and (IV) in Columns (4) and (8) the average monthly log
wage during the year. High-skilled labor includes employees that have at least completed an undergraduate
degree. Low-skilled labor includes employees that have at most received high-school education. Post is a
dummy that equals 1 for the two-year period after the M&A transaction, and 0 for the the two-year period
prior to the M&A transaction. ITreatedj is an indicator function equal to 1 for individuals that have been
employed in a firm that was the target of an M&A transaction at any point in time, and equal to 0 for the
individuals of control firms. Employee controls include age, gender, tenure and education. Standard errors
are clustered at the transaction level. The sample period is from 2002 to 2014.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Chapter 2
Firm Growth and Labor Reallocation
after Exposure of Corrupt Practices
2.1 Introduction
Recent studies using firm-level data have documented two stylized facts. First, the exis-
tence of large and persistent differences in size and productivity across firms even within
narrowly-defined sectors. Second, that such differences are larger among firms that operate
in developing countries than among firms that operate in developed countries (Hsieh and
Klenow 2009). Several theoretical models have attributed this dispersion to frictions at the
firm level, which prevent the reallocation of factors of production from low to high produc-
tivity firms. For example, some low-productivity firms might be kept artificially large by
preferential access to finance, government subsidies, corporate tax policy or other regulation,
at the expense of more productive firms whose growth is, in this way, hindered. Therefore,
removing or attenuating these frictions should result in a lower dispersion in firm size and
productivity, a better allocation of resources, and higher output (Restuccia and Rogerson
2008).
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In this essay I study one potential source of such frictions: preferential assignment of
procurement contracts by the government. In particular, I estimate the effect of disclosing
corrupt practices of firms that have procurement contracts with local governments on firm
growth and labor reallocation. To identify this effect, I exploit exogenous variation in the
timing of exposure of illegally favored firms using random municipality audits by a large
anti-corruption program in Brazil. In 2003, the Brazilian government started to randomly
audit municipal budgets for their use of federal funds. Among the most common types of
misuse of federal funds revealed by this auditing program are the absence of a proper tender
process - which favored a specific company - or the over-invoicing for the provision of certain
goods and services. Both companies and local politicians involved in these practices are
reported. The audit reports are then published online and are available to the public and
the popular press. From the audit reports, I manually collected information on the firms
illegally favored by local government officials, as well as details on the nature of the misuse
and the sums involved. When corrupt practices are revealed, consequences for firms involved
vary from a ban to participate in future tender processes, restitution of misuse funds, pay of
a penalty fee up to judicial action.
I match corrupt firms exposed in this program with detailed information on their labor
force. I use the employer-employee dataset RAIS (Relação Anual de Informações Sociais) of
the Brazilian Ministry of Labor (MTE), which records comprehensive employee-level infor-
mation on wage, occupation, demographic characteristics along with employer tax identifier,
location and sector of operation.1 According to the Brazilian law, every private or public-
1To be more precise, I match the 14-digit firm fiscal identifier reported in the audit report with the fiscal
identifier in the RAIS dataset. This code identifies a firm for single-plant firms, and a specific plant for
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sector employer must report this information every year to the Ministry of Labor. The
Ministry of Labor estimates that RAIS includes over 90 percent of formally employed indi-
viduals in Brazil.
I then use the random nature of the auditing program to estimate the effect of disclosure
of corrupt practices on firm growth and labor reallocation. I find that firms exposed by
the auditing program experience a decline in employment growth relative to similar firms
operating in the same sector and municipality after public disclosure of the report. The
magnitude of my estimates indicate that exposed firms experienced on average 1.1% lower
monthly growth (13.2% annualized) in terms of employment relative to non-exposed firms in
the year after the audit report. In addition, exposed firms are 5.4% more likely to exit from
my sample within a year following disclosure of corrupt practices. There are two potential
mechanisms that can explain this effect. Exposed firms might experience a negative shock to
the present value of their future earnings coming from procurement contracts.2 This could
be because local politicians that used to favor them are less likely to be re-elected, as shown
in Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2011). Or because, following exposure, the company might be
banned from participating in future tender offers by local governments. Also, if the federal
government is a customer itself of the same company, those contracts might also be lost.
Another potential mechanism linking exposure to firm growth has to do with reputation.
That is, exposed companies might face issues getting new credit, catering to new clients or
hiring workers due to the exposure of their questionable ethical behavior.
multi-plant firms. In the rest of the essay I will use the term firm to identify this unit of observation.
2The positive effect of procurement contracts on firm growth has been documented in Ferraz, Finan, and
Szerman (2015).
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Next, given the observed employment decline, I focus on exposed firms and investigate
the heterogeneous effects on the probability of separation among employees with different
characteristics. I observe that, after exposure, separation rates are higher for male, younger
employees and employees with lower education. Furthermore, non-managerial employees are
more likely to leave exposed firms.
Finally, and related to the previous point, I investigate the effect of this auditing pro-
gram on labor reallocation. I find that municipality-sectors in which exposed firms operate
experience a reduction in the dispersion of firm size after the disclosure of the audit report.
This result is consistent with part of the workers released by exposed firms being hired by
smaller firms operating in the same municipality-sector, and whose growth was previously
limited by unfair competition. Crucially, I find that the share of workers that leave exposed
firms and is then hired by another exposed firms substantially decreases after exposure. My
results show that, conditional on finding another job, 17% of workers leaving exposed firms
in the year before exposure end up working for another exposed firm. This share decreases
to 9% in the year after exposure and to only 5% two years after exposure. In other words,
these results suggest that exposure of corrupt practices generates a reallocation of workers
from politically-connected firms to non-politically connected ones.
The essay adds to the literature investigating the effect of corruption on firm-level out-
comes. There is a vast literature that shows that corruption reduces aggregate growth and
has negative implications for welfare (e.g. Mauro 1995, Clague, Keefer, Knack, and Olson
1996, Hall and Jones 1999, La Porta and Lopez-de Silanes 1999, Shleifer and Vishny 1993,
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Glaeser and Saks 2006.)3 Moreover prior studies have shown that preferential treatment of
firm by politicians increase firm value (Fisman 2001, Johnson and Mitton 2003, Bortolotti
and Faccio 2004 and Brogaard, Denes, and Duchin 2016). Furthermore I relate to the liter-
ature that studies the effects of revealing corruption in firms (Smith, Stettler, and Beedles
1984, Karpoff, Lee, and Martin 2013 and Zeume 2017).
My study both complements and adds to these literatures. By exploiting the random
timing of the audits, I can precisely identify the effects of revealing corruption on firms
and alleviate concerns that my results might be driven by aggregate trends. Furthermore,
although it is not random which firms are caught, the random timing of the audits and the
fact that I can observe all firms caught, overcomes reporting and timing concerns related
to using prosecuted cases (i.e. many cases can be settled before going to prosecution stage)
or cases related to voluntary disclosures. Moreover, my study offers new evidence in the
literature on the effect of revealing corruption on labor reallocation. I show that exposing
corrupt practices leads to increased separation rates in the firms, especially for young and
less educated employees. Thus, my results highlight the role of preferential allocation for
contracts as a potential friction generating labor misallocation. In this sense, my essay is
also linked to the recent literature on the determinants of misallocation of capital and labor
across firms, and their aggregate implications (Hsieh and Klenow 2009).
Several papers have exploited the Brazilian random audit reports experiment following
the seminal work of Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2011). Most of the literature has used variation
at municipality level to study the effect of exposure of corruption practices on electoral and
3Bardhan (1997) and Svensson (2005) offer a review of the literature on this topic.
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economic outcomes. For example, Bologna and Ross (2015) use random audits of municipal
governments to study the effect of corruption on the number of business establishment as
reported in RAIS. My experiment is similar in nature but exploit information on specific firms
whose corrupt practices have been exposed in the audit reports and study their performance
around these episodes. In a contemporaneous study, Colonnelli and Prem (2017) examine
the effect of the Brazilian anti-corruption program on local economic activity, as well as
the direct effect of exposure of corrupt practices at firm-level employment, credit borrowing
and investment. They show that, over the five years after exposure, exposed firms tend to
perform better than comparable firms in terms of both financial and real outcomes. I differ
from this study by focusing on the short run effects of the auditing program on employment
growth, as well as by focusing on the establishments mentioned directly in the audit reports
instead of the firms they belong to.
The rest of the essay proceeds as follows. In section 2.1.1, I describe the federal audit-
ing program in more details. Then, in section 2.2.1, I describe my two main data sources:
employer-employee information from the RAIS dataset and manually extracted information
on firm corrupt practices from publicly available audit reports. In this section I also present a
set of stylized facts and summary statistics on firms that were exposed by the anti-corruption
program and how they compare with similar firms operating in the same sector and munici-
pality. Section 2.2.3 presents a simple theoretical framework that I use to guide the empirical
analysis. Finally, in Section 2.3 I present all my main empirical results.
82
2.1.1 Background: Brazil Anti-Corruption Program
The anticorruption program, which features a municipality-level random auditing, began
in 2003. The audit process is conducted by the Controladoria-Geral da União (CGU). It
audits the municipal governments’ expenditures from federal funds. The program began by
selecting 26 municipalities (one from each state in Brazil) per lottery, and later expanded
to 60 municipalities per lottery. The random selection is performed monthly. The lottery
draw event invites the press, political parties, and the civil society to join and spectate, for
transparency purposes. The pool from which the lottery is drawn includes all municipalities
with population less than 450,000; the pool includes approximately 92 percent of Brazil’s
5,564 municipalities and 73 percent of Brazil’s total population (Ferraz and Finan (2008)).
The information is collected by auditors who travel to the municipality and manually reviews
the governments expenditure documents. The auditors are hired competitively through an
exam and earn a competitive salary. The audit process lasts about ten days. In addition to
Brazil’s federal accountability office (the Tribunal de Contas de União), public prosecutors,
and the municipal legislative branch, the results of the audit are released on the internet and
to the media. According to Ferraz and Finan (2008), the news of revealed corruption will
likely reach the public through the local radio. From the mayors side, corruption commonly
takes the form of frauds, usage of phantom firms, over-invoicing, and diverting resources.
The firms involved in the corrupt behavior are discovered and reported along with the mayor.
There are several potential consequences for firms that are exposed by the auditing pro-
gram. Firms can be barred from participating in future tendering processes for federal
contracts. For example, Planam, an ambulance company, was found to overprice for the
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services provided. The company was subsequently declared illicit by CGU (Internal Audit
Agency/Federal Comptroller) and barred from future public proposals. Furthermore exposed
firms might have to pay penalties or return misused funds. In certain instances, firm owners
might face judicial action.4 Thus there are potentially severe repercussions for caught firms.
My working assumption is that firms exposed by the reports are likely to face a negative
shock to the present value of their future discounted cash flows.
2.2 Methods
2.2.1 Data
This essay uses two main data sources. First, I use employer-employee data covering all for-
mal workers operating in Brazil from RAIS (Relação Anual de Informações Sociais). Second,
I use manually extracted information on firm identifiers and type of misconduct from the
audit report published online by the Controladoria-Geral da União (CGU).
2.2.1.1 RAIS Data
Information on employer-employee relationship contained in RAIS data is collected by the
Ministry of Labor (MTE). Although the data is collected annually, it can be retrospectively
analyzed at a monthly frequency as each observation reports the starting and ending month
of employer-employee relationship. RAIS is published at the employee-level, and the gov-
ernment requires it to cover employees from all formal workers (private and public sector).
The MTE estimates that RAIS includes over 90 percent of formally employed individuals in
4According to the audit reports: ”Irregular practices are forwarded to the Public Ministry and the TCU
(Federal Court of Accounts) for penal action, the CGU for civil action of returning misused funds, and to
Congress.”
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Brazil. The RAIS data include information regarding starting/ending dates of employment,
occupation type, wage level, and demographic characteristics. The ending date is available
in the data if the employee was separated from the job in that year. Interpreting layoffs may
be complicated by mock firing then rehiring for receiving severance pay, a common practice
found in Brazil. Available demographic characteristics include gender, age, and education
level. The occupation type is coded according to the Classificação Brasileira de Ocupações
(CBO). Two versions of the CBO code are reported (one version from 1994 and another
from 2002); the CBO codes from the 1994 publication are mapped to the standard inter-
national occupation classification (ISCO). This concordance follows the approach developed
by Muendler, Poole, Ramey, and Wajnberg (2004). I restrict my sample to workers aged 15
to 55. This is to avoid early retirement affecting entry and exit of workers in the data.5
2.2.1.2 Data from Auditing Reports
Information on the identity of corrupt firms is sourced from the audit reports published
online by the Controladoria Geral da União (CGU). I analyzed 2,144 audit reports. First
I collected the names and social security numbers (CNPJ) of all firms mentioned in these
reports. Second, I manually checked each firm to ensure that it was actually found to be
connected with an irregularity. Finally, I extracted information on the identity of the corrupt
firm, the type of misuse of federal funds in which the firm was involved, the Federal Ministry
that was the original source of the funds, and the amount of money received by the firm.
Using the procedure, I identified a total of 8,854 exposed firms.
5I use the same age restriction as Bustos, Caprettini, and Ponticelli (2016b).
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Figure 2.1 reports the number of lotteries by year (solid black line) as well as the number
of municipalities audited (dashed blue line) and the number of firms whose corrupt practices
have been exposed by the program (dashed red line). The program started in 2003 and,
for this essay, I focus on the 12 years of data between 2003 and 2014. As the figure shows,
the number of lotteries – and of municipalities audited – has been decreasing over time,
at least in part due to the decrease in resources allocated to this auditing program by the
federal Government over time. It is interesting to notice how, despite the lower number of
municipalities audited, the number of exposed firms has been relatively constant at least
until 2010. This might be due to either federal officials getting better at detecting misuse
of federal funds or to a secular increase in corrupt practices in the assignment of public
procurement contracts. Notice also that, starting from 2011 when Brazil enters into a period
of lower economic growth, the number of exposed firms decreases more than proportionally
with respect to the number of audited municipalities per year.
Table 2.1 reports the main types of irregularities detected by the auditing program, as
well as the average and median amount received by the exposed firms. As shown, the most
frequent type of irregularity (38.24%) occurs at the tendering process stage. Standard ex-
amples include procurement contracts assigned without the tendering process ever being
started, favoritism of a given firm in the tendering process and simulation of a competitive
auction (e.g. two competitors with the same address). Other common irregularities include
the existence of fake receipts - i.e. the company charges to local government expenses that
were never incurred - and different types of violation of the contract terms - a common one
being late delivery of goods and services. Notice that if I focus on firms with large procure-
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ment contracts, the most frequent irregularity is overpricing, collusion with competitors and
other irregularities in the tendering process.
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 report, respectively, Ministries and Federal Spending Programs that
are the predominant sources of federal funds and where some type of misuse is detected at
the local level. It is important to remember here that the source of funding is the federal
government but the funds are allocated by municipality-level governments. As shown, the
majority of misused funds originates from the Health and Education Ministries. Detected
misuses include the overpricing of medicines for hospitals or the overpricing of school meals
and desks, up to the improper acquisition of a school bus then used for the political campaign
of the local major.
2.2.2 Descriptive Statistics on Exposed vs Non-Exposed Firms
In this section I present a set of descriptive statistics and basic stylized facts on the firms
whose corrupt practices have been exposed by the auditing program. As I mentioned in
section 2.2.1.2, I manually analyzed 2,144 audit reports from 39 lotteries between the year
2003 to the year 2014, and found a total of 8,854 exposed firms. Figure 2.2 shows the
number of exposed firms (in units) by lottery. As reported in section 2.1.1, the number
of municipalities extracted per lottery has changed over time, which in part explains the
variation in the number of exposed firms. Figure 2.2 additionally separates the number of
exposed firms by size category. I use the firm size categories used by the Brazilian National
Statistical Institute (IBGE), which are based on number of employees. The IBGE defines as
Micro, firms that have between 1 and 9 employees, as Small, firms that employ between 10
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and 49 employees, as Medium, firms that have between 50 and 99 employees, and as Large,
firms with 100 or more employees.6
Table 2.4 compares the share of exposed firms in each size category at the time of the
lottery with the correspondent share in the population of non-exposed firms present in my
data (around 7.1 million). As shown, exposed firms are on average larger than non-exposed
firms. In particular, 36.1 % of exposed firms have at least 10 employees compared to 11.4%
in the total population of firms.
Table 2.5 presents both firm-level and worker-level summary statistics for exposed and
non-exposed firms, as observed at the time of the lottery. In Panel A, I show summary
statistics at the firm level based on 8,854 unique exposed firms and 7,124,669 non-exposed
firms.7 As shown, exposed firms are around 4 to 5 times larger in terms of number of
employees at the time of the lottery. The average size of exposed firms is 53 employees
against the 12 employees of the non-exposed ones. This difference is even larger in terms
of total wage bill. This is consistent with the idea that firms successfully catering to the
demand for goods and services by local governments can rely on relative steady demand as
well as large orders, and therefore grow more. In addition, exposed firms pay, on average,
2% larger salary per worker.
6I add an additional residual category, which I label “Zero” and which captures exposed firms that have
zero employees at the time the lottery took place. As explained in section 2.2.1, the RAIS database only
covers formal firms that have at least 1 employee. However, notice that I build my dataset at firm-month
level starting from contract-level information. This means that a firm that has one employee for at least
one month in a given year will show up in my data with one employee in that month and then with zero
employees in all other months. I will disregard the ”Zero” firms in the empirical analysis.
7The number of observations is higher since several exposed firms have been ”exposed” more than once.
Each exposed firm is then compared with all non-exposed firms operating in the same industry, municipality,
and size category at the time of exposure. This means that I construct a different group of non-exposed peer
firms for each exposed firm, and several non-exposed firm enter in several of these groups (which explains
the large number of N). Similar logic applies to Panel B when I look at workers’ characteristics.
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In Panel B, I report summary statistics at the worker level, which are based on 444,065
unique workers of exposed firms and 84,747,871 unique workers of non-exposed firms. As
shown, workers of exposed firms display, on average: slightly higher levels of education, lower
share of female employees, higher average age and higher average tenure in the firm with
respect to workers in non-exposed firms.
Table 2.6 shows the distribution of exposed and non-exposed firms by 2-digit sector. The
distribution of exposed firms is skewed towards the services sector, and in particular retail
trade and construction. These two sectors alone account for more than 50% of the exposed
firms. Both agriculture and manufacturing have a lower share of exposed firms with respect
to non-exposed firms.
Finally, I look at the geographical location of exposed firms. Notice that firms that
are exposed by the auditing program are not necessarily located in the same municipality
extracted in the lottery. This is because local governments are not required to purchase
goods and services from local firms. Figure 2.3 shows the number and the share of exposed
firms located in the audited municipalities by lottery. Around 70% of exposed firms were
operating outside the municipality that was audited at the time of the lottery.
2.2.3 Theoretical Framework
In this section I present a simple theoretical framework to guide the empirical analysis. In
this framework, firms use labor to produce a final good. One example is a catering firm
producing meals for hospitals.8 Firms are price takers and the market price for the final
8As showed in Table 2.6, the vast majority of exposed firms in my sample operate in the services and
construction sectors.
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good – in my example, an hospital meal – is P . I assume that firms are heterogeneous in two
dimensions: their initial productivity and their connection to the local government. This
connection allows certain firms to be more likely to win a procurement contract. In my
example, connected firms are more likely to win a contract to cater a large public hospital.
Therefore, these firms receive a boost in revenues from their connections, which is captured
by τ . I can write the value of output of firm i as:
PYi =

(1 + τ)P (AiL
α
i ) if i is government-favored
P (AiL
α
i ) if i is not government-favored
(2.1)
where Ai and Li are, respectively, physical productivity and number of workers of firm i.
Profits for firm i can be written as:
πi =

(1 + τ)PYi − wLi if i is government-favored
PYi − wLi if i is not government-favored
(2.2)
Standard FOC for labor implies that the value of marginal product of labor is equal to
the equilibrium wage:
PMPLi = w =

(1 + τ)PMPLi = (1 + τ)Pα
Yi
Li




if i is not government-favored
(2.3)
Consider now two firms that operate in the same sector – the catering business. Suppose
now that firm 1 is a local-government-favored firm, while firm 2 is not. Assume also that
τ > 0. Then, given that the equilibrium wage w must equalize across firms, the following
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holds:
(1 + τ)PMPL1 = w = PMPL2
and:
MPL1 = MPL2/(1 + τ) (2.4)
Since τ > 0, equation 2.4 implies: MPL1 < MPL2. That is, in equilibrium government-
favored firms have lower marginal productivity of labor. In the presence of frictions in
the assignment of procurement contracts, firms connected with the local government are
artificially larger. Labor is misallocated.
Let me now describe how I think about mapping this simple framework to the data. The
basic idea is that exposing corrupt firms removes the wedge τ and let firms compete only on
physical productivity.
In my simple theoretical framework, when τ = 0, labor reallocates from government
favored firms towards non government favored firms until marginal products are equalized.
Therefore, I expect exposed firms to grow relatively less than non-exposed firms following
the audit report. Notice that the timing with which τ goes from positive to zero is exogenous
in the data, as the municipalities targeted by the auditing programs are randomly drawn.
This is important in order to disentangle a shock to τ from other productivity shocks – for
example, a change in Ai – which could also generate a reallocation of labor. In the data, I
do not have a good proxy for firm physical productivity. Therefore, my experiment relies
on the random timing of the exposure. My identification assumption is that the timing of a
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shock to τ is uncorrelated with other productivity shocks happening at the same time. Since
my data is at monthly frequency, I believe this assumption is likely to hold.
Finally, notice that in my theoretical framework there is a unique final good and labor
can freely reallocate across firms. In order to match these assumptions of the model with
the data, when studying the effect of a decrease in τ on changes in employment I always
compare firms operating in the same narrowly defined sector and in the same municipality.
2.3 Results
The objective of this section is to test the main predictions of the theoretical framework
described in section 2.2.3. To this end, I proceed in two steps. First, I study the effect
of exposure on firm growth and firm exit. My hypothesis is that, once corrupt practices
are exposed by the auditing program, firms that used to receive favorable treatment in the
assignment of procurement contracts by the local government no longer do. This translates
into lower employment growth relative to comparable firms operating in the same sector and
municipality, and, potentially, a higher probability of exit. Employees that are laid off by
exposed firms as well as new entrants in the labor market should therefore be more likely
to work for non-exposed firms, at least until marginal products of labor across firms are
equalized. In a second step, I study heterogeneous effects of the auditing program across
workers of different types. Here I am particularly interested in whether exposed firms tend
to lay off relatively more skilled versus unskilled employees, their probability of finding a
new job, as well as which type of job they find in terms of sector, location, and occupation.
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2.3.1 Main Effects of Exposure on Firm Growth
The objective of this section is to document the main effect of being exposed by the audit-
ing program on firm growth. To this end, I estimate the following difference-in-differences
specification:








i ×Monthp) + εimjt (2.5)
where i indexes firms, t indexes time – which is expressed in months – m indexes municipal-
ities and j indexes sectors. I would like to compare exposed firms with non-exposed firms
that are as similar as possible. To this end, I add to my specification a set of municipal-
ity and sector fixed effects interacted with monthly fixed effects (αmt and αjt). Sectors are
defined according to the 2-digit CNAE Brazilian classification, which distinguishes between
the 59 sectors reported in Table 2.6 and described in section 2.2.1. The variable IExposedi is
an indicator function equal to 1 for firms that have been exposed by the auditing program at
any point in time, and equal to 0 for firms that are never exposed during the period under
study.9 Finally, Monthp is a dummy equal to 1 if Monthp = p. The coefficient of interest is
βp, which captures the average difference in firm growth between exposed and non-exposed
firms in the same sector and located in the same municipality when Monthp = p.
10 Notice
that p is expressed relative to the exposure month, which I denote as p = 0. This means that
p = 1 indicates the first month after a firm has been exposed, and β1 captures the average
difference in firm growth between exposed and non-exposed firms one month after exposure.
9This implies that firms that are exposed by audit reports at any point in time are never used as ”control”
group in periods outside the two years around their exposure.
10I assign firms to municipality and sector as reported in my data at time p = 0.
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My working hypothesis is that exposed firms plausibly receive a negative shock to public
procurement contracts after the audit report.
I construct the control group in three alternative ways. In the first approach, for each
lottery I take a 10% random sample of non-exposed firms to be used as control. The random
sample is created using firms that are operating at p = 0, the month of the lottery. In
the second approach, for each exposed firm I use as control group all the firms in the same
municipality and sector that exist at p = 0, the month of the lottery. In the third approach,
for each exposed firm I use as control group all the firms in the same municipality, sector and
size category that exist at p = 0, the month of the lottery. I use the fmy firm size categories
used by the Brazilian National Statistical Institute, as I describe them in Section 2.2.2. In all
three approaches, I then normalize time for both the treated and control group and follow
firms before and after the audit. I am going to focus on exposed and non-exposed firms
that are non-government agencies and located in municipalities that are never audited. The
rationale is that by excluding firms located in audited municipalities we, at least in part,
purge my estimates from any general equilibrium effects coming from changes triggered by
the auditing program on the municipality as a whole. However, my results are unchanged if
I focus on exposed firms regardless of geographical location.
Figure 2.4 reports the estimated βp from equation 2.5 along with the 95 percent confidence
interval, when the outcome variable is firm growth in terms of employment. Notice that in
this specification I focus on a 24 months window around the month of the lottery. Also, the
excluded month is p = −12. This implies that differences in firm growth between exposed
and non-exposed firms are expressed relative to the same difference observed one year before
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the audit report.
As shown, exposed firms have a similar growth rate in terms of employment up to the
month of exposure. Starting from the first month after the publication of the audit report,
however, exposed firms have a relatively lower employment growth with respect to compa-
rable firms operating in the same municipality and sector. Notice that the magnitude of the
estimated coefficients suggests that exposed firms experience around 1 percentage point lower
monthly growth after exposure. After around a year, the difference in firm growth tends to
shrink. Notice that my finding that the effect of exposure on firm growth is temporary is
consistent with my simple theoretical framework. As workers reallocated from exposed to
non-exposed firms, the marginal product of labor of the latter decreases until it equalizes
the one of exposed firms.
Next, I estimate the average effect of exposure on firm growth over the 12 months fol-
lowing the audit report as follows:
∆ log yimjt = αi + αmt + αjt + γPostp + β(I
Exposed
i × Postp) + εimjt (2.6)
where the variable Postp is a dummy equal to 1 for the twelve months following the audit
report, and zero for the twelve months before it. Differently from equation 2.5, where I
estimate the effect of exposure separately for each month, in equation 2.6 I estimate a single
β which captures the average difference in growth rates between exposed and non-exposed
firms in the year after the audit report relative the year before the audit report. Panel A
Column (1) of Table 2.7 reports the results using as control group a 10% random sample
of non-exposed firms. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient indicates that exposed
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firms experienced on average 1.1% lower monthly growth (13.2% annualized) in terms of
employment relative to non-exposed firms in the year after audit report. As I mentioned
above I focus on exposed and non-exposed firms that are located in municipalities that are
never audited, thus my results are not likely to be driven by general equilibrium effects. In
Column (2), I use an alternative control group, composed by non-exposed firms that operate
in the same sector and municipality. In Column (3), in addition to municipality and sector,
I match on size category. Matching on location, sector and size category reduces my point
estimates by half. As shown, the estimated coefficient reported in Column (3) indicates that
exposed firms experienced on average 0.4% lower monthly employment growth relative to
comparable firms. In unreported regressions, I find similar results if I use wage bill as an
alternative outcome.
Furthermore, in Panel B Table 2.7 I estimate the same equation extending the post-
exposure period to 24 months. The results show that the effect still holds in the two-year
horizon, and the estimated coefficients are of similar size as those in Panel A.
2.3.2 Main Effects of Exposure on Exit
In this section I study the effect of exposure of corrupt practices on firm probability of exit.
To this end, I run a simple linear probability model similar to equation (2.6) in the previous
section, as follows:
Pr(Exitimjt = 1) = αi + αmt + αjt + β1Postp + β2(I
Exposed
i × Postp) + εimjt (2.7)
where Pr(Exitimjt = 1) is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i exits from my sample in month t,
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while the variables IExposedi and Postp are defined as in equation (2.6). I define Exit = 1 if a
firm exits the RAIS sample and it is never observed entering again during the period under
study.11 The coefficient of interest is β, which captures the difference in monthly probability
of exit between exposed firms and comparable non-exposed firm before and after exposure.
The results of estimating equation 2.7 are reported in Table 2.8. As shown, exposed
firms have a statistically significant higher probability of exit with respect to comparable
non-exposed firms in the period under exposure. Panel A Column (1) of Table 2.8 reports
the results using as control group a 10% random sample of non-exposed firms. The magnitude
of the estimated coefficient indicates that exposed firms experienced on average 0.45% lower
monthly growth in terms of employment relative to non-exposed firms in the year after
audit report. Given that the mean monthly probability of exit in the sample is 0.4%, the
result implies that the probability of exit doubles after exposure. Over the twelve months
after exposure this translates into 5.4% higher probability of exit, or 478 firms out of the
8,854 which are exposed during the period under study. Moreover, in Column (2) I use an
alternative control group, where I match by sector and municipality and in Column (3), in
addition to municipality and sector I match on size category. Again, matching on location,
sector and size category reduces the magnitude of my point estimates, which, however,
remains positive and statistically significant.
Furthermore, in Panel B Table 2.8 I investigate the effect on exit over a longer horizon.
I follow firms 24 months after exposure and I find similar results.
11In what follows I will interpret exit as going ”out of business”. However, notice that I can not disentangle
a firm that goes out of business from a firm that loses all its employees but it is still operating as a business
run by a self-employed owner, or a firm that becomes informal and stops reporting to the Ministry of Labor.
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2.3.3 Labor Reallocation
In this section I study in more detail the effect of exposure of corrupt practices on labor
reallocation. I start with a municipality-level analysis. My simple theoretical framework
predicts that a decrease in τ , the price wedge favoring corrupt firms, should translate into a
reallocation of workers from low to high productivity firms until marginal products of labor
are equalized. As I do not observe MPL at firm level, in section 2.3.3.1 I use firm size as
a proxy for MPL and study the effect of the auditing process on the distribution of firm
size at municipality level. In particular, I test whether audited municipalities experience a
decrease in dispersion of firm size relative to non-audited ones. Next, in section 2.3.3.2, I
exploit the detailed nature of my data and follow workers that are laid off by exposed firms.
My objective is to trace the flow of released workers following firm exposure and study the
characteristics of the destination firms they end up working for in terms of size, industry
and location. I also exploit the contract-level nature of my data to look at how exposure of
corrupt practices affect unemployment spells.
2.3.3.1 Municipality-level Analysis: Firm Size Dispersion
I start by studying the effect of auditing on the dispersion of firm size at municipality level.
My experiment aims at capturing the effect of removing favoritism in the allocation of pro-
curement contracts on the firm size distribution. My simple theoretical framework predicts
that a decrease in favoritism – i.e. a reduction in τ – should translate into a reallocation of
workers from low to high productivity firms and a convergence in marginal products of labor
within an industry. As my data do not report information of firm value added, I do not
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observe firm average labor productivity and cannot directly test this prediction. However,
as an imperfect proxy for labor misallocation, I can test whether the auditing program had
an effect on the dispersion of the within-sector firm size distribution in a given municipality.









= αm + αt + β1Postp + β2Auditedm × Postp + εmt (2.8)
where Auditedm is a dummy equal to 1 if a municipality has been audited and Postp = 1
is a dummy equal to 1 for the 24 months after the municipality is extracted for auditing
(p = 1 to p = 24), and zero for the 24 months before. The outcome variable is my measure
of firm-size dispersion in deviation from the industry mean (Ljt) computed at national level.
Table 2.9 reports the result of estimating equation (2.8). As shown, the coefficient on the
interaction is negative and significant. The size of the estimated coefficient indicates that
audited municipalities experienced a decrease in firm-size dispersion with respect to non-
audited municipalities. The size of the estimated coefficient indicates that municipalities
that are randomly audited experience a 2.3% of a standard deviation decrease in firm-size
dispersion with respect to the control group. I interpret this finding as suggestive evidence
that the auditing program might have decreased misallocation of labor across firms.12
2.3.3.2 Worker-level Analysis: Separations
In this section I study whether employees are more likely to leave firms after the revelation
of corrupt practices. Furthermore I investigate the composition of employees who leave the
12In future version of this draft I aim at constructing a more precise estimate of labor productivity merging
data from RAIS with data on firm output and value added from sector-specific surveys.
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firm after the revelation of corruption. Specifically I investigate the characteristics of workers
who leave the exposed firms.
Workers with different characteristics may have different preferences and incentives to
leave the exposed companies. On one hand, more talented or high-level (managerial) em-
ployees might be more likely to leave because they have a larger set of available outside
options. On the other hand, more talented workers or managerial employees are often con-
sidered to have more influence on company decisions, including the decision to embark in
corrupt practices to win a procurement contract from the local government. In that sense,
managers of exposed firms might suffer a higher reputation cost of being associated with such
corrupt practices. This might create a stigma in the job market which limits their options
outside the exposed firm.
Moreover, from the perspective of the firms, exposed firms are likely to lose the contracts
as well as eligibility for future government contracts. As a response, on one hand they might
decide to lay off younger and lower level employees, since it is less costly to fire them. On
the other hand, they might decide to fire high level employees who are more likely to be
responsible for the misconducts. The theoretical ambiguity that arises from the different
economic forces makes it an interesting empirical question which type of employees are more
likely to leave exposed firms.
To perform the analysis I estimate the following linear probability model:
Pr(Separationeijt = 1|IExposedi = 1) = αe + αt + αj + βPostp + uijt (2.9)
where Separationeijt is a dummy variable that takes the value of one in the month the
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worker e leaves firm i and 0 otherwise, αe is worker fixed effect, αt is time fixed effect,
and αj is industry fixed effect.
13 The variable Postp is a dummy equal to 1 for the twelve
months following the audit report, and zero for the twelve months before it. Notice that this
analysis is performed within the sample of exposed firms, so conditional on IExposedi = 1. The
coefficient β measures the increase in the monthly probability of an employee leaving the
firm after corrupt practices are revealed. All the regressions include employee fixed effects
to account for time invariant-worker characteristics. I also include month fixed effects and
industry fixed effects. I cluster standard errors at the firm level.
Table 2.10 reports the results of estimating equation (2.9). In Column (1) I examine
separations in a window of 3 months before and 3 months after the exposure, while in
Columns (2) and (3) I examine 6 and 12 months around the exposure, respectively. In
Column (1) I find that employees of exposed firms have a 2.7% higher monthly probability to
leave the firms in the 3 months after corruption is revealed, compared to the 3 months before
corruption is revealed. Moreover, since the specifications include employee fixed effects, the
coefficient shows that there is a within-employee increase in the probability of leaving the
firm after corruption is revealed. Column (2) shows that when looking in a 6 month window,
employees of exposed firms have 2.7% higher monthly probability to leave after the firm is
exposed, while the coefficient becomes 2% when I look into a window of 12 months around
the lottery.
Table 2.10 documents a within-worker increase in the probability of leaving exposed
firms after corrupt practices are revealed. Next, I investigate what are the characteristics of
13The employee might be leaving the firm either voluntarily or because he is fired. In this analysis I do
not distinguish the reason of the separation.
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employees who leave exposed firms. I start by reporting average characteristics of workers
of exposed firms in the month the firm is exposed by the auditing program, and compare
them with average characteristics of separated workers. I define separated workers as those
whose working relationship with the exposed firm is interrupted between month 0 and 12
after exposure.
The first column of Table 2.11 shows the characteristics of employees in exposed firms
at the time of exposure. The second column, describes the characteristics of employees who
depart the firms after corruption is exposed. I observe that while 59% of the workforce of
exposed firms consists of men, male workers comprise 72% of the released employees. Thus
male workers seem more likely to leave. In terms of education, workers with basic education
(lower than high-school) comprise 37% of the workers of exposed firms but 47% of the leavers.
On the other hand, employees with higher than high-school education are less likely to leave
the exposed firms. Consistent with firing low-skilled, and lower-cost employees, I observe
that younger employees are more likely to leave the firm. Although employees younger than
35 years old represent 49% of workers in exposed firms, they are 63% of the leavers. The
vast majority of workers have indefinite contracts, so there is not much variation in the
type of labor contracts. Finally, I classify the employees into managers and non-managerial
employees. Consistently with my previous findings, I observe that although managers are
21% of the employees, they only comprise 17% of the released employees. To sum up, the
summary statistics presented in Table 2.10 indicate that young, lower-educated and non-
managerial employees are more likely to depart from the exposed firms. I next test this more
formally.
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To more formally investigate how different worker characteristics relate to the probability
of a worker leaving the firm, I estimate equation 2.9 and interact the Postp dummy with a
set of worker characteristics. Table 2.12 investigates whether male or female employees are
more likely to leave exposed firms. Gender is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for
female employees and 0 for male employees. All the specifications include month fixed effects,
employee fixed effects and industry fixed effects. I report the coefficient of the interaction
Post*Gender (Post and Gender are subsumed by the fixed effects). Column (1) shows that
looking at a window of 3 months before and after the audit, female employees have 1.3%
lower monthly probability to leave the firms after corruption is revealed, compared to male
employees. Relative to the average effect of 2.7% from Table 2.10, this estimate implies that
female workers are 48% less likely to leave the exposed firms than the average employee.
Columns (2) and (3) examine a window of 6 and 12 months around the audit and show
similar results, although demonstrating a lower economic magnitude.
Table 2.13 investigates whether more educated employees are less or more likely to leave
exposed firms. The education variable takes 3 distinct values. It takes the value 1 for
employees with basic education, the value 2 for employees who have graduated high school
and the value 3 for employees with higher than high-school education. All the specifications
include month fixed effects, employee fixed effects and industry fixed effects. I report the
coefficient of the interaction Post with dummies of Education (Post and Education are
subsumed by the fixed effects). Column (1) shows results looking at a window of 3 months
before and after the audit. The Basic education is the omitted category. The coefficient
of the interaction Post*Education(2− 1) shows that employees with high school education
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are less likely to leave compared to employee with basic education. Also as the coefficient
of the interaction Post*Education(3 − 1) shows, employees with higher than high school
education are less likely to leave exposed firms relative to employees with basic education.
I find similar results for a window of 6 and 12 months around the audit. Overall, Table
2.13 shows that employees with low education are more likely to leave exposed firms after
corruption is revealed.
In Table 2.14 I examine how age relates to the propensity to leave the exposed firms. I
classify employees into four age groups. Age takes the value 1 for employees between 16-25
years old, the value 2 for 26-35 years old, the value 3 for 36-45 years old and the value 4
for 46-55 years old. All the specifications include month fixed effects, employee fixed effects
and industry fixed effects. The 16-25 years old group is the omitted age group. Throughout
Columns (1)-(3) I observe that the coefficients of the interaction of Post with dummies of
Age is negative, indicating that older employees are more likely to leave exposed firms after
corruption is revealed relative to the youngest group.
Moreover, I examine whether managers are more likely to leave exposed firms. Table
2.15 presents the results. Manager is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 for em-
ployees who hold a managerial position and 0 otherwise. In Column (1), which examines
the 3-month window around the audit. The coefficient of the interaction Post*Manager re-
veals that managers are 0.8% less likely to leave exposed firms, compared to non-managerial
employees. Overall, the results shows that younger, less educated and non-managerial em-
ployees are more likely to leave exposed firms, after corruption is revealed. Thus the results
are inconsistent with firms losing their most valuable workers.
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Finally, I investigate labor reallocation across firms. In particular, I study the charac-
teristics of firms that workers released from exposed firms end up working for. Table 2.16
reports the characteristics of destination firms in the period before and after exposure. I
focus on the following dimensions of heterogeneity across destination firms: size, industry,
location, and exposure. In Column (1) I focus on all workers employed by exposed firms at
time p = −12, and look at their employment situation in month p = 0.14 I use this as a
counter factual of labor reallocation in ”normal times”, which is based on employees of the
exposed firms who left the firms before corruption was revealed. In Column (2) I focus on
all workers employed by exposed firms at time p = 0 – the time of exposure – and look at
their employment situation in month p = 12, a year after exposure. Finally, in Column (3),
I focus on all workers employed by exposed firms at time p = 0 – the time of exposure – and
look at their employment situation in month p = 24, two years after exposure. As shown,
labor reallocation follows similar patterns – in terms of direction of the flow – before and
after exposure when I focus on size of destination firms. Around 65% of workers released
from exposed firms are still unemployed at the end of the year, 21-22% of released employees
move to firms of similar size category, while 9-10% move to smaller firms. Moreover, only
4% of released employees go to larger firms. These results are, at least in part, driven by the
fact that exposed firms tend to be relatively large. Therefore, separated workers are more
likely to find an occupation in either a smaller firm or a firm of the same size.
Results are relatively similar in the period before versus after exposure also when I look
at the industry and the location of destination firms of released workers. Out of those moving
14Notice that this analysis does not take into account entrants between p = −11 and p = 0.
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to other firms, in the pre-exposure year 46% move to a different industry. This percentage
grows to 50% after 1 year from exposure, and to 54% after two years. Similarly, out of the
workers moving to other firms, in the pre-exposure year 49% move to a different municipality.
This percentage grows to 51% in the post-exposure period.
In the bottom panel of Table 2.16, I investigate whether workers leaving exposed firms
are more likely to be hired by exposed or non-exposed firms. My results show that, on
average, in the year before exposure, almost 1 out of 5 workers (17%) leaving exposed
firms – and finding a new job – end up working for another exposed firm. This share
substantially decreases in the first year after exposure, when only 1 out of 10 workers (9%)
leaving exposed firms and finding a new job end up working for another exposed firm,
while the remaining 91% is reallocated towards non-exposed firms. Notice that this share
is even larger if one considers the two years after exposure. Column (3) shows that, out
of all workers leaving exposed firms and working for another firm two years after exposure,
only 5% work for an exposed firm, while 95% is employed by a non-exposed firm. These
results are consistent with the main prediction of my theoretical framework which suggests
that exposure of corrupt practices should generate a reallocation of workers from politically-
connected and low marginal productivity of labor firms to non-politically connected but high
marginal productivity of labor firms.
2.4 Conclusion
Corruption in the assignment of procurement contracts is largely diffused in both developed
and developing countries. In this essay I exploit a unique experiment to estimate the effect of
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disclosing corrupt practices on firm-level and worker-level outcomes. I obtain variation in the
disclosure of corrupt practices from random municipality audits by a large anti-corruption
program introduced by the Brazilian government in 2003, which was aimed at monitoring
local governments’ use of federal funds. I manually collect information on the identity of all
firms mentioned in the audit reports, and match them with detailed information on their
labor force from social security data. I find that firms exposed by the auditing program
experience a decline in employment growth and an increase in the probability of exit relative
to their peers after public disclosure of the audit report. Given the observed employment
decline, I investigate the heterogeneous effects on the probability of separation across em-
ployees with different characteristics. I document that young, less-educated workers that do
not occupy a managerial position have higher probability to leave the exposed firms. Also,
I find that the laid-off workers tend to reallocate into firms that are not found as being
illegally favored during the period under study, which is consistent with a reduction in labor
misallocation at local level.
107
2.5 Figures and Tables
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2.5.2 Tables
Table 2.1: Irregularities Detected
Type of Irregularity Percent Amount Received (R$)
Average Median
Irregularities in Tendering Process 38.24 237,038 14,317
Documentation Issue/Contract Breach 26.50 99,145 6,300
Fake Receipt/Suspicious Expense 20.43 102,610 2,949
Resource Misuse 7.11 153,370 2,175
Overpricing 3.36 330,330 60,413
Phantom Company; Collusion/Unfair Competition 2.49 238,848 55,374
Poor/Inadequate Quality 1.86 283,326 82,420
Notes: Authors’ calculations from manually extracted information contained in audit reports.
Table 2.2: Top-10 Ministries Source of Misused Federal Funds
Ministry Percent
Ministry of Health 35.83
Ministry of Education 33.14
Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger 15.97
Ministry of Cities 3.61
Ministry of Rural development 3.31
Ministry of National Integration 2.39
Ministry of Tourism 1.64
Ministry of Sport 1.40
Ministry of Social Security 0.46
Ministry of Environment 0.37
Notes: Authors’ calculations from manually extracted information contained in audit reports.
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Table 2.3: Top-10 Federal Spending Programs Source of Misused Federal Funds
Program Percent
Schooling Brazil 22.65
Basic Assistance in Health 16.48
Pharmaceutical Assistance 8.40
Basic Social Protection 4.60
Conditional Transfer of Income - Bolsa Famı́lia 4.40
Appraisal of Education Professionals 3.77
Urban Water and Sewage Services 3.77
Eradication of Child Labor 3.71
Basic Assistance Bloc-Financial Resources 2.23
Support to Small Cities’ Urban Development 1.70
Notes: Authors’ calculations from manually extracted information contained in audit reports.
Table 2.4: Exposed and Non-Exposed Firms by Size Category
Size Non-Exposed Exposed
Zero 30.56% 7.67%
Micro (1-4) 43.23% 37.01%




Notes: Source: RAIS, Authors’ calculations.
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Firm Characteristics
Exposed Firms Non-Exposed Firms
Variables N p50 Mean Std Dev. N p50 Mean Std Dev.
Number of Employees 10,864 6 53 347 111,589,240 2 12 341
Total Wage Bill (R$) 10,864 3,668 92,005 1,105,297 111,589,240 1,269 15,713 634,030
Average Wage per Employee (R$) 10,082 618 769 713 97,387,540 586 748 723
Log Employment 10,082 1.9 2.1 1.6 97,387,540 1.1 1.1 1.2
Log Total Wage Bill 10,064 8.4 8.6 1.8 97,033,442 7.4 7.7 1.5
Number of (unique) Firms 8,854 7,124,669
Panel B: Workers’ Characteristics
Exposed Firms Non-Exposed Firms
Variables N p50 Mean Std Dev. N p50 Mean Std Dev.
Education 572,366 7 6.3 2 1,324,042,033 7 6.2 2
Gender 572,366 0 0.33 0.47 1,324,042,033 0 0.41 0.49
Age 572,366 34 35 9.6 1,324,042,033 33 34 9.8
Tenure (in Months) 572,366 34 69 83 1,324,042,033 29 60 75
Number of (unique) Workers 444,065 84,747,871
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics at firm-level (Panel A) and worker-level (Panel B). The data
refers to the month before exposure. Exposed firms are firms that have been exposed at any point in time
during the period under study (2003-2014). Non-exposed firms are firms that were never exposed by audit
reports during the period under study. Source: RAIS, Authors’ calculations.
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Table 2.6: Exposed and Non-Exposed Firms by Sector of Operation
Sector Non-Exposed Exposed Difference
Retail Trade and Repairs 30.25% 33.80% -3.55%
Construction 6.08% 22.80% -16.72%
Automotives and Fuels Trade 5.18% 10.79% -5.61%
Wholesale Trade 4.36% 10.41% -6.05%
Corporate Services 6.17% 2.53% 3.64%
Ground Transportation 3.17% 2.33% 0.84%
Health and Social Services 4.55% 2.23% 2.32%
Public Administration, Defense, and Social Security 0.30% 2.04% -1.74%
Printing 0.66% 1.47% -0.81%
Associative Activities 1.67% 1.21% 0.46%
Food and Beverages Manufacturing 1.51% 1.17% 0.34%
Accommodation and Food 5.88% 0.97% 4.91%
Non-Metallic Mineral Manufacturing 0.62% 0.74% -0.12%
Rentals 0.78% 0.69% 0.09%
Clothing Manufacturing 1.56% 0.50% 1.06%
Machinery and Equipments Manufacturing 0.64% 0.48% 0.16%
Education 1.71% 0.47% 1.25%
Metal Products Manufacturing 1.07% 0.47% 0.60%
Furniture Manufacturing 0.78% 0.42% 0.36%
Non-Metallic Mineral Extraction 0.20% 0.35% -0.15%
Agriculture 9.58% 0.33% 9.25%
Computed and Related Activities 1.01% 0.32% 0.69%
Chemical Manufacturing 0.30% 0.30% 0.00%
Sewage Cleaning 0.10% 0.29% -0.19%
Mail and Telecommunication Services 0.46% 0.27% 0.19%
Recreational, Cultural and Sports Activities 1.20% 0.26% 0.94%
Vehicles Manufacturing 0.14% 0.26% -0.12%
Wood Manufacturing 0.47% 0.23% 0.24%
Rubber and Plastic Manufacturing 0.36% 0.21% 0.15%
Medical Instruments/Equipment Manufacturing 0.14% 0.21% -0.07%
Auxiliary Transportation Services 0.97% 0.20% 0.77%
Electricity and Gas Distribution 0.07% 0.19% -0.12%
Textile Manufacturing 0.40% 0.15% 0.25%
Real Estate 2.94% 0.11% 2.83%
Paper Manufacturing 0.13% 0.10% 0.03%
Financial Services 0.63% 0.08% 0.55%
Leather and Footwear Manufacturing 0.40% 0.08% 0.32%
Electrical Machinery/Equipment Manufacturing 0.17% 0.08% 0.09%
Insurance 0.12% 0.08% 0.04%
Water Treatment and Distribution 0.04% 0.08% -0.04%
Personal Services 1.42% 0.07% 1.35%
Computer and Office Equipment Manufacturing 0.03% 0.05% -0.02%
Metallurgy 0.15% 0.04% 0.11%
Other Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 0.05% 0.04% 0.01%
Air Transportation 0.03% 0.03% 0.00%
Forestry 0.32% 0.03% 0.29%
Recycling 0.08% 0.03% 0.05%
Auxiliary Financial Services 0.39% 0.02% 0.37%
R&D 0.03% 0.02% 0.01%
Fishing 0.09% 0.01% 0.08%
Oil Extraction 0.01% 0.01% 0.00%
Domestic Services 0.48% 0.00% 0.48%
Electronics Manufacturing 0.05% 0.00% 0.05%
Marine Transportation 0.03% 0.00% 0.03%
Metallic Mineral Extraction 0.02% 0.00% 0.02%
International Organizations 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
Oil Refining, Production of Nuclear Fuels and Alcohol 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
Coal Extraction 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
Tobacco Manufacturing 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Notes: Sector of operation is observed in the month of the lottery. Sector classification is 2-digit CNAE.
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Table 2.7: Employment Growth
Panel A: 1-Year Horizon
(1) (2) (3)
10% Random Sector and Municipality Sector, Municipality
Match Size Match
IExposedi × Post -0.0111*** -0.00313* -0.00388**
(0.00187) (0.00181) (0.00184)
Post -0.0153*** -0.0169*** -0.0160***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Municipality × Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 53,443,232 24,313,668 10,903,455
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.085 0.102
Panel B: 2-Year Horizon
(1) (2) (3)
10% Random Sector and Municipality Sector, Municipality
Match Size Match
IExposedi × Post -0.0122*** -0.00520*** -0.00554***
(0.00160) (0.00153) (0.00155)
Post -0.0139*** -0.0155*** -0.0145***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Municipality × Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 75,204,311 33,771,664 15,292,483
Adjusted R2 0.088 0.078 0.091
Mean Employment Growth 0.009 0.011 0.011
Std. Dev. Employment Growth 0.146 0.156 0.155
Notes: The following table reports the effect of audit and exposure on the firm’s employment growth. In
Panel A, the sample covers the window [-12, 12] and in Panel B the period [-12, 24] around the audit month,
in monthly unit. The sample excludes government firms, firms with less than five employees, and firms in
any audited municipalities. The control group for each lottery in the first column was chosen by randomly
selecting ten percent of the non-exposed firms at the tome of the lottery. In the second column, for each
exposed firm I use as control group all the firms in the same municipality and sector that exist at the month
of the lottery. The third column in addition to sector and municipality matches on size category. I then
normalize time for both the treated and control group and follow firms before and after the audit. The
outcome variable is defined as the log change in total monthly employment. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 2.8: Exit
Panel A: 1-Year Horizon
(1) (2) (3)
10% Random Sector and Municipality Sector, Municipality
Match Size Match
IExposedi × Post 0.00450*** 0.00248*** 0.00269***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Post 0.00806*** 0.00848*** 0.00817***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Municipality × Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 53,727,322 24,454,005 10,965,681
Adjusted R2 0.133 0.128 0.142
Panel B: 2-Year Horizon
(1) (2) (3)
10% Random Sector and Municipality Sector, Municipality
Match Size Match
IExposedi × Post 0.00586*** 0.00382*** 0.00393***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Post 0.00761*** 0.00803*** 0.00769***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Municipality × Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 75,523,163 33,928,375 15,362,358
Adjusted R2 0.129 0.122 0.133
Mean Exit Rate 0.004 0.005 0.005
Std. Dev. Exit Rate 0.067 0.070 0.069
Notes: The following table reports the effect of audit and exposure on the firm’s survival. In Panel A, the
sample covers the window [-12, 12] and in Panel B the period [-12, 24] around the audit month, in monthly
unit. The sample selection and the control/treatment group selections are performed as in Table 2.7. Exit
is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm exits in the month. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level.
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Auditedm × Postp -0.011**
(0.005)
Municipality Fixed Effects Yes




Notes: Standard errors clustered at municipality level reported in parenthesis.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.10: Separations Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Separationeijt = {0,1}
Variables 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
Post 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.020***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Employee Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,965,475 12,918,987 24,286,869
Adjusted R2 0.302 0.236 0.200
Notes: Standard errors clustered at firm level reported in parenthesis.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.11: Composition of Exposed Firms’ Workers’ Characteristics
(1) (2)
Workers’ Characteristics



















Notes: Column (1) reports the composition of workers’ characteristics at the time of exposure. Column (2)
reports the composition of characteristics of the workers that left the firm at any point in time within the
12-month period after the exposure. Exposed firms are from manually extracted dataset constructed from
audit reports. Source: CGU and RAIS, Authors’ calculations.
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Table 2.12: Separations Regressions by Gender
(1) (2) (3)
Separationeijt = {0,1}
Variables 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
Post × Gender -0.013*** -0.008*** -0.005***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Employee Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,965,475 12,918,987 24,286,869
Adjusted R2 0.302 0.237 0.200
Notes: Standard errors clustered at firm level reported in parenthesis.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.13: Separations Regressions by Education
(1) (2) (3)
Separationeijt = {0,1}
Variables 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
Post × Education (2-1) -0.020*** -0.015*** -0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Post × Education (3-1) -0.026*** -0.021*** -0.012***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Employee Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,965,475 12,918,987 24,286,869
Adjusted R2 0.303 0.237 0.200
Notes: Standard errors clustered at firm level reported in parenthesis.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.14: Separations Regressions by Age
(1) (2) (3)
Separationeijt = {0,1}
Variables 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
Post × Age (2-1) -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Post × Age (3-1) -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.015***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Post × Age (4-1) -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.014***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Employee Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,965,475 12,918,987 24,286,869
Adjusted R2 0.302 0.236 0.200
Notes: Standard errors clustered at firm level reported in parenthesis.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.15: Separations Regressions by Hierarchy
(1) (2) (3)
Separationeijt = {0,1}
Variables 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
Post × Manager -0.008** -0.006* -0.003*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Employee Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,965,475 12,918,987 24,286,869
Adjusted R2 0.302 0.236 0.200
Notes: Standard errors clustered at firm level reported in parenthesis.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.16: Exposed Firms’ Workers’ Reallocation Characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
Labor Reallocation
t = {-12, 0} t = {0, +12} t = {0, +24}
Outcomes at t = 0 Outcomes at t = +12 Outcomes at t = +24
Size
Larger 0.04 0.04 0.06
Same 0.22 0.21 0.29
Smaller 0.09 0.10 0.17
Unemployed 0.65 0.65 0.48
Industry
Same 0.54 0.50 0.46
Different 0.46 0.50 0.54
Municipality
Same 0.51 0.49 0.49
Different 0.49 0.51 0.51
Exposed Firms
Exposed 0.17 0.09 0.05
Non-Exposed 0.83 0.91 0.95
Notes: The table reports characteristics of destination firms for workers that leave exposed firms. Column
(1) refers to labor outcomes up to the month of exposure for workers that were employed at the exposed firm
12 months before the exposure and left at any point in time between this month (t = -12) and the month
of exposure. Column (2) refers to labor outcomes up to 12 months after the exposure for workers that were
employed at the exposed firm at the time of exposure and left at any point in time between the month of
exposure and 12 months after. Column (3) refers to labor outcomes up to 24 months after the exposure
for workers that were employed at the exposed firm at the time of exposure and left at any point in time
between the month of exposure and 12 months after.
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Chapter 3
Family Control and the Cost of Debt:
Evidence from the Great Recession
3.1 Introduction
Founders or their families control the majority of firms around the world (Faccio and Lang
(2002)). Even among public firms, families control 45% of the listed international firms
(La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999)) and at least one third of S&P500 firms
(Anderson and Reeb (2003)). Despite the prevalence of family firms, we have limited knowl-
edge on how family control affects firm policies and outcomes (Bennedsen, Pérez-González,
and Wolfenzon (2010)). Prior research has mainly focused on implications of family control
for equity valuation. The relationship between family control and the agency cost of debt
has received limited attention, although debt is a major source of external finance for firms.
Theoretical predictions on how family control should affect agency cost of debt are actually
ambiguous, and empirical measurement has been difficult due to the endogeneity of family
control. In this essay, I measure the direction and magnitude of the effect of founding-family
control on the cost of bank debt. To overcome the endogeneity problem, I exploit the re-
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cent financial crisis and the unexpected nature of Lehman Brothers’ collapse as a natural
laboratory in order to tease out the effect of family control.
Theoretically, predicting how family control affects the cost of debt is difficult because
we must consider different dimensions. On one hand, family control can exacerbate agency
conflicts and increase the cost of debt. The existence of a controlling shareholder elevates
the risk of strategic default (Hart and Moore (1994), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), Hart
and Moore (1998)). Furthermore, the family as a dominant shareholder can influence post-
default restructuring and extract some of the surplus from creditors (Aslan and Kumar
(2012)). Moreover, the controlling family can extract private benefits at the expense of
the firm’s other constituents. Family firms are also more opaque than diffused shareholder
firms (Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2009), Fan and Wong (2002)), which makes fraud more
likely. On the other hand, family control might mitigate shareholder-debtholder conflicts and
decrease the cost of debt. The family has a long-term commitment to the firm, spanning
various generations, and its reputation is tied to the firm. Moreover, the family has a
large and highly undiversified investment in the firm. The combination of the long-term
commitment, the reputation concerns, and the high, undiversified cash-flow stakes suggest
the family is more likely to value firm survival over strict wealth maximization. Thus, how
family control should affect the cost of debt in practice is theoretically ambiguous.
Although limited, a number of empirical studies have explored the relationship between
family control and cost of debt for different debt instruments. However, the evidence remains
mixed. The earlier work in this area finds family firms are related to a lower cost of debt.
The first paper that looks into this question is Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003), who
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look into public debt for 252 S&P 500 firms and find family firms are associated with a
lower cost of public-debt financing. Ellul, Guntay, and Lel (2007) look at international bond
issues and find the relationship between family control and cost of debt varies with the level
of investor protection. Family firms in low-investor-protection countries suffer from higher
public debt costs, whereas family firms in high-investor-protection environments benefit from
lower public-debt costs.
On the other hand, recent papers have called into question the negative relationship
between family control and the cost of debt. In terms of private debt agreements, in an
international setting, Aslan and Kumar (2012) find family firms are associated with a higher
agency cost of debt. Also in an international setting, Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan (2011)
find the higher the wedge between control and cash-flow rights, the higher the cost of debt,
especially for family firms. The effect is further amplified if the CEO is a member of the
controlling family.
Despite the various evidence, establishing a causal effect of the family on the cost of
debt is difficult due to endogeneity concerns. The main challenge is that a third omitted
factor could drive both family control and cost of debt. In this essay, I measure the direction
and magnitude of the effect of founding-family control on the cost of bank debt, by taking
advantage of the recent financial crisis and the unexpected nature of Lehman Brothers’
collapse as a natural laboratory in order to tease out the effect of family control.
For my empirical analysis, I focus on private credit agreements in the syndicated loan
market for the years 2004-2010. I employ a difference-in-differences approach and compare
the change in spreads on syndicated loans during the crisis between family and non-family
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firms. As Lemmon and Lins (2003) point out, financial crises represent a relative exogenous
shock, with respect to the individual firm. One potential concern, however, is that family and
non-family firms might have differential exposure to the shock. To alleviate any potential
concerns (e.g., due to family firms matching with better financial institutions), I further
exploit the cross-sectional dispersion in lender health induced by the collapse of Lehman
Brothers as a source of exogenous variation in the exposure to the shock. Specifically,
I hypothesize that if financial frictions make accessing external capital or switching from
one source of capital to another difficult, firms that maintained lending relationships with
financial institutions that were highly exposed to the negative liquidity shock during the
crisis experienced tighter financial constraints and a higher cost of accessing the syndicated
loan market. Therefore, the research design I consider compares firms with different levels of
control at the same point in time that have been subject to the same shock and have similar
exposure to the shock based on their lending relationships with differentially liquidity-struck
financial institutions.
I find the increase in loan spreads around the Lehman crisis was at least 24 basis points
lower for family firms. Furthermore, the gap in spreads among family and non-family firms
becomes wider among firms that had pre-crisis relationships with less healthy lenders. Specif-
ically, in the group of firms that were highly exposed to the Lehman collapse, the spreads
on loans family firms took out during the crisis were at least 73 basis points lower compared
to the spreads on loans non-family firms took out. This difference is sizeable given that the
mean spread in the crisis period was 344 basis points. The results hold when I look sepa-
rately into term loans and credit lines. The analysis shows family control is associated with
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a lower cost of debt during the Great Recession and the effect of family ties is exacerbated
among firms with higher exposure to the liquidity shock. The results provide evidence that
family control has a greater effect on the cost on borrowing, especially when lenders are
constrained.
Furthermore, I investigate other contract terms. I find no significant difference in loan
maturity, but I find some evidence that family firms received higher loan amounts during
the crisis. I also look into the extensive margin but find no difference between family and
non-family firms in the access to the bank-lending market during the crisis.
I provide numerous tests that show the robustness of my results. I show that differences
in corporate policies related to dividends, cash holdings, and leverage between family and
non-family firms during the crisis do not explain my results. Furthermore, the results are
similar when I repeat the analysis in a subsample in which I require firms not only to have
accessed the bank-lending market before and after the crisis, but also to have borrowed the
same type of loan from the same lender. Moreover, I use a matching-estimator approach
to alleviate concerns that some pre-crisis characteristics might differ across the family and
non-family group of firms, and these characteristics potentially explain both the founding
family’s endogenous decision to maintain control in the firm and to secure bank financing in
the crisis. I also provide evidence that differential changes in credit quality for family and
non-family firms during the crisis or the selection of firms that get a loan during the crisis
do not drive my results. Finally, my results are robust to using an alternative definition for
exposure to the liquidity shock based on Chodorow-Reich (2014).
I next move to consider potential alternative interpretations of my results. One potential
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alternative interpretation is that family-controlled firms maintain a longer and tighter rela-
tion with financial institutions before the shock, and thus, the difference in the length of the
lending relations between family and non-family firms rather than the family control itself
might drive the result. Furthermore, another alternative explanation that may be potentially
responsible for my results is that lenders may not value family control per se in the presence
of liquidity constraints, but, in general, value the presence of a blockholder, thus leading to a
lower cost of bank capital. Moreover, a potential concern is that founder-run firms that might
not be family firms drive my results. Finally, I also examine whether family-controlled firms
experience a lower cost in accessing bank financing, because they accept stricter covenants
in the lending agreements. I test and find no support for these alternative interpretations.
Having established the relationship between family control and cost of debt, I proceed
with unveiling potential (non-mutually) exclusive factors that influence the relation between
family control and loan spreads. I find the gap in spreads between family and non-family firms
is higher in firms with higher expected shareholder-debtholder agency conflicts. Furthermore,
as previous literature has stressed the effect of a family member acting as the CEO on
firm performance, I explore the impact of CEO affiliation on the cost of debt within the
subsample of family firms, and find credit spreads are lower when family CEOs run the
firms. Furthermore, I provide novel evidence that for 17% of the family firms, creditors
impose explicit restrictions in private credit agreements that require the founding family to
maintain a minimum percentage of ownership or voting power. These types of covenants
show creditors value the involvement of the founding family. Finally, I investigate covenant
violations and find no difference in covenant violations between family and non-family firms.
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My results make several contributions to the literature. By taking advantage of the
recent financial crisis and the unexpected nature of Lehman Brothers’ collapse as a natural
laboratory, I am able to tease out the effect of family control on the cost of private debt.1
Although I cannot randomly assign family control to firms, the research design I consider
compares family and non-family firms at the same point in time that have been subject
to the same shock, and observe the effect on their debt cost. Moreover, in my empirical
design, I compare family with non-family firms with similar exposure to the shock, further
alleviating concerns that family firms might have different exposure to the shock through
their lenders.2 Thus, my identification strategy allows us to add to the prior literature that
examines the link between control and the cost of debt (Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan
(2011), Aslan and Kumar (2012)) and in particular the literature on family control and cost
of debt (Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003), Ellul, Guntay, and Lel (2007)), by establishing
a causal link between family control and cost of debt and providing robust evidence on the
direction and magnitude of the impact. Because my essay focuses on the United States, it
is more closely related to Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003), which is the first paper that
studies the relationship between family control and cost of debt. I add to their findings not
only by being able to establish a causal link between family control and the cost of debt,
but also by focusing on private debt agreements. Eighty percent (80%) of public firms in the
United States have private credit agreements, compared to only 15%-20% that have public
1Furthermore, by conducting the analysis within a country I avoid the potential concerns arising due to
unobserved differences among various countries (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005).
2Thus, my empirical design improves upon prior literature that compares firms with different control
structure around crises (Lins, Volpin, and Wagner (2013), Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan (2011)) by ad-
dressing concerns of potential differential exposure to the shock for firms with different control structure.
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debt (Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009)). Also my results add to the evidence of Aslan and Kumar
(2012) who focus on private credit agreements in an international setting. They find that
family firms are associated with higher cost of debt, while I find the opposite effect in US.
Furthermore, to my knowledge, this essay is the first to document that agency cost of
debt of family control becomes lower during financial shocks. Furthermore, I show lender
constraints exacerbate the effect of family ties. Lins, Volpin, and Wagner (2013) provide
international evidence that family control negatively affects minority shareholders during the
2008 crisis, but they find no evidence on how family control affects agency cost of debt. My
results allow me to better understand how family control affects firm policies and outcomes.
The findings, thus, more generally contribute to the literature that investigates how family
control affects firm valuation (e.g., Anderson and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006),
Ellul, Guntay, and Lel (2007), Bennedsen, Nielsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon (2007),
Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2009), Masulis and Mobbs (2011)).3
3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Sample Construction
To construct my sample, I collect information on firms that are present in both the Thompson
Reuters Dealscan database and Compustat. I connect the two databases using the linking
table based on the information provided in Chava and Roberts (2008). The Thompson
Reuters Dealscan database contains information on syndicated loans. The data that are
available comprise the identities of the borrowing entity and the lending institution that
3See Bennedsen, Pérez-González, and Wolfenzon (2010) for a comprehensive survey.
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participated in the deal at origination, the terms of the loan, and the purpose of the loan.
I focus on non-financial US borrowers. That is, I exclude borrowers with SIC codes 6011-
6799, and I require that each deal has information on the interest spread of all tranches in
the deal. I restrict my main sample to borrowers that have obtained a syndicated loan both
in the pre-crisis period (January 2004-September 2008) and the post-crisis period following
the collapse of Lehman Brothers (October 2008-December 2010).4
For the purpose of exploring the heterogeneous response to the shock based on the type
of lending facility, I classify a loan as a term loan if Dealscan explicitly reports the loan type
to be a term loan (e.g., Delay Draw Term Loan, Term Loan A, Term Loan B), whereas I
classify a loan as a credit line if Dealscan reports the loan type to be one of the following:
364-Day Facility, Revolver/Line < 1 Yr., Revolver/Line ≥ 1 Yr., Demand Loan. To identify
a syndicate’s lead financial institution, I follow Ivashina (2009). Specifically, I define the
administrative agent to be the lead bank if identified; otherwise, I define the financial insti-
tutions that act as agent, arranger, bookrunner, lead arranger, lead bank, or lead manager to
be lead banks. I corroborate and complement the information on the role of a participant in
a syndicate as a lead arranger by taking advantage of the LeadArrangerCredit field available
in Dealscan.
Regarding the financial information of lending institutions, if the highest level parent
is either a domestic financial holding company or a domestic bank holding company, I col-
lect information related to financial data of lending institutions by hand-matching at the
4In Table 3.10 that tests the extensive margin, the sample contains all the borrowers that obtained a
syndicated loan in the pre-crisis period, irrespectively of whether they obtained a loan in the post-crisis
period.
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holding-company level between the name, the geographic location, and the operational pe-
riod as reported in Dealscan and as presented in the Federal Financial Institutions Exami-
nation Council’s (FFIEC) National Information Center (NIC) database. For foreign holding
companies and investment banks, I collect the relevant information either from Bankscope
or based on manual inspection of the financial statements of the financial institutions. To
control for mergers prior to the onset of the crisis, the acquiring lenders inherit the target’s
syndicated lending relationships with both borrowers and other lenders, thus transferring
the unexpired loans at the date of the merger to the acquirer’s record. For mergers that take
place following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, I maintain separate identifiers for the ac-
quiring and the target firm, although in estimating the measure of change in lending supply,
I consider as borrowing from the target if a borrower of the target in the pre-crisis period
obtains a crisis loan from the acquirer.
My final sample consists of 1,171 firms that have 6,169 lending facilities extended by 71
banks (2,006 bank-firm pairs). The unit of observation is a bank-firm-loan triple. Of the
1,171 borrowers, 313 firms (26.7%) are classified as family firms.
3.2.2 Definition of Family Firms
To identify family firms, I manually collect information on the presence of a founding family
from 10-K and DEF14A fillings. I also corroborate the information with corporate histories
for each firm in the sample. I collect corporate history information from Factiva, Hoovers,
and company press releases. In cases of family presence, I manually collected information on
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family involvement5 in boards of directors and in firm management from 10-K and DEF14A
fillings.
I follow Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006), and classify firms
as family firms if the founder or a member of his family by either blood or marriage is an
officer, director, or blockholder, either individually or as a group. My main analyses are
based on this definition. Furthermore, in subsequent tests, I show the robustness of my
results if I impose additional restrictions on the definition of family firms. Specifically, these
restrictions include the family being the largest voteholder, the largest shareholder, or in the
second generation or later. My later test aims to alleviate concerns that founder-run firms
that might not be family firms drive my results.
3.2.3 Measures of Exposure to the Shock
In my analysis, I compare family to non family firms with similar exposure to the shock,
to alleviate concerns that my results are driven by family firms having differential exposure
to the shock. To estimate the heterogeneous impact of the collapse of Lehman Brothers on
borrowing firms, I follow Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) and construct a firm-level measure
that depends on the exposure of each financial institution to Lehman through co-syndication.
The measure relies on the assumption that borrower-lender relationships are sticky. Specifi-
cally, at the lender level, I estimate the exposure as the fraction of the number of outstanding
credit lines co-syndicated with Lehman and in which Lehman is the lead arranger, over the
total number of outstanding revolving facilities of the lender at the time of the collapse.
5Although the Osiris database from Bureau Van Dijk offers good coverage for international firms’ owner-
ship structure, their coverage for US firms is limited, thus I handcollect it.
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Then, at the firm level, I focus on the last pre-crisis syndicated loan for each firm i, and I
construct a weighted-average exposure measure based on each financial institution b that is
part of syndicate s, with weights corresponding to the participation rates of each lender in






The rationale is that the collapse of Lehman Brothers imposed a liquidity problem in the
financial institutions with which Lehman maintained a co-syndication relationship, because
the exposed financial institutions were forced both to replace the role of Lehman in the
syndicated loan and to confront additional drawdowns when maintaining credit lines with
the borrowers. Besides, because the impact was heterogeneous among lenders based on
the level of exposure to the failing institution, the exogenous variation created is useful in
controlling for the differential exposure to the shock at the bank-firm level and in examining
the impact on contractual terms.
Moreover, I show my results are robust to using as an alternative measure of exposure
to the shock, the measure proposed in Chodorow-Reich (2014) that relies on the heteroge-
neous change in the lending supply of financial institutions following the Lehman collapse.
Specifically, the lending-supply measure is defined based on the difference in the quantity of
loans initiated by lender b to all borrowers other than firm i before and after the collapse
of Lehman Brothers. The pre-crisis period that is considered for the construction of the
measure is the nine-month periods from October 2005 to June 2006 and October 2006 to
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June 2007, whereas the crisis period is from October 2008 to June 2009. The loan quantities
have been weighted based on the participation rates of the lender in the syndicated loan.
Hence, letting L−i,b equal 1 if bank b has a lending relationship with borrower j in period t
and letting ab,j,t equal the participation rate of the syndicated loan, the change in the credit








Then, the final measure of bank health corresponding to the last pre-crisis syndicated
loan of each borrower is based on the participation rates of each lender of the last pre-crisis






If the actual share of each lender in a loan commitment is missing in Dealscan, I calculate
the participation rate as the average share of lead lenders and participants in a facility
involving the same structure.
Previous research has examined the effectiveness of my measures, demonstrating a sig-
nificant contraction in the bank lending channel occurs following the Lehman collapse, the
dispersion of which among financial institutions is sufficiently captured by the proposed
bank-health measures. In particular, Chodorow-Reich (2014) shows the credit-supply mea-
sure is negatively correlated with exposure to Lehman through co-syndication, controlling
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for a battery of observable bank characteristics, indicating the contraction in bank credit is
supply-driven. The use of the alternative measure contributes to mitigating any concerns
that the findings potentially are affected by the shuffling of financial institutions in being
the lead arrangers in the post-crisis loan originations in the syndicated market. Specifically,
as the measure captures the change in the lending supply around the crisis, by using the
alternative measure I am able to show that my findings are not driven by family firms being
disproportionately matched with banks that increased their share in the post crisis.
3.2.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for the key variables in the analysis, broken down
by family and non-family firms. I find that the percentage of family firms in my sample is
26.7%, which is in line with the percentage of family firms that Villalonga and Amit (2006)
and Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003) report for Fortune 500 (37%) and S&P500 (34%)
firms, respectively. Panel A of Table 3.1 concentrates on firm characteristics. On average,
family firms have fewer assets than non-family firms and are younger, and the difference is
statistically significant at the 5% level. The average leverage for family firms is 34%, which
is not significantly different from non-family firms. Furthermore, family firms do not differ in
terms of cash flow, interest expense, cash holdings, and S&P rating. Therefore, family and
non-family firms appear to be balanced among the aforementioned observable characteristics
apart from size and age; however, size and age are expected to induce a bias - if any - against
my results, because size is negatively correlated with credit spreads, implying non-family
firms might experience favorable rates due to larger size or higher age. Nevertheless, I use
140
a matching estimation approach to alleviate any concerns related to alternative sources of
firm heterogeneity that underlie the observed relation.
Panel B of Table 3.1 compares the characteristics of loans that family and non-family
firms take out before the crisis. The loan-characteristics measures come from Dealscan,
which allows me to identify deal-level data and observe the terms of loans at origination.
Credit spread is the main dependent variable I use in my analysis. The average spread on
loans that family firms take out is 190 basis points and is not significantly different from the
average spread for loans that non-family firms take out. Also, when I split the loans into
term loans and credit lines, I do not find any statistically significant difference in the spreads
between loans that family versus non-family firms take out. Furthermore, the loans that
family firms take out do not differ in terms of maturity and average loan amount. Finally, I
compare whether pre-crisis family firms were matched with banks that had a higher fraction
of their syndicated portfolio co-syndicated with Lehman Brothers, and in which Lehman has
a lead role (Lehman exposure). I do not find a difference between family and non-family
firms in exposure to Lehman.
Panel C of Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for bank characteristics. In particular,
in my specifications, I use lead bank characteristics that are able to capture both the strength
of a financial institution to absorb potential losses (e.g., capital ratio) and the liquidity of its
funding base (e.g., deposit ratio) as controls. I also use financial performance measures (e.g.,
profitability) and actual measures of loan portfolio quality that are based on the expectations
of the loan portfolio behavior (e.g., provisions for loan losses) as controls. The final sample
includes 71 banks. The average bank has $550 million in assets in the pre-crisis period.
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Table 3.2 provides information on the distribution of lending facilities per origination
year. The purpose of the table is to mitigate concerns that the results might be driven
by the borrowing activity of family firms been differentially skewed towards the end of my
crisis period - a period of less tightening terms in the provision of credit as a result of
Fed’s unconventional policy actions to spur economic activity. It is apparent from Table
3.2 that there are no significant differences in the timing that family and non-family firms
access the syndicated lending market, thus alleviating concerns that seasonality or potential
heterogeneity in credit cycles at the time that family and non-family firms originate lending
facilities, introduce any bias in the interpretation of the results.
Table 3.3 shows the distribution of family and non-family firms in my sample, using
the Fama-French 48-industry classification. Similar to Villalonga and Amit (2006), I find
family firms are present throughout the economy, but the percentage of family firms in the
various industries differs. The industries with the highest percentage of family firms are
apparel, beer and liquor, personal services, and printing and publishing, whereas defense,
fabricated products, gold, metals and mining, and tobacco products have no family firms.
The difference in the presence of family firms within and across industries suggests the
importance of controlling for industry in all my analyses.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Family Firms and Credit Spreads: Baseline Results
I start the analysis by studying the effect of family control on loan spreads during the crisis.
I first offer graphical evidence. Figure 3.1 depicts the time-series evolution of average credit
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spreads around the financial crisis for family and non-family firms. Figure 3.1 shows that
around the crisis, credit spreads increased for all firms, but the increase was larger for non-
family firms. Furthermore, the figure shows the trends of family and non-family firms before
the crisis exhibit no noticeable differences. My main analysis that follows, confirms this
evidence. In Table 3.4, I explore the change in loan spreads during the crisis for family and
non-family firms. Panel A presents the univariate analysis. Column (1) presents mean loan
spreads for family firms, Column (2) presents mean spreads for non-family firms, and Column
(3) provides the difference in means between the loan spreads for family and non-family firms.
Panel A shows that before the crisis there is no statistically significant difference in spreads
between family and non-family firms. During the crisis, loan spreads increased by 129.93
basis points for family firms and by 152.12 basis points for non-family firms. Thus, non-
family firms experienced a 22.2 basis points higher increase in loan spreads relative to family
firms. The difference is not only statistically significant, but also economically significant,
because non-family firms experienced a 15% higher increase in spreads.
In Panel B, I provide regression results. The specification I estimate is the following:
yit = α + βPostit + γI
Family
i + δPostit × I
Family
i + ζXi,t−1 + θZb,t−1 + ηb + ηs + εit (3.4)
where yit is the credit spread for loans taken out by company i in quarter t. Postit (either 0
or 1) is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 between the fourth quarter of 2008 and
the end of 2010, and 0 otherwise. IFamilyi is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 for
family firms and 0 for non-family firms. Xi,t−1 are firm controls. I control for size (logarithm
of assets), cash flow, leverage, cash holdings, interest expense, and S&P rating. Furthermore,
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I include controls for bank characteristics Zb,t−1. Bank controls include assets, deposit ratio,
capital ratio, profitability, and provision for loan losses. Section 3.2.4 describes in detail the
firm and bank controls used in the tests. ηs are industry fixed effects. Finally, I add bank
fixed effects ηb to control for time-invariant bank characteristics. In Column (1), I do not
include any firm or bank controls, whereas in Column (2), I include firm and bank controls.
In both Columns (1) and (2), I include industry fixed effects to absorb any time-invariant
industry heterogeneity. Column (1) shows that spreads increased during the crisis for all
firms, as reported by the positive coefficient on the variable Post. But for family firms, the
increase in spreads was 28.96 basis points lower than the increase in spreads for non-family
firms. The results are similar in Column (2), where I introduce firm and bank controls. In
Column (3), I add firm fixed effects to account for firm time-invariant heterogeneity. I do
not include IFamilyi as a stand-alone variable in the model because it is subsumed by the firm
fixed effects. The coefficient on Post × IFamilyi remains both economically and statistically
significant when I add firm fixed effects. The results in Table 3.4 indicate family firms
experienced a smaller increase in the credit spreads relative to non-family firms, and family
control seems to affect the agency cost of debt.
3.3.2 Family Firms, Credit Spreads and Exposure to the Shock
The previous subsection showed that family control is associated with lower agency costs
of debt. One potential concern is that family and non-family firms might have different
exposure to the liquidity shock through their banks. Addressing this concern is especially
important as Table 3.19 and prior literature (Santos (2010)) shows that firms maintaining
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lending relationships with financial institutions with high exposure to Lehman experienced
a higher increase in interest rates during the crisis.
To address this concern, I split the sample into firms that experienced a larger exposure
to the liquidity shock and firms with limited exposure, and re-run the specification (3.4)
that focuses on the impact of family control. I classify a firm as having high exposure to the
shock if the measure of exposure to the Lehman collapse (LehmanExposurei) is in the top
25% of the distribution, and as having low exposure to the shock if the measure of exposure
to the Lehman collapse is in the bottom 25% of the distribution. The analysis in Table 3.5
allows me to isolate the impact of family control within a particular level of exposure,thus
mitigating the concern that the results are driven by family-controlled firms having less
exposure to the crisis if they were matching with financial institutions that engaged less in
co-syndication activity with Lehman. Furthermore, the analysis in Table 3.5 allows me to
capture a potential heterogeneous impact of family control between different exposure levels
to the shock.
The results in Table 3.5 show that firms in both subsamples experienced a higher cost
in accessing the bank lending market, as reported by the positive coefficient on the variable
Post, but as expected, the increase in the cost of bank debt was higher for firms with the
highest exposure to the liquidity shock though their banks. Furthermore, Table 3.5 unveils an
interesting observation. Family control has a statistically and economically significant impact
on the cost of acquiring bank credit in the crisis period only for the subsample of firms that
maintained lending relationships with financial institutions highly exposed to the collapse
of Lehman. Indeed, only family-controlled firms of the highly exposed subsample (Columns
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(1) and (2)) experienced lower credit spreads in the lending facilities originated during the
crisis, compared to widely held firms. The economic magnitude is in the level of 75 basis
points, implying that highly exposed family-controlled firms experience a sizeable benefit in
the cost of private debt compared to a mean spread of 344 basis points in the crisis period. In
Columns (2) and (4) I add firm fixed effects to control for firm time-invariant heterogeneity.
The coefficient on Post × IFamilyi shows the results are robust when I include firm fixed
effects. Furthermore, in unreported results I repeat the analysis restricting my sample to the
period from 2005 to 2009 to reflect the termination of the post-Lehman recessionary period
that ended in 2009 and the results remain unchanged.
Table 3.20 explores the impact of family control on credit spreads in subsamples with
similar exposure to the shock, although examining term loans and credit lines separately,
and reports similar results. The rationale of splitting my sample based on the type of lending
facility is based on the fact that different loan types potentially involve heterogeneous pricing
characteristics that the additive nature of my specification in Table 3.5 fails to incorporate.
Specifically, Table 3.20 shows that family firms are associated with a 120-123 basis points
lower spread for highly-exposed firms in the case of term loans and a 42-47 basis point in
the subsample that consists of credit lines.
Table 3.21 repeats the analysis of Tables 3.5 and 3.20 with an alternative triple-difference
specification that takes advantage of the continuous variation in the Lehman exposure. The
dependent variable is the credit spread on loans. The specification I estimate is the following:
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+ νIFamilyi × LehmanExposurei + δPostit × LehmanExposurei+
+ φPostit × LehmanExposurei × IFamilyi + ζXi,t−1 + χZb,t−1 + ηbi + ηs + εit.
(3.5)
The specification is the same as that in equation (3.4), but I now introduce the inter-
actions of IFamilyi with the variables LehmanExposure and Post. All the specifications
include firm and bank controls, as well as bank and industry fixed effects. In Column (1), I
investigate credit spreads on all loans taken out. In Columns (2) and (3), I present results
separately for term loans and credit lines.
The main coefficient of interest in Column (1) is the coefficient on the triple interaction
Post×IFamilyi ×LehmanExposure. The negative coefficient shows that among the firms that
had high exposure to the liquidity shock, family firms got a lower credit spread compared to
non-family firms in their loans taken out during the crisis. In terms of economic significance,
a standard-deviation increase in the exposure to the liquidity shock is associated with a 26
basis points lower cost of bank capital for family firms compared to non-family firms. In
Columns (2) and (3), I repeat the analysis separately for term loans and credit lines and find
similar results. Specifically, a standard-deviation increase in the exposure to the liquidity
shock is associated with a 32 basis points lower spread for family firms in the case of term
loans and a 22 basis point in the case of credit lines.
Therefore, the results show family firms are associated with lower cost of debt and the
effect of family ties is exacerbated especially among firms with higher exposure to the liquidity
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shock. If financial frictions make it difficult for firms to access external capital or switch
from one source of capital to another, firms that maintained lending relationships with
financial institutions that were highly exposed to the negative liquidity shock during the
crisis experienced tighter financial constraints. The results provide evidence that family
control has a particularly greater effect on the cost on borrowing among the firms with
higher exposure to the shock, potentially because agency conflicts become binding in the
highly affected group. In section 3.3.6, I will further investigate various potential factors that
can drive the effect of family control and analyze whether the lower debt cost is concentrated
in family firms expected ex ante to have larger agency costs.
3.3.3 Other Contract Terms and Access to the Bank Lending Mar-
ket
In Table 3.6, I examine the change in loan maturity and loan amount for loans taken out
before and after the crisis for family and non-family firms. The specification I estimate is
similar to equation (3.5), but now the dependent variable is either loan maturity or the log of
the loan amount. All the specifications include industry and bank fixed effects. In Columns
(1) and (2), I investigate loan maturity, and in Columns (3) and (4), the log of loan amount.
The negative coefficient on the variable Post in Columns (1) and (2) indicates loan maturity
decreased by about 10-12 months during the Great Recession period, whereas the negative
coefficient on the variable Post in Column (4) provides evidence in support of a decline in
the amount of lending in the crisis period. Furthermore, the coefficient on the interaction
Post×IFamilyi is insignificant in both cases in the case of maturity, which shows no difference
in the maturity of loans taken out by family and non-family firms during the crisis, whereas
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I find limited evidence that family firms have also accessed a larger pool of funds during
the crisis period. This table alleviates a potential concern that the effect of family firms on
credit spreads that I find during the financial crisis is due to lower maturity or loan amount.
Table 3.7 focuses on the extensive margin and examines whether family-controlled firms
have heterogeneous access to the bank lending market during the crisis, by considering a
probit specification. For this test, the sample contains all the borrowers that obtained a
syndicated loan in the pre-crisis period (3,322 firms and, out of these, 733 are family firms).
The dependent variable is an indicator corresponding to whether the borrower who had
obtained a loan in the pre-crisis period obtained a new loan commitment between October
2008 and December 2010. The results indicate no differences between family and non-family
firms in accessing the bank lending market in the crisis period.
3.3.4 Robustness Tests
In this section I provide numerous tests that show the robustness of my results. I show that
my results are not explained by differences in corporate policies related to dividends, cash
holdings, and leverage between family and non family firms during the crisis. Furthermore,
the results are similar when I repeat the analysis in a subsample in which I require firms not
only to have accessed the bank lending market before and after the crisis, but also to have
borrowed the same type of loan from the same lender. Moreover, I use a matching estimator
approach to alleviate concerns that some pre-crisis characteristics might differ across the
family and non-family group of firms, and these characteristics potentially explain both the
founding family’s endogenous decision to maintain control in the firm and to secure bank
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financing in the crisis. I also provide evidence that my results are not driven by differential
changes in credit quality for family and non-family firms during the crisis or by the selection
of firms that get a loan during the crisis. Finally, my results are robust to using an alternative
definition for exposure to the liquidity shock.
3.3.4.1 Differences in Corporate Policies
The purpose of my essay is to examine the relation between family control and the contract
terms associated with syndicated lending. Treating the recent financial crisis as an exogenous
shock, I find that family-controlled firms exhibit lower costs of accessing the syndicated
loan market in the crisis period. Nevertheless, a potential concern is that the observed
relation reflects differences in corporate policies between family-controlled firms and non-
family firms during the crisis. For example, as creditors are only interested in the ability of the
borrowing firms to repay the loan obligations, if non-family firms distributed a larger amount
of dividends to shareholders in the period following the Lehman collapse compared to family-
controlled firms or disproportionally accumulated debt, the lending financial institutions are
likely to differentially re-evaluate the creditworthiness of non-family firms. Therefore, in
Table 3.8, I examine whether family firms engaged in different corporate actions during the
crisis relative to non-family firms. Specifically, I investigate their policies regarding dividends,
cash holdings, and leverage. The specification I estimate is similar to equation (3.4), but
now the dependent variable is the respective financing decision. All the specifications include
quarter fixed effects and industry fixed effects. Columns (1)-(4) present the results for firms
with high exposure to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, whereas Columns (5)-(8) present the
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results for firms with low exposure. The coefficients on Post×IFamilyi show family-controlled
firms do not differ in their crisis-period decisions about cash holdings, cash, leverage, and
short-term debt compared with non-family firms, implying that my findings are not explained
by differences in corporate policies during the crisis.
3.3.4.2 Subsample of Borrowers Borrowing from the Same Lender
My previous results show family firms get lower credit spreads than non-family firms during
the crisis. Furthermore, I show that firms that had high exposure to the liquidity shock are
the primary driver of this difference in spreads. In this section, I repeat the analysis in a
subsample in which I require firms not only to have accessed the bank lending market before
and after the crisis, but also to have borrowed the same type of loan from the same lender.
This subsample alleviates concerns that firms that switch lenders or firms that switched
to different types of loans taken out from the same lender drive the results. For example,
because revolving facilities are shorter in maturity than term loans, leading potentially to
lower credit spreads, family firms might experience a lower cost of raising bank funding not
due to reasons related to the presence of the family, but because of a change in the loan-type
structure towards credit-line-type facilities in the post-crisis period. The results in Table
3.23 alleviate these concerns.
3.3.4.3 Matching Results
If firms were randomly assigned as family and non-family firms in the pre-crisis period,
then it would be sufficient to make causal inferences by just comparing the outcomes of
family (treated) and non-family (control) firms. However, some pre-crisis characteristics
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differ across the family and non-family group of firms. These differences raise the potential
concern that the observed differences in firm characteristics at least partially explain both
the endogenous decision of the founding family to maintain control in the firm and the ability
to secure bank financing in the crisis. By just including a battery of observable firm controls
in my baseline specifications to capture the additional sources of firm heterogeneity may not
alleviate the potential concerns.
To assess whether pre-crisis differences between family and non family firms influence
my results, I allow for nonlinear and nonparametric methods with the use of matching es-
timators. The rationale of using a matching estimator approach is to achieve the optimal
matching of treated firms with control firms based on multiple observable characteristics, so
as to restrict the set of counterfactuals to the matched controls; in other words, I expect
the treated firms to behave similarly to the control group in the absence of the treatment.
To define a counterfactual control group, I take advantage of the Abadie and Imbens (2011)
matching estimator that minimizes the Mahalanobis distance between the set of observable
firm variables prior to the exogenous shock that have been used as controls across family and
non-family firms. Compared to a propensity-score-matching analysis, the Abadie-Imbens es-
timator provides the opportunity to achieve exact matching on categorical variables and,
thus I am able to identify a control group of firms that match precisely on industry. More-
over, the process minimizes the distance among a vector of continuous covariates, including
firm size, profitability, and exposure to the collapse of Lehman Brothers among others, by
applying a bias-correction component to the estimates.6
6The matching process leads to similar results when cash-flow volatility is included in the covariates.
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Panel A of Table 3.9 reports that following the matching process, both the family and
non-family group are identical on the set of observable characteristics. Indeed, contrary to
the pre-crisis differences in the univariate approach, the matching process leads to a sample
with no statistically significant differences in the pre-crisis characteristics.
Having identified a matched sample of control firms, in the second stage, I compare
changes in the outcome variables between the groups around the liquidity shock instead of
comparing levels of the outcome variables in the treatment and control groups. Therefore,
inferences about the heterogeneous exposure to the shock are based on the average effect of
the treatment on the treated (ATT). The intuition behind deciding to compare differences
rather than levels is that the outcome levels for treated and controls potentially differ prior
to the shock, and continue being different after as well, in which case the uncontrolled
firm-specific differences might bias the inferences. The outcome variables are presented in
Panel B, confirming that even after I match for firms with similar observable characteristics,
firms that are family-controlled experience favorable access in the syndicated loan market, as
evidenced by significantly lower credit spreads. In particular, both types of firms experience
an increasing cost of bank capital following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, consistent with
the anecdotal evidence of limited access to the syndicated lending market; however, family-
controlled firms that access the syndicated loan market obtain a lower credit spread by 26
basis points. Furthermore, when I examine loan amounts, I find that family firms have also
accessed a larger pool of funds during the crisis period.
The findings of the matching process alleviate the concern that pre-crisis differences in
firm characteristics may explain the impact of family control on lending terms in the crisis
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period and further support my results.
3.3.4.4 Changes in Credit Quality of Borrowers
In my empirical results I analyze the loan characteristics at the origination of the lending
facility, thus the variables used as controls to capture the credit quality of the firms are the
ones observed one time period before the origination of the lending facility. One potential
concern is whether the credit quality of the borrowers changes from the pre-Lehman to the
post-Lehman period differentially for family and non-family firms. For example, if family-
controlled firms deleveraged (or did not increase leverage) over the pre-crisis period at a faster
rate than non-family firms, the observed advantage of family-controlled firms in obtaining
beneficial credit spreads is potentially explained by a differential change in credit quality.
To begin with, I have already provided evidence on the distribution of loan originations
per year between family-controlled and non-family firms along with evidence that family-
controlled and non-family firms did not demonstrate heterogeneity in their corporate policies.
Nevertheless, in order to further alleviate any concerns, I track the credit quality variables
used over time from the pre-Lehman to the post-Lehman period, and provide graphical
evidence that leverage, interest expense, and credit rating between family-controlled and non-
family firms follow a parallel path. Specifically, it is apparent from Figure 3.4 that in the pre-
crisis period leverage ratios are relatively parallel, and, if anything, family-controlled firms
leverage at a faster rate in the peak of the crisis, while Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 demonstrate
that interest expense and credit ratings exhibit parallel paths for family-controlled and non-
family firms. Moreover, it is important to mention that including in my regressions controls
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for changes in the credit quality variables from the pre-crisis to the crisis period, have no
impact on my results.
3.3.4.5 Selection Concerns
Because the focus of my essay is on the impact of family control on loan pricing in the
intensive margin of firms following the liquidity crisis, a potential concern is that family-
controlled firms that accessed bank lending in the crisis period are selected from a different
part of the distribution compared to non-family firms that accessed bank lending in the
crisis period, and specifically that family firms that accessed bank debt during the crisis
were selected from the top part of the distribution. In other words, the potential selection
issue reflects the fact that the distribution of family firms rationed out is different from the
distribution of non-family firms, providing room for an explanation that only a handful of
the top family firms are allowed to access the bank market, while a wider part of the non-
family firms distribution borrows in the crisis period, thus leading to heterogeneous loan
pricing. To mitigate the potential selection issue, I compare both the firm and the loan
characteristics of family and non-family firms that accessed the debt market in the pre-crisis
period, but did not access the market in the crisis period. Panel A of Table 3.10 focuses
on firm characteristics, whereas Panel B compares the characteristics of loans taken out by
family and non-family firms. On average, family firms that got a loan in the pre-crisis period
but not in the crisis period are smaller in assets than non-family firms that got a loan in the
pre-crisis period but not in the crisis period (as Table 3.1 shows family firms are on average
smaller in my overall sample as well). Furthermore, family firms have higher cash flow,
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lower leverage, and, hold more cash, though the differences are statistically insignificant.
Regarding the loan characteristics, both credit spread and maturity are not significantly
different between family and non-family firms. Thus the evidence in Table 3.10 provide
support that selection does not drive the results.
3.3.4.6 Alternative Measure of Exposure to the Shock
In Table 3.22, I verify the validity of my results by using as an alternative measure of
exposure to the liquidity shock the change in the lending supply of financial institutions
following the Lehman collapse. To get an expected sign on the liquidity-shock measure
that is compatible to my previous specification, I slightly divert from the construction of
the measure as originally proposed in Chodorow-Reich (2014), by estimating the inverted
ratio of the measure. As a result, the higher the value of the credit-supply measure, the
larger the contraction in the lending activity occurring by the respective financial institution
in the syndicated loan market. Table 3.22 reports the results of splitting the sample into
highly exposed firms and firms experiencing limited exposure to the shock, and confirms
that family-controlled firms have favorable access to the bank lending market during the
crisis. Specifically, family firms are associated with a 60 basis points lower spread for highly
exposed firms, which increases to 85 basis points in the case of term loans. In the credit-lines
subsample, the coefficient is still negative, though statistically insignificant. Thus, my results
remain robust when I use an alternative measure of exposure to the shock.
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3.3.5 Robustness to Alternative Explanations
In this section, I consider several alternative hypotheses for the lower cost of obtaining access
to bank financing for family firms. First, family firms might maintain a longer and tighter
relation with financial institutions before the shock, and thus, the difference in the length
of the lending relations between family and non-family firms rather than the family control
itself might be driving the result. Furthermore, another alternative explanation that may
be potentially responsible for my results is that lenders do not value family control per
se, but rather concentrated blockholding in general in the presence of liquidity constraints,
thus leading to a lower cost of bank capital. The intuition is that a significant ownership
stake accompanies family control, and as a result, the observed difference in credit spreads
is a manifestation of the different ownership structure in terms of concentrated ownership.
Moreover, an additional concern is that my results are not capturing the effect of the family,
but are driven by founder-run firms, which might not be family firms. Finally, I also examine
whether family-controlled firms experience a lower cost in accessing bank financing, because
they accept stricter covenants in the lending agreements. In the sections below, I provide
additional tests to investigate and rule out these alternative channels. 7
3.3.5.1 Length of Relationship
Lending relationships matter for the cost of borrowing (Petersen and Rajan (1994), Bharath,
Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2009)), and I next investigate whether family firms having
7In unreported tests, I also test whether the effect is due to differences in cash-flow volatility between
family and non-family firms. I do not find any differences in the cash-flow volatility in the pre-crisis period
between family and non-family firms. Furthermore, my results remain unchanged when I control for cash-flow
volatility in my specifications.
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longer and tighter relationships with financial institutions explains my results. In Table 3.11,
I re-run my baseline specifications by controlling for measures that capture the level of lending
relationships. I consider the following three measures: (1) a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the firm has obtained a lending facility over the previous year from the financial institution
responsible for the current lending facility, following Santos (2010); (2) the duration of
the lending relationship, captured by the time elapsed since the origination of the first
loan with the lender; and (3) the fraction of the syndicated loans of a firm in which a
specific lender has participated. Although the measures are coarse because of limitations
in the available information in the data set, considering different aspects of the lending
relationship contributes to alleviating my concerns. The results are presented in Table 3.11
and demonstrate that the inclusion of controls capturing the lending relationship of a bank-
firm pair has no material impact on my results.
3.3.5.2 Blockholding
Previous research has shown large blockholders affect firm valuation (i.e., Vishny and Shleifer
(1986), Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002), Lemmon and Lins (2003)). In Table 3.12,
I examine whether concentrated ownership instead of family involvement explains the results.
I investigate the concentrated ownership channel by re-running my baseline specifications
by separating firms based on the presence of a large shareholder instead of founding-family
control. I measure concentrated ownership in two ways. The first one uses a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if an institutional investor holds 10% or more of the common stocks of
the firm. The data come from the Thompson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) database
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that tracks the portfolios of institutional investors that are obliged to report their common
stock holdings and transactions on Form 13F filed with the SEC. The second approach
is to add to the presence of a large institutional shareholder with concentrated ownership
the dimension of long-term orientation. The intuition is that concentrated ownership is not
necessarily accompanied by active involvement in the management of the firm or with a long-
term horizon perspective; thus, taking into account institutional blockholders with a long
trading horizon provides a closer comparison group both in terms of ownership concentration
and in temrs of horizon. The measure of investor horizon I employ is a firm-level measure
used in Cella, Ellul, and Giannetti (2013) and proxies portfolio turnover by institutional
investors. I classify firms with an investor-horizon value in the lowest tercile as held by
long-term investors and those with an investor-horizon value in the highest tercile as held
by short-term investors.
The results are presented in Table 3.12, demonstrating the presence of a large shareholder
(institutional investor in my case) either as a passive investor or with a long-term horizon has
no significant impact on a firm’s ability to obtain bank funding under favorable terms during
the crisis. Panel A reports the coefficient of the interaction term when only the presence of a
large institutional shareholder with ownership greater than 10% is considered, whereas Panel
B reports the coefficient of the interaction term when considering long-orientation as well.
The results in Table 3.12 provide further support that creditors value family involvement
and not just the presence of a large shareholder.
To provide even more compelling evidence in favor of an explanation consistent with
family control being differentially valued by creditors during the crisis, I repeat the matching
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process of section 3.3.4.3, but now I also restrict the matching firm to be a non-family firm
that not only matches in log assets, cash flow, leverage, cash, and Lehman exposure, but
also has a similar level of blockholder ownership.
The results of the matching process are presented in Table 3.13, confirming that even
after I match for firms with similar observable characteristics and blockholder ownership level,
firms that are family-controlled experience favorable access in the syndicated loan market, as
evidenced by significantly lower credit spreads. In particular, both types of firms experience
an increasing cost of bank capital following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, consistent
with anecdotal evidence of limited access to the syndicated lending market; however, family-
controlled firms that access the syndicated loan market obtain a lower credit spread by 37
basis points.
3.3.5.3 Alternative Definition of Family Firms
In Table 3.14, I show the robustness of my results if I impose additional restrictions in the
definition of family firms. Specifically, I consider three alternative definitions of family firms.
The first definition requires the family to be the largest voteholder. The second definition
requires the family to be the largest shareholder. Finally, the third definition requires one
or more family members from the second or later generations to be officers, directors, or
stockholders. My later test aims to alleviate concerns that founder-run firms that might not
be family firms drive my results. Table 3.14 reports the coefficient of Post× IFamilyi for the
different definitions of a family firm. The results remain robust.
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3.3.5.4 Covenant Strictness
The results demonstrate that family-controlled firms appear to access bank financing at a
lower cost compared to non-family firms. However, a potential alternative explanation is
that family-controlled firms experience a lower cost in accessing bank financing, because
they accept stricter covenants in the lending agreements. Therefore, the potential concern
is whether family-controlled firms potentially trade off the lower funding cost for tighter
covenant terms. To address the concern, I investigate whether family firms differ with
respect to covenant strictness compared to non-family firms. In Table 3.24, I re-run my main
specification with covenant strictness as a dependent variable. Following Murfin (2012), I
construct a covenant-strictness measure that reflects the probability that a firm violates any
of the covenants over the next quarter. Column (1) presents the results for the subsample of
firms that were highly exposed to the Lehman collapse, whereas Column (2) focuses on firms
that were less affected. In both subsamples, covenant strictness is not significantly different
between family and non-family firms; thus, differences in covenant strictness do not seem to
drive the wedge in credit spreads.
3.3.6 Factors Influencing the Link between Family Control and
Cost of Bank Debt
The results of the main analysis show family firms have a lower cost of accessing private debt
markets during the crisis. What is different about family firms? In this section, I examine
potential mechanisms that can contribute to the lower cost of debt financing for family firms.
First, I investigate whether the lower debt cost is concentrated in family firms expected ex
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ante to have larger agency costs. Second, I investigate whether the identity of the CEO
matters. Finally, I explore the role of covenants.
3.3.6.1 Firm Differences in Agency Conflicts
To further assess the interpretation of my results, in Table 3.15, I repeat my analysis for
firms with different ex-ante agency conflicts. If family control mitigates agency costs of debt,
I would expect the impact of family control on the cost of debt during the crisis to be more
pronounced in firms with higher ex-ante debt-agency conflicts. I classify firms as having
a high potential for agency conflicts if they have leverage that is in the top 30% of the
distribution (Panel A) or they are closer to bankruptcy, as predicted by an Altman Z-score
in the top 30% of the distribution (Panel B). The results in Table 3.15 show, as before, that
the impact of family control on the cost of debt is concentrated among firms with higher
exposure to the shock, through their banks. Moreover, the results show that within firms
with high exposure to the shock, the impact is concentrated on firms with a higher potential
of agency conflicts. These results further reinforce the interpretation that family control
mitigates agency conflicts between shareholders and debtholders.
3.3.6.2 Family or Outside CEO
Anderson and Reeb (2003) has shown that having a family member as CEO is associated with
higher cost of debt, in the case of public debt. In Table 3.16, I investigate the relationship
between family CEOs and the cost of bank debt for the family firms in my sample. CEO is
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is a family member, and 0 otherwise.
Column (1) looks at all credit agreements, whereas Columns (2) and (3) look at term loans
162
and credit lines, respectively. I find that in the case of private debt agreements, having a
family CEO is associated with a cost of debt financing that is 49-71 basis points lower during
the crisis. The coefficient of Post× ICEOi is negative and statistically significant in all three
columns.
The results in Table 3.16 show the relationship between family CEO and the cost of bank
debt is opposite to the one that prior literature has shown for public debt. One potential
explanation comes from the fact that private debt is relationship-based. The results show
that for the more relationship-based bank debt, the providers of bank capital value the fact
that the family that owns a large part of the company is also the one that manages the
company.
3.3.6.3 Violation of Covenants
In Table 3.17, I investigate whether family firms differ from non-family firms with respect to
covenant violations. Following Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009), I use a text-search program to
collect information from 10-K and 10-Q filings on whether firms violate a covenant. I collect
data on covenant violations for all firms in my sample for the years 2004-2010.
The dependent variable in Table 3.17 is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if a covenant
has been violated, and 0 otherwise. In Column (1), the coefficient on IFamilyi shows that
throughout the period 2004-2010, family firms did not have a higher propensity than non-
family firms to violate their covenants. Furthermore, in Column (2), I examine whether
covenant violations were different in the crisis period for family firms, but I do not find any
difference between family and non-family firms. Thus, differences in covenant violations do
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not seem to drive the wedge in credit spreads.
3.3.6.4 Covenants on Retaining Family Involvement
Creditors use covenants to mitigate shareholder-debtholder conflicts. I provide novel evidence
that in the case of family firms, creditors often use covenants that require the founding family
to maintain its presence in the firm by requiring a minimum percentage of ownership or voting
power. The control covenant contained in the 2009 10-K for Ralph Lauren Corporation is
a typical example: “Additionally, the Credit Facility provides that an Event of Default will
occur if Mr. Ralph Lauren, my Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, and
entities controlled by the Lauren family fail to maintain a specified minimum percentage of
the voting power of my common stock.” These types of covenants show creditors value the
involvement of the founding family.
In this section, I examine how common it is for creditors to require a minimum percentage
of family ownership and control. For the family firms in my sample, I collect information
on ownership and control covenants from the 10-K filings. Table 3.18 shows that 17% of the
family firms in my sample mention the existence of control covenants in their 10-K filings at
some point between 2004 and 2010. The percentage is similar when I look at family firms
in which the family has more than 20% voting power or when the CEO is a member of
the founding family. Across size categories, restrictions are more common in small firms,
but a substantial fraction of firms with over $1 billion in book assets also have control and
ownership restrictions. Because companies are not obliged to mention such agreements in
their 10-K filings, Table 3.18 underestimates the usage of such restrictions.
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3.4 Conclusion
The purpose of the essay is to examine the impact of family control on the agency cost
of debt. In particular, I focus on the market for private debt and I analyze the potential
heterogeneity in the terms of debt contracts between family and non-family firms. Using the
recent financial crisis as a laboratory, I find family firms received lower rates compared to
non-family firms when accessing the syndicated loan market during the crisis. Furthermore,
I find tighter liquidity constraints amplify the effect of family control on the cost of debt.
To alleviate any potential concerns (e.g., due to family firms matching with better fi-
nancial institutions), I exploit the cross-sectional dispersion in lender health induced by the
collapse of Lehman Brothers as a source of exogenous variation in the exposure to the shock.
Specifically, I hypothesize that if financial frictions make it difficult for firms to access ex-
ternal capital or switch from one source of capital to another, firms that maintained lending
relationships with financial institutions that were highly exposed to the negative liquidity
shock during the crisis experienced tighter financial constraints and a higher cost of accessing
the syndicated loan market. Indeed, the government decision not to provide financial support
and to allow Lehman Brothers to go bankrupt was considered unexpected, thus providing a
useful laboratory to identify the relationship between private debt markets and family con-
trol. Therefore, the research design that I consider compares family and non-family firms at
the same point in time that have been subject to the same shock and have similar exposure
to the shock based on their lending relationships with differentially liquidity-struck financial
institutions. Thus I am able to tease out the effect of family control on the cost of debt.
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Furthermore, I unveil potential channels that drive the relation between family control
and loan spreads. I find the gap in spreads between family and non-family firms is higher
in firms with higher ex-ante shareholder-debtholder agency conflicts. Moreover, the effect is
stronger when family CEOs run the firms. Finally, I investigate the importance of covenants
linked with founding-family control as a manifestation of the importance of family control
for lending relations and the role of long-term orientation on the cost of accessing the private
debt market.
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3.5 Figures and Tables
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3.5.2 Tables
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Pre-Crisis
Panel A: Firm Variables
Family Firms Non-Family Firms
Variables N Mean Std Dev. p10 p50 p90 N Mean Std Dev. p10 p50 p90 Difference
Log Assets 1,103 7.17 1.64 5.08 7.05 9.43 2,937 7.65 1.67 5.59 7.56 9.97 -0.47***
Cash Flow 1,080 0.037 0.031 0.012 0.036 0.069 2,893 0.035 0.035 0.012 0.033 0.064 0.002
Leverage 1,103 0.34 0.25 0.04 0.33 0.64 2,937 0.38 0.28 0.08 0.32 0.70 -0.03
Interest Expense 981 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.005 0.014 2,703 0.008 0.008 0.001 0.005 0.016 0
Cash 1,103 0.066 0.102 0.003 0.031 0.155 2,937 0.065 0.090 0.003 0.033 0.158 0.001
S&P Rating 610 12 4 8 11 17 2,000 12 4 8 11 17 0
Age 1,116 17 14 3 13 42 2,945 25 19 5 18 56 -8***
Number of Firms 313 858
Panel B: Loan Variables
Family Firms Non-Family Firms
Variables N Mean Std Dev. p10 p50 p90 N Mean Std Dev. p10 p50 p90 Difference
Credit Spread
All Loans 1,149 190 137 50 175 325 3,232 187 142 35 175 350 2.76
Term Loans 386 254 159 113 225 450 1,081 267 162 100 225 475 -13.70
Credit Lines 763 157 111 33 150 275 2,151 146 111 30 125 288 10.82
Maturity 1,117 54 21 22 60 81 3,187 53 21 12 60 81 0.55
Log Amount 1,149 19.06 1.42 17.22 19.11 20.91 3,232 19.24 1.36 17.50 19.28 20.95 -0.17
Lehman Exposure 1,149 0.071 0.054 0.037 0.058 0.119 3,232 0.074 0.047 0.041 0.065 0.116 -0.003
Panel C: Bank Variables
Variables N Mean Std Dev. p10 p50 p90
Assets (in million $) 71 550.2 622.2 48.4 206.9 1,494.1
Deposits/Assets 71 0.24 0.13 0.12 0.23 0.40
Profitability 71 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.013
Capital/Assets 71 0.079 0.032 0.034 0.085 0.105
Loan Net Charge-Offs 71 0.002 0.002 0 0.001 0.005
Lehman Exposure 71 0.068 0.082 0.013 0.057 0.119
Number of Loans Ratio (Post/Pre) 71 0.50 0.56 0.10 0.38 0.89
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for the sample used in the analysis, broken down by family and non-family firms. Panel A provides summary
statistics on firm characteristics in the period before the crisis. The last column in Panel A provides the difference in means between the characteristics of
family and non-family firms. Panel B describes the characteristics of loans taken out by firms in the pre-crisis period. The last column in Panel B provides
the difference in means between the characteristics of the loans taken out by family and non-family firms. Panel C provides summary statistics on the bank
characteristics for the pre-crisis period.
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Table 3.2: Loan Origination Distribution
Distribution of Loan Facilities Per Origination Year
Family Firms Non-Family Firms
Year N # of Loans % of Loans N # of Loans % of Loans
2004 170 325 18% 471 855 17%
2005 157 298 17% 497 910 18%
2006 160 274 16% 454 836 17%
2007 126 222 13% 353 669 13%
2008 113 176 10% 290 459 9%
2009 128 193 11% 355 527 10%
2010 188 272 15% 495 784 16%
Total 1,760 5,040
Notes: The table reports the distribution of loan facilities per origination year broken down by family and
non-family firms.
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Table 3.3: Industry Distribution
Non-Family Firms Family Firms
Industry N Percentage N Percentage Total Family Firms in
Industry
Agriculture 6 0.7% 1 0.3% 7 14%
Aircraft 5 0.6% 3 1.0% 8 38%
Apparel 7 0.8% 7 2.2% 14 50%
Automobiles & Trucks 23 2.7% 6 1.9% 29 21%
Beer & Liquor 1 0.1% 1 0.3% 2 50%
Business Services 71 8.3% 38 12.1% 109 35%
Business Supplies 14 1.6% 8 2.6% 22 36%
Candy & Soda 2 0.2% 2 0.6% 4 50%
Chemicals 33 3.9% 6 1.9% 39 15%
Coal 9 1.1% 1 0.3% 10 10%
Computers 11 1.3% 7 2.2% 18 39%
Construction 10 1.2% 6 1.9% 16 38%
Construction Materials 25 2.9% 3 1.0% 28 11%
Consumer Goods 19 2.2% 6 1.9% 25 24%
Defense 3 0.4% 0 0.0% 3 0%
Electrical Equipment 6 0.7% 1 0.3% 7 14%
Electronic Equipment 30 3.5% 10 3.2% 40 25%
Entertainment 13 1.5% 6 1.9% 19 32%
Fabricated Products 1 0.1% 0 0.0% 1 0%
Food Products 23 2.7% 10 3.2% 33 30%
Gold 3 0.3% 0 0.0% 3 0%
Healthcare 26 3.0% 7 2.2% 33 21%
Machinery 28 3.3% 9 2.9% 37 24%
Measuring & Control Equipment 9 1.1% 2 0.6% 11 18%
Medical Equipment 14 1.6% 6 1.9% 20 30%
Metals & Mining 5 0.6% 0 0.0% 5 0%
Other 3 0.4% 1 0.3% 4 25%
Personal Services 10 1.2% 8 2.6% 18 44%
Petroleum & Natural Gas 54 6.3% 36 11.5% 90 40%
Pharmaceutical Products 17 2.0% 3 1.0% 20 15%
Printing & Publishing 13 1.5% 9 2.9% 22 41%
Recreation 5 0.6% 2 0.6% 7 29%
Restaurants & Hotels 31 3.6% 14 4.5% 45 31%
Retail 68 7.9% 29 9.3% 97 30%
Rubber & Plastic Products 13 1.5% 2 0.6% 13 13%
Shipbuilding & Railroad Equipment 3 0.4% 0 0.0% 3 0%
Shipping Containers 6 0.7% 1 0.3% 7 14%
Steel 18 2.1% 3 1.0% 21 14%
Telecommunications 34 4.0% 28 9.0% 62 45%
Textiles 10 1.2% 1 0.3% 11 9%
Tobacco Products 1 0.1% 0 0.0% 1 0%
Transportation 25 2.9% 13 4.2% 38 34%
Utilities 109 12.7% 4 1.3% 113 4%
Wholesale 41 4.8% 13 4.2% 54 24%
Total 858 313 1,171
Notes: The table presents the industry distribution of firms by family ties. Firms are sorted by industry
using the Fama-French 48-industry classification.
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Table 3.4: Family Control and Credit Spread
Panel A: Univariate Test
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Family Non-Family Difference
Pre-Crisis 176.89*** 171.81*** 5.08
Crisis 306.82*** 323.93*** -17.12*
Difference 129.93*** 152.12***
Difference-in-Differences -22.20**
Panel B: Regression Analysis
(1) (2) (3)
Variables




Post× IFamilyi -28.96** -24.69** -20.60*
(12.46) (11.64) (12.22)
Firm Controls No Yes Yes
Bank Controls No Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes No
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes
Observations 6,157 4,965 4,965
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.42 0.62
Notes: The table reports the change in loan spreads during the crisis for family and non-family firms.
Panel A presents the univariate test. Column (1) presents mean loan spreads for family firms, column (2)
for non-family firms, and column (3) provides the difference in means between the loan spreads for family
and non-family firms. Panel B report estimates of the following regression: yit = α+ βPostit + γI
Family
i +
δPostit × IFamilyi + ζXit−1 + θZbt−1 + ηb + ηs + εit, where yit is the credit spread for loans taken out by
company i in quarter t. Postit is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 between the fourth quarter of
2008 and the end of 2010, and 0 otherwise. IFamilyi is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for family
firms, and 0 for non-family firms. X are firm controls. I control for size (logarithm of assets), cash flow,
leverage, cash holdings, interest expense, and S&P rating. I include bank controls (Z) that include assets,
deposit ratio, capital ratio, profitability, and provision for loan losses. ηs are industry fixed effects. Finally,
I add bank fixed effects ηb. In column (3) I include firm fixed effects. In each column, I report estimated
coefficients and their standard errors. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered by
firm.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.5: Credit Spread by Lehman Exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables
High Lehman Low Lehman
Post 185.83*** 191.90*** 136.73*** 132.87***
(30.48) (24.17) (19.37) (21.64)
IFamilyi 23.89 -9.17
(15.83) (12.24)
Post× IFamilyi -75.54*** -51.52** 1.66 2.05
(25.31) (23.44) (18.61) (21.73)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,211 1,211 1,333 1,333
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.64 0.38 0.55
Notes: The table explores the change in credit spreads during the crisis for family and non-family firms.
The sample is divided into firms that maintain relationships with financial institutions highly exposed
(LehmanExposurei is in the top 25% of the distribution) or less exposed (bottom 25%) to the Lehman
collapse, so that I compare family and non-family firms with similar exposure to the shock. Lehman Ex-
posure measures the exposure to the liquidity shock at the firm level and is constructed following Ivashina
and Scharfstein (2010). I report estimates of the following regression: yit = α + βPostit + γI
Family
i +
δPostit × IFamilyi + ζXit−1 + θZbt−1 + ηb + ηs + εit, where yit is the credit spread for loans taken out by
company i in quarter t. Postit is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 between the fourth quarter
of 2008 and the end of 2010, and 0 otherwise. IFamilyi is a that variable which takes the value 1 for family
firms, and 0 for non-family firms. X are firm controls. I control for size (logarithm of assets), cash flow,
leverage, cash holdings, interest expense, and S&P rating. I include controls for bank characteristics (Zbt−1).
Bank controls include assets, deposit ratio, capital ratio, profitability, and provision for loan losses. ηs are
industry fixed effects. Finally, I add bank fixed effects ηb. In specifications (2) and (4), I add firm fixed
effects. In each column, I report estimated coefficients and their standard errors. Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and are clustered by firm.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.6: Other Contract Terms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables
Maturity Loan Amount
Post -10.44*** -12.29*** -0.07 -0.29***
(0.80) (1.43) (0.05) (0.10)
IFamilyi 1.14 1.77 -0.04 0.02
(1.24) (1.17) (0.09) (0.06)
Post× IFamilyi -0.07 -0.54 0.09 0.12*
(1.35) (1.38) (0.08) (0.07)
Firm Controls No Yes No Yes
Bank Controls No Yes No Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,608 5,357 6,777 5,463
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.18 0.17 0.56
Notes: The table explores the change in other contract terms during the crisis for family and non-family
firms. I report estimates of the following regression: yit = α + βPostit + γI
Family
i + δPostit × I
Family
i +
ζXit−1 + θZbt−1 + ηb + ηs + εit, where yit is either the maturity or the log amount on loans, i in quarter
t. Postit is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the end
of 2010, and 0 otherwise. IFamilyi is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for family firms and 0 for
non-family firms. X are firm controls. I control for size (logarithm of assets), cash flow, leverage, cash
holdings, interest expense and S&P rating. Z are bank controls. Bank controls include assets, deposit ratio,
capital ratio, profitability, and provision for loan losses. ηs are industry fixed effects, and ηb bank fixed
effects. In each column, I report estimated coefficients and their standard errors. Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and are clustered by firm.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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IFamilyi × LehmanExposure -0.24
(1.72)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,492 3,492 3,492
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.31 0.48
Notes: The table reports the results of the regressions that consider the impact of exposure to the collapse of
Lehman and family control on the likelihood of obtaining bank credit during the crisis. The sample contains
all the borrowers that obtained a syndicated loan in the pre-crisis period. The dependent variable is an
indicator corresponding to whether the borrower who had obtained a loan in the pre-crisis period obtained a
new loan commitment between October 2008 and December 2010. LehmanExposure measures the exposure
to the liquidity shock at the firm level and is constructed following Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010). IFamilyi
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for family firms, and 0 for non-family firms. I control for size
(logarithm of assets), cash flow, leverage, cash holdings, interest expense, and S&P rating. I include controls
for bank characteristics. Bank controls include assets, deposit ratio, capital ratio, profitability, and provision
for loan losses. ηs are industry fixed effects. Finally, I add bank fixed effects ηb. In each column, I report
estimated coefficients and their standard errors. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are
clustered by firm.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.8: Financing Decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables
High Lehman Low Lehman
Dividends Cash Leverage S-T Debt Dividends Cash Leverage S-T Debt
IFamilyi -0.001 0.005 0.042 0.001 0.001 0.008 -0.019 -0.025
(0.001) (0.013) (0.030) (0.020) (0.001) (0.013) (0.021) (0.032)
Post× IFamilyi 0.000 0.002 -0.011 0.024 0.001 -0.010 0.024 0.006
(0.001) (0.011) (0.020) (0.024) (0.001) (0.010) (0.016) (0.035)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,167 6,384 6,189 5,952 7,090 7,384 7,120 6,231
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.34 0.54 0.18 0.04 0.31 0.42 0.21
Notes: The table reports the change in financing decisions during the crisis for family and non-family
firms. The sample is divided into firms that maintain relationships with financial institutions highly exposed
(LehmanExposurei is in the top 25% of the distribution) or less exposed (bottom 25%) to the Lehman
collapse. Lehman Exposure measures the exposure to the liquidity shock at the firm level and is constructed
following Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010). In each column, I report estimated coefficients and their standard
errors. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered by firm.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.9: ATT Matching Estimator
Panel A: Control Variables
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Family Non-Family Difference
Log Assets 6.75*** 6.74*** 0.01
Cash Flow 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.000
Leverage 0.28*** 0.30*** -0.02
Cash 0.079*** 0.084*** -0.004
Lehman Exposure 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.001
Panel B: Outcomes
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Family Non-family Difference
Credit Spread
Before 176.89*** 171.81*** 5.08





Before 52.79*** 51.78*** 1.01





Before 18.81*** 19.07*** -0.25***




Notes: The table presents the results of the difference-in-differences Abadie and Imbens matching estima-
tor around the Lehman collapse, imposing treated and control firms to be similar in terms of observable
characteristics. Treated firms are the family-controlled firms. Panel A reports that following the matching
process, both the family and non-family group are identical on the set of observable characteristics. Panel B
compares changes in the outcome variables between family and non-family firms around the liquidity shock.
The dependent variables include the credit spread, the maturity, and the amount of the lending facilities.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.10: Robustness to Selection
Pre-Crisis
Panel A: Firm Variables
Family Firms Non-Family Firms
Variables N Mean Std Dev. p10 p50 p90 N Mean Std Dev. p10 p50 p90 Difference
Log Assets 1,049 6.57 1.63 4.45 6.57 8.66 2,721 7.24 1.93 4.63 7.31 9.83 -0.67***
Cash Flow 995 0.036 0.045 -0.001 0.036 0.077 2,562 0.035 0.036 0.006 0.033 0.069 0.002
Leverage 1,049 0.31 0.23 0.04 0.28 0.60 2,721 0.33 0.22 0.07 0.31 0.61 -0.03
Interest Expense 952 0.007 0.008 0.001 0.005 0.014 2,483 0.007 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.013 0
Cash 1,047 0.097 0.124 0.006 0.048 0.249 2,721 0.086 0.115 0.005 0.039 0.218 0.011
S&P Rating 433 12 3 8 11 15 1,588 12 4 8 12 17 0
Number of Firms 384 831
Panel B: Loan Variables
Family Firms Non-Family Firms
Variables N Mean Std Dev. p10 p50 p90 N Mean Std Dev. p10 p50 p90 Difference
Credit Spread
All Loans 955 196 144 50 175 350 2,478 187 141 40 175 350 9
Term Loans 270 280 177 113 225 565 769 264 161 100 225 450 17
Credit Lines 685 163 112 45 150 300 1,709 152 116 30 125 300 11
Maturity
All Loans 1,023 51 20 18 60 72 2,650 52 22 12 60 78 -1
Term Loans 289 60 22 35 50 84 813 60 23 26 60 84 0
Credit Lines 734 47 19 13 59 60 1,836 48 20 12 60 60 -1
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of firms that accessed the syndicated loan
market in the pre-crisis period but not in the crisis period. The summary statistics are decomposed into
family and non-family firms. Panel A provides summary statistics on firm characteristics in the period before
the crisis. The last column in Panel A provides the difference in means between the characteristics of family
and non-family firms. Panel B describes the characteristics of loans taken out by firms. The last column in
Panel B provides the difference in means between the characteristics of the loans taken out by family and
non-family firms in the pre-crisis period.
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Table 3.11: Lending-Relationship Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables













Post 181.46*** 192.15*** 174.43*** 129.81*** 119.80*** 144.10***
(33.20) (36.19) (27.59) (19.50) (22.78) (26.64)
IFamilyi 22.88 20.34 23.29 -9.24 -7.57 -9.42
(15.86) (16.72) (15.99) (12.22) (12.03) (12.18)
Post× IFamilyi -74.79*** -71.40*** -78.38*** -2.05 0.54 1.85
(25.32) (25.66) (26.84) (18.05) (18.72) (18.69)
Relationship -16.64 -0.67 12.20 0.52 -1.27*** 12.20
(11.14) (0.41) (20.36) (10.37) (0.42) (16.69)
Post×Relationship 0.41 -0.11 19.76 46.97 1.32** -10.93
(46.48) (0.68) (46.48) (29.41) (0.59) (31.84)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,211 1,211 1,211 1,333 1,333 1,333
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.35 0.35 0.35
Notes: The table reports the change in credit spreads during the crisis for family and non-family firms.
The sample is divided into firms that maintain relationships with financial institutions highly exposed
(LehmanExposurei is in the top 25% of the distribution) or less exposed (bottom 25%) to the Lehman
collapse, so that I compare family and non-family firms with similar exposure to the shock. Lehman Expo-
sure measures the exposure to the liquidity shock at the firm level and is constructed following Ivashina and
Scharfstein (2010). I report estimates of the following regression: yit = α+ βPostit + γI
Family
i + δPostit ×
IFamilyi +ζXi,t−1+θZb,t−1+φRelationshipibt+ηb+ηs+εit, where yit is the credit spread for loans taken out
by company i in quarter t. Postit is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 between the fourth quarter
of 2008 and the end of 2010, and 0 otherwise. IFamilyi is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for family
firms, and 0 for non-family firms. Relationshipibt is one of the following: (1) a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the firm has obtained a lending facility over the previous year from the financial institution responsible for
the current lending facility following Santos (2010), (2) the duration of the lending relationship, captured by
the time elapsed since the origination of the first loan with the lender, or (3) the fraction of the syndicated
loans of a firm in which a specific lender has participated. X are firm controls. I control for size (logarithm
of assets), cash flow, leverage, cash holdings, interest expense, and S&P rating. I include controls for bank
characteristics (Zb,t−1). Bank controls include assets, deposit ratio, capital ratio, profitability, and provision
for loan losses. ηs are industry fixed effects. Finally, I add bank fixed effects ηb. In each column, I report
estimated coefficients and their standard errors. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are
clustered by firm.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.12: Institutional Ownership
(1) (2)
Panel A: Concentrated Ownership
Post× IConcentratedi -1.77 2.95
(11.37) (10.93)
Firm Controls Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes No
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes
Observations 5,218 5,218
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.62
Panel B: Concentrated Ownership with Long-Term Horizon
Post× ILong−Concentratedi 14.10 13.35
(13.16) (13.21)
Firm Controls Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes No
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes
Observations 2,868 2,868
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.68
Notes: The table reports the change in credit spreads of credit loans during the crisis for firms with an
institutional owner that holds 10% or more of the common stock of the firm. To account for the heterogeneous
exposure to the shock, the sample is divided into firms that maintain relationships with financial institutions
highly exposed (LehmanExposurei is in the top 25% of the distribution) or less exposed (bottom 25%)
to the Lehman collapse. Lehman Exposure measures the exposure to the liquidity shock at the firm level




where yit is the credit spread for loans taken out by company i in quarter t. Postit is an indicator variable
that takes the value 1 between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the end of 2010, and 0 otherwise. In Panel A,
IConcentratedi is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for firms with an institutional investor that holds
10% or more of the common stock of the firm, and 0 otherwise, whereas in Panel B, ILong−Concentratedi is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 for firms with an institutional investor that holds 10% or more of the
common stock of the firm and has a long-term horizon as defined in Subsection 3.3.5.2, and 0 otherwise. X
are firm controls. I control for size (logarithm of assets), cash flow, leverage, cash holdings, interest expense,
and S&P rating. I include controls for bank characteristics (Z). Bank controls include assets, deposit ratio,
capital ratio, profitability, and provision for loan losses. ηs are industry fixed effects. Finally, I add bank
fixed effects ηb. In each column, I report estimated coefficients and their standard errors. Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered by firm.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.13: ATT Matching Estimator with Ownership
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Family Non-family Difference
Credit Spread
Before 174.91*** 158.37*** 16.54**




Notes: The table presents the results of the difference-in-differences Abadie and Imbens matching estima-
tor around the Lehman collapse, imposing treated and control firms to be similar in terms of observable
characteristics including the level of ownership. Treated firms are the family-controlled firms. The table
compares changes in the credit spreads between treated and control firms around the liquidity shock. The
dependent variables that have been considered are the credit spread, the maturity, and the amount of the
lending facilities.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.14: Alternative Definitions of Family Firms
(1) (2) (3)
Variables
Number of Family Firms High Lehman Low Lehman
Largest Voteholder 171 -58.04* 1.06
(31.72) (26.39)
Largest Shareholder 167 -58.04* 3.68
(31.72) (27.51)
Second Generation 145 -52.01** 23.59
(24.39) (18.07)
Notes: The table reports, for different definitions of a family firm, the coefficient of Postit× IFamilyi based





where yit is the credit spread for loans taken out by company i in quarter t. Postit is an indicator variable
that takes the value 1 between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the end of 2010, and 0 otherwise. IFamilyi is
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for family firms, and 0 for non-family firms. X are firm controls.
I control for size (logarithm of assets), cash flow, leverage, cash holdings, interest expense, and S&P rating.
I include controls for bank characteristics (Z). Bank controls include assets, deposit ratio, capital ratio,
profitability, and provision for loan losses. ηs are industry fixed effects. Finally, I add bank fixed effects
ηb. I consider three alternative definitions of family firms: (1) The family is the largest voteholder, (2) the
family is the largest shareholder, and (3) one or more family members from the second or later generations are
officers, directors, or stockholders. The sample is divided into firms that maintain relationships with financial
institutions highly exposed (LehmanExposurei is at the top 25% of the distribution) or less exposed (bottom
25%) to the Lehman collapse, so that I compare family and non-family firms with similar exposure to the
shock. Lehman Exposure measures the exposure to the liquidity shock at the firm level and is constructed
following Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010). Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered
by firm.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.15: Firm-Level Differences in Agency Conflicts
Panel A: Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables
High Lehman Low Lehman
High Leverage Low Leverage High Leverage Low Leverage
Post 227.39*** 237.06*** 124.39*** 110.12***
(59.01) (38.35) (43.67) (21.53)
IFamilyi 24.57 2.07 -23.95 -4.54
(22.37) (23.29) (28.80) (16.72)
Post× IFamilyi -102.41** -66.29 -33.81 -12.34
(45.60) (44.86) (46.81) (22.12)
Firm and Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 543 302 196 757
R2 0.38 0.65 0.34 0.39
Panel B: Altman’s Z-Score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Lehman Low Lehman
High Z-Score Low Z-Score High Z-Score Low Z-Score
Post 139.81*** 243.84*** 165.26*** 127.36***
(26.70) (28.10) (30.80) (22.18)
IFamilyi 37.02 37.44 10.56 -5.75
(23.41) (24.11) (27.43) (15.45)
Post× IFamilyi -68.24** -46.73 -25.28 25.67
(29.733) (36.608) (48.401) (21.35)
Firm and Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 576 329 304 683
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.63 0.40 0.43
Notes: The table presents the change in credit spreads during the crisis for family and non-family firms
based on the heterogeneous exposure to the shock and a firm-level measure of differences in ex-ante agency
conflicts. In Panel A, firms are divided based on their pre-crisis leverage, whereas in Panel B, firms are
divided based on their pre-crisis Altman’s Z-Score. The dependent variable is the loan credit spread. I
control for size (logarithm of assets), cash flow, leverage, cash holdings, interest expense, and S&P rating
and I include controls for bank characteristics - assets, deposit ratio, capital ratio, profitability, and provision
for loan losses. ηs are industry fixed effects. Finally, I add bank fixed effects ηb. In each column, I report
estimated coefficients and their standard errors. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are
clustered by firm.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.16: Family CEO and Credit Spread
(1) (2) (3)
Variables
All Loans Term Loans Credit Lines
Post 151.22*** 161.27*** 160.20***
(25.81) (46.09) (23.12)
ICEOi 14.16 28.16 16.22
(10.98) (24.44) (10.47)
Post× ICEOi -54.53*** -70.78* -49.30***
(20.44) (41.42) (18.22)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,411 418 993
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.50 0.54
Notes: The table explores the relationship between family CEOs and the cost of private debt for family
firms. The sample is restricted to family firms. ICEOi is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO
is a family member, and 0 otherwise. Column (1) incorporates all credit agreements, whereas column (2)
and (3) focus on term loans and credit lines, respectively. Firm controls include size (logarithm of assets),
cash flow, leverage, cash holdings, interest expense, and S&P rating, whereas bank controls include assets,
deposit ratio, capital ratio, profitability, and provision for loan losses. Furthermore, industry, and bank fixed
effects are included. In each column, I report estimated coefficients and their standard errors. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered by firm.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
187









Firm Controls Yes Yes
Observations 26,532 26,532
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.13
Notes: The table reports the relationship between family control and the incidence of violating a covenant.
The dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if a covenant has been violated, and 0
otherwise. Post is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the
end of 2010, and 0 otherwise. IFamilyi is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for family firms, and 0 for
non-family firms. Column (1) reports the impact of family control, whereas column (2) examines whether
there is a change in the relation between family control and covenant violation during the crisis. Firm
controls include size (logarithm of assets), cash flow, leverage, cash holdings, interest expense, and S&P
rating. In each column, I report estimated coefficients and their standard errors. Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and are clustered by firm.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.18: Control Covenants
Fraction with Control
Covenant
Fraction of Family Firms
0.17
Fraction of Family Firms With Voting






$100M - $250M 0.13
$250M - $500M 0.23
$500M - $1000M 0.23
$1000M - $2,500M 0.12
$2,500M - $5,000M 0.15
≥ $5,000M 0.15
Notes: The table provides information on the fraction of family-controlled firms that have ownership and
control covenants, as reported in the 10-K fillings.
189







Post× LehmanExposure 258.01** 222.10**
(44.94) (44.67)
Firm Controls No Yes
Bank Controls No Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 6,141 5,151
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.41
Notes: The table investigates the change in loan spreads during the crisis for the firms in my sample. I report
estimates of the following regression: yit = α+βPostit+γLehmanExposurei+δPostit×LehmanExposurei+
ζXit−1 + θZbt−1 + ηb + ηs + εit, where yit is the credit spread for loans taken out by company i in quarter
t. Postit is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the end of
2010, and 0 otherwise. Lehman Exposure measures the exposure to the liquidity shock and is constructed
following Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010). X are firm controls. I control for size (logarithm of assets), cash
flow, leverage, cash holdings, interest expense, and S&P rating. Furthermore, I include controls for bank
characteristics (Z). Bank controls include assets, deposit ratio, capital ratio, profitability, and provision for
loan losses. ηs are industry fixed effects. Finally, I add bank fixed effects ηb. In each column, I report
estimated coefficients and their standard errors. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are
clustered by firm.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.20: Credit Spread by Lehman Exposure for Term Loans and Credit Lines
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables
Term Loans Credit Lines
High Lehman Low Lehman High Lehman Low Lehman
Post 257.96*** 235.38*** 152.44*** 173.53*** 181.14*** 163.08*** 122.63*** 120.63***
(33.81) (62.37) (28.39) (40.77) (10.90) (18.26) (9.14) (14.57)
IFamilyi -19.30 -0.98 7.45 -3.06 30.27 26.38 -23.18 -11.35
(27.01) (21.53) (35.21) (37.30) (19.61) (17.01) (17.44) (9.51)
Post× IFamilyi -123.10*** -120.87*** -36.17 -25.15 -42.05* -46.95** 15.55 13.66
(40.47) (45.58) (41.22) (42.82) (23.73) (19.99) (16.38) (15.04)
Firm Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 614 471 409 359 829 740 1,043 974
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.37 0.22 0.23 0.45 0.56 0.35 0.46
Notes: The table presents the change in credit spreads during the crisis for family and non-family firms for
different loan types. The sample is divided into firms that maintain relationships with financial institutions
highly exposed (LehmanExposurei is in the top 25% of the distribution) or less exposed (bottom 25%) to the
Lehman collapse, so that I compare family and non-family firms with similar exposure to the shock.Lehman
Exposure measures the exposure to the liquidity shock at the firm level and is constructed following Ivashina
and Scharfstein (2010). I report estimates of the following regression: yit = α+βPostit+γI
Family
i +δPostit×
IFamilyi + ζXi,t−1 + θZb,t−1 + ηb + ηs + εit, where yit is the credit spread for loans taken out by company i
in quarter t. Postit is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 between the fourth quarter of 2008 and
the end of 2010, and 0 otherwise. IFamilyi is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for family firms, and
0 for non-family firms. X are firm controls. I control for size (logarithm of assets), cash flow, leverage, cash
holdings, interest expense, and S&P rating. Furthermore, I include controls for bank characteristics (Z).
Bank controls include assets, deposit ratio, capital ratio, profitability, and provision for loan losses. ηs are
industry fixed effects. Finally, I add bank fixed effects ηb. In each column, I report estimated coefficients
and their standard errors. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered by firm.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
191
Table 3.21: Family Control and Credit Spread - Continuous Lehman Measure
(1) (2) (3)
Variables
All Loans Term Loans Credit Lines
Post 141.25*** 159.81*** 130.45***
(15.82) (28.01) (12.15)
IFamilyi -16.95 -21.05 -20.13
(11.42) (15.57) (12.39)
LehmanExposure -23.71 -48.63 6.02
(74.66) (86.54) (63.78)
Post× IFamilyi 11.50 16.26 19.95
(19.85) (33.72) (19.78)
Post× LehmanExposure 359.17*** 387.79** 259.30**
(136.55) (197.01) (104.72)
IFamilyi × LehmanExposure 302.92** 225.16* 341.95*
(148.904) (132.528) (177.309)
Post× IFamilyi × LehmanExposure -522.36** -549.71** -510.95**
(233.82) (276.89) (251.65)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,075 1,507 3,568
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.38 0.52
Notes: The table presents the change in credit spreads during the crisis for family and non-family firms
for different loan types based on the heterogeneous exposure to the shock. LehmanExposurei measures the
exposure to the liquidity shock at the firm level and is constructed following Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010).





Postit + νFamilyi × LehmanExposurei + δPostit × LehmanExposurei + φPostit × LehmanExposurei ×
IFamilyi + ζXi,t−1 + χZb,t−1 + ηbi + ηs + εit, where yit is the credit spread for loans taken out by company
i in quarter t. Postit is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 between the fourth quarter of 2008 and
the end of 2010, and 0 otherwise. IFamilyi is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for family firms, and
0 for non-family firms. X are firm controls. I control for size (logarithm of assets), cash flow, leverage, cash
holdings, interest expense, and S&P rating. Furthermore, I include controls for bank characteristics (Z).
Bank controls include assets, deposit ratio, capital ratio, profitability, and provision for loan losses. ηs are
industry fixed effects. Finally, I add bank fixed effects ηb. In each column, I report estimated coefficients
and their standard errors. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered by firm.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.22: Credit Spread - High/Low Delta
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables
High Delta Low Delta
All Loans Term Loans Credit Lines All Loans Term Loans Credit Lines
Post 229.78*** 298.11*** 176.13*** 113.89*** 78.70** 116.14***
(34.67) (65.55) (22.62) (15.95) (37.32) (14.13)
IFamilyi 7.81 -16.93 10.66 0.45 11.27 -8.07
(17.53) (26.07) (17.95) (11.27) (30.49) (8.86)
Post× IFamilyi -59.42** -84.71** -21.76 -15.86 -32.75 -3.74
(31.28) (50.18) (27.12) (14.88) (35.78) (13.34)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,188 523 665 1,328 277 1,051
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.37 0.49 0.44 0.42 0.51
Notes: The table presents the change in credit spreads during the crisis for family and non-family firms for
different loan types based on the heterogeneous exposure to the shock. The sample is divided into firms that
maintain relationships with financial institutions highly exposed (∆L̃i,s is in the top 25% of the distribution)
or less exposed (bottom 25%) to the Lehman collapse. ∆L̃i,s measures the availability of bank credit at the
firm level and is constructed following Chodorow-Reich (2014). The dependent variable is the credit spread
on loans. I report estimates of the following regression: yit = α+ βPostit + γI
Family
i + δPostit × I
Family
i +
ζXi,t−1 + θZb,t−1 + ηt + ηb + ηs + εit, where yit is the credit spread for loans taken out by company i in
quarter t. Postit is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the
end of 2010, and 0 otherwise. IFamilyi is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for family firms, and 0
for non-family firms. X are firm controls. I control for size (logarithm of assets), cash flow, leverage, cash
holdings, interest expense, and S&P rating. Furthermore, I include controls for bank characteristics (Z).
Bank controls include assets, deposit ratio, capital ratio, profitability, and provision for loan losses. ηt are
year fixed effects and ηs are industry fixed effects. Finally, I add bank fixed effects ηb. In each column, I
report estimated coefficients and their standard errors. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
are clustered by firm.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.23: Demand Effects
(1) (2)
Variables





Post× IFamilyi -59.32** -15.41
(26.20) (20.25)
Firm Controls Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 813 880
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.42
Notes: The table focuses on the subsample of firms borrowing the same type of loan from the same
lender during the crisis and presents the change in credit spreads during the crisis for family and non-
family firms accounting for the heterogeneous exposure to the shock. The sample is divided into firms
that maintain relationships with financial institutions highly exposed (LehmanExposurei is in the top 25%
of the distribution) or less exposed (bottom 25%) to the Lehman collapse. Lehman Exposure measures
the exposure to the liquidity shock at the firm level and is constructed following Ivashina and Scharfstein
(2010). The dependent variable is the credit spread on loans. I report estimates of the following regression:
yit = α+ βPostit + γI
Family
i + δPostit × I
Family
i + ζXi,t−1 + θZb,t−1 + ηb + ηs + εit, where yit is the credit
spread for loans taken out by company i in quarter t. Postit is an indicator variable that takes the value
1 between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the end of 2010, and 0 otherwise. IFamilyi is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 for family firms, and 0 for non-family firms. X are firm controls. I control for size
(logarithm of assets), cash flow, leverage, cash holdings, interest expense, and S&P rating. Furthermore,
I include controls for bank characteristics (Z). Bank controls include assets, deposit ratio, capital ratio,
profitability, and provision for loan losses. ηs are industry fixed effects. Finally, I add bank fixed effects
ηb. In each column, I report estimated coefficients and their standard errors. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and are clustered by firm.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.24: Family Control and Strictness
(1) (2)
Variables





Post× IFamilyi 0.020 -0.014
(0.013) (0.012)
Firm Controls Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 1,332 1,453
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.05
Notes: The table explores the change in covenant strictness during the crisis for family and non-family
firms. The sample is divided into firms that maintain relationships with financial institutions highly exposed
(LehmanExposurei is in the top 25% of the distribution) or less exposed (bottom 25%) to the Lehman
collapse, so that I compare family and non-family firms with similar exposure to the shock. Lehman Exposure
measures the exposure to the liquidity shock at the firm level and is constructed following Ivashina and
Scharfstein (2010). The dependent variable is the covenant strictness measure constructed following Murfin
(2012) that reflects the probability that a firm violates any of the covenants over the next quarter. I report
estimates of the following regression: yit = α+βPostit +γI
Family
i + δPostit× I
Family
i + ζXi,t−1 + θZb,t−1 +
ηb + ηs + εit. Postit is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 between the fourth quarter of 2008 and
the end of 2010, and 0 otherwise. IFamilyi is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for family firms, and
0 for non-family firms. X are firm controls. I control for size (logarithm of assets), cash flow, leverage, cash
holdings, interest expense, and S&P rating. Furthermore, I include controls for bank characteristics (Z).
Bank controls include assets, deposit ratio, capital ratio, profitability, and provision for loan losses. ηs are
industry fixed effects. Finally, I add bank fixed effects ηb. In each column, I report estimated coefficients
and their standard errors. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered by firm.
Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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